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BURGOYNE'S  INVASION  OF  1777 S° 

THE   TAKING  OF   LOUISBURG 50 

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Uectsifoe  (Efoents  in  American  f&tstorg 

THE 

BATTLE    OF    GETTYSBURG 
1863 


BY 

SAMUEL    ADAMS    DRAKE 

AUTHOR  OF  "BUKGOYNE'S  INVASION,"   "TAKING    OF 

LOUISBURG,"    ETC. 


"The  world  will  little  note,  nor  long  remember,  what  we  say  here" 

ABRAHAM  LINCOLN 


BOSTON 

LEE     AND     SHEPARD     PUBLISHERS 
10    MILK    STREET 
1892 


Copyright,  1891 
By    LEE    AND     SHEPARD 


THE    BATTLE    OF    GETTYSBURG 


PRESS  or 

Sothfartll  an&  Cij 

BOSTON 


CONTENTS. 


I.  GETTYSBURG 9 

II.  THE  MARCH  INTO  PENNSYLVANIA      ....  23 

III.  FIRST  EFFECTS  OF  THE  INVASION       ....  34 

IV.  REYNOLDS 46 

V.  THE  FIRST  OF  JULY 60 

VI.  CEMETERY  HILL 81 

VII.  THE  SECOND  OF  JULY 97 

VIII.  THE  SECOND  OF  JULY  —  continued     ....  112 

IX.  THE  THIRD  OF  JULY 132 

X1.  THE  RETREAT 150 

XI.  THINGS  BY  THE  WAY  .  160 


M17S908 


THE   BATTLE   OF   GETTYSBURG 

1863 


GETTYSBURG  1 

STRIPPED  of  the  glamour  which  has  made   its 
every  stick  and  stone  an  object  of  eager   curiosity 
or  pious  veneration,  Gettysburg  becomes  a  very 
plain,  matter-of-fact  Pennsylvania  town,  of  no  par 
ticular  antiquity,  with   a   very   decided 

The  Town. 

Dutch  flavor  in  the  names  and  on  the 
tongues  of  its  citizens,  where  no  great  man  has 
ever  flourished,  or  anything  had  happened  to 
cause  its  own  name  to  be  noised  abroad,  until 
one  day  in  the  eventful  year  1863 — the  battle 
year  —  fame  was  suddenly  thrust  upon  it,  as 
one  might  say,  not  for  a  day,  -but  for  all  time. 
The  dead  who  sleep  in  the  National  Cemetery 2 
here,  or  who  lie  in  unknown  graves  about  the 


BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 


fields  and  woods,  and  counting  many  times  more 
than  the  living,  help  us  to  understand  how  much 
greater  was  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  than  the 
town  which  has  given  it  its  name. 

Gettysburg  is  the  market  town  —  or  borough, 
accurately  speaking  —  of  an  exclusively  farming 
population,  planted  in  one  of  the  most  productive 
sections  of  the  Keystone  State.  It  is  the  seat  of 
justice  of  the  county.  It  has  a  seminary  and  col 
lege  of  the  German  Lutheran  Church,  which  give 
a  certain  tone  and  cast  to  its  social  life.  In  short, 
Gettysburg  seems  in  all  things  so  entirely  devoted 
to  the  pursuits  of  peace,  there  is  so  little  that  is 
suggestive  of  war  and  bloodshed,  even  if  time  had 
not  mostly  effaced  all  traces  of  that  gigantic  strug 
gle,3  that,  coming  as  we  do  with  'one  absorbing 
idea  in  mind,  we  find  it  hard  to  reconcile  the  facts 
of  history  with  the  facts  as  we  find  them. 

There  is  another  side  to  Gettysburg  —  a  pictur 
esque,  a  captivating  side.  One  looks  around  upon 
the  landscape  with  simple  admiration.  One's 
The  highest  praise  comes  from  the  feeling 

Landscape.         Qf    quiet     satisfaction     wjth      which     the 

harmony  of  nature  reveals  the   harmony  of  God. 


GETTYSBURG  1 1 

You  are  among  the  subsiding  swells  that  the 
South  Mountain  has  sent  rippling  off  to  the  east. 
So  completely  is  the  village  hid  away  among 
these  green  swells  that  neither  spire  nor  steeple 
is  seen  until,  upon  turning  one  of  the  numerous 
low  ridges  by  which  the  face  of  the  country  is  so 
cut  up,  you  enter  a  valley,  not  deep,  but  well 
defined  by  two  opposite  ranges  of  heights,  and 
Gettysburg  lies  gleaming  in  the  declining  sun 
before  you  —  a  picture  to  be  long  remembered. 
Its  situation  is  charming.  Here  and  there  a 
bald  ridge  or  wooded  hill,  the  name  of  which 
you  do  not  yet  know,  is  pushed  or  bristles  up 
above  the  undulating  prairie-land,  but  there  is  not 
one  really  harsh  feature  in  the  landscape.  In  full 
view  off  to  the  northwest,  but  softened  by  the 
gauzy  haze  of  a  midsummer's  afternoon,  the 
towering  bulk  of  the  South  Mountain,  vanguard 
of  the  serried  chain  behind  it,  looms  imposingly 
up  between  Gettysburg  and  the  Cumberland  Val 
ley,  still  beyond,  in  the  west,  as  landmark  for  all 
the  country  round,  as  well  as  for  the  great  battle 
field  now  spreading  out  its  long  leagues  before 
you ;  a  monument  more  aged  than  the  Pyramids, 


12  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

which  Napoleon,  a  supremely  imaginative  and 
magnetic  man  himself,  sought  to  invest  with  a 
human  quality  in  the  minds  of  his  veterans, 
when  he  said  to  them,  "  Soldiers !  from  the 
summits  of  yonder  Pyramids  forty  ages  behold 
you."  In  short,  the  whole  scene  is  one  of  such 
quiet  pastoral  beauty,  the  village  itself  with  its 
circlet  of  fields  and  farms  so  free  from  every  hint 
of  strife  and  carnage,  that  again  and  again  we  ask 
ourselves  if  it  can  be  true  that  one  of  the  greatest 
conflicts  of  modern  times  was  lost  and  won  here. 

Yet  this,  and  this  alone,  is  what  has  caused 
Gettysburg,  the  obscure  country  village,  to  be 
inscribed  on  the  same  scroll  with  Blenheim,  and 
Waterloo,  and  Saratoga,  as  a  decisive  factor  in  the 
history  of  the  nations.  Great  deeds  have  lifted  it 
to  monumental  proportions.  As  Abraham  Lin 
coln  so  beautifully  said  when  dedicating  the 
National  Cemetery  here,  "  The  brave  men,  living 
and  dead,  who  struggled  here  have  consecrated  it 
far  above  our  power  to  add  or  detract.  The 
world  will  little  note,  nor  long  remember,  what  we 
say  here,  but  it  can  never  forget  what  they  did 
here." 


GETTYSBURG  1 3 

Those  noble  words  ought  to  be  the  guiding  in 
spiration  of  every  one  who  intends  adding  his  own 
feeble  impressions  of  this  great  battle  to  what  has 
been  said  before. 

The  strategic  importance  that  Gettysburg  sud- 
strategic  deiily  assumed  during  Lee's  invasion  of 
importance.  Pennsylvania,  in  July,  1863,  first  de 
mands  a  little  of  our  attention.  Yet  it  seems  cer 
tain  that  neither  Meade  nor  Lee  had  thought  of 
it  as  a  possible  battle-ground  until  accident  thrust 
it  upon  them.  At  his  first  setting  out  on  this 
campaign  Lee  had  not  been  able  to  say,  with  the 
map  before  him,  "  I  will  fight  a  battle  either  in 
this  or  that  place,"  because  he  had  marched  not 
toward,  but  away  from,  his  adversary,  and,  so  far 
as  can  be  known,  without  choosing  beforehand  a 
position  where  Meade  would  have  to  come  and 
attack  him.  For  his  part,  so  long  as  Meade  was 
only  following  Lee  about,  the  Union  general  can 
not  be  said  to  have  had  much  voice  in  the  matter. 
It  was  Lee  who  was  really  directing  Meade's 
march.  True  enough,  Meade  did  select  a  battle 
field,  but  not  here,  at  Gettysburg;  nor  do  we 
know,  nor  would  it  be  useful  to  inquire,  whether 


14  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

Lee  could  have  been  induced  to  fight  just  where 
Meade  wanted  him  to.  As  Lee  fought  at  Gettys 
burg  only  because  he  was  struck,  it  is  probably 
beyond  any  man's  power  to  say  that  if  this  had 
not  happened,  as  it  did,  Lee  would  have  marched 
on  toward  Baltimore,  knowing  that  Meade's  army 
lay  intrenched  in  his  path.  There  is  a 

Playing  at 

Blind-Man's-  homely  maxim  running  to  the  effect 
that  you  can  lead  a  horse  to  water, 
but  cannot  make  him  drink.  The  two  generals, 
therefore,  merely  launched  their  columns  out  hit 
or  miss,  like  men  playing  at  blind-man's-buff. 

Gettysburg  lies  at  the  apex  of  a  triangle  of 
which  Harrisburg  and  Baltimore  form  the  base 
angles,  at  north  and  south  —  Harrisburg  being 
only  thirty-six  and  Baltimore  about  fifty  miles 
distant.  York  and  Carlisle  also  lie  either  on 
or  so  near  this  triangle  as  to  come  within  its 
scope  as  a  basis  for  military  operations.  Placed 
at  Gettysburg,  an  army  threatened  all  of  these 
points. 

From  a  military  point  of  view  there  are  but  two 
features  about  Gettysburg  on  which  the  eye  would 
long  rest.  These  are  the  two  ridges,  with  a  broad 


GETTYSBURG  1 5 

valley  between,  heaved  up  at  east  and  west  and 
Topographical  running  off  south  of  the  town.  They 
Features.  stand  about  a  mile  apart,  though  the 


\Y  --;"IS 


Diagram  showing  strategic  value  of  Gettysburg.  H.,  Harrisburg; 
G.,  Gettysburg;  P.,  Philadelphia;  Y.,  York;  B.,  Baltimore;  W.,  Wash 
ington. 

distance  is  sometimes  less  than  that.     As  it  nears 
Gettysburg  the  easternmost  ridge  glides  down,  by 


1  6  THE   BATTLE   OF   GETTYSBURG 

a  gentle  slope,  into  what  may  be  called  a  plain, 
in  comparison  with  the  upheavals  around  it, 
although  it  is  by  no  means  a  dead  level.  Yet 
it  is  open  because  the  ridges  themselves  have 
stopped  short  here,  forming  headlands,  so  to 
speak,  above  the^  lower  swells.  On  coming  down 
off  this  ridge  the  descent  is  seen  to  be  quite 

Baltimore  and     CaSy  ~  in  faCt>  tWO    r°ads     ascend    ^    by 


Taneytown       so  gradual  a  rise  that  the  notion  of  its 

Roads. 

being  either  high  or  steep  is  quite  lost, 
and  you  are  ready  to  discard  off-hand  any  pre 
conceived  notion  about  its  being  a  natural  strong 
hold.  It  is  mostly  on  this  slope  that  Gettysburg 
Cemetery  is  built,  its  houses  extending  well  up 

toward  the  brow,  and  its  cemetery  oc 
cupying  the  brow  itself.  Hence,  although  the 
centre  of  Gettysburg  may  be  three-fourths  of  a 
mile  from  the  cemetery  gate,  the  town  site  is  in 
fact  but  a  lower  swell  of  the  historic  ridge  which 
has  since  taken  the  name  of  its  graveyard  — 
Cemetery  Ridge. 

Across  this  valley,  again,  the  western  ridge, 
which  looks  highest  from  the  town,  has  what 
Cemetery  Hill  has  not,  namely,  a  thin  fringe  of 


GETTYSBURG  I  / 

trees  skirting  its  entire  crest,  thus  effectually 
masking  the  view  in  that  direction ;  and  it  is 
further  distinguished  by  the  cupola  of  the  Lu- 
seminary  theran  Seminary,4  seen  rising  above 
Ridge.  trees  at  a  point  opposite  the  town,  and 

giving  its  name  to  this  ridge  —  Seminary  Ridge. 
Both  ranges  of  heights  are  quite  level  at  the  top, 
and  easily  traversed ;  so  also  the  slopes  of  both 
are  everywhere  easy  of  ascent,  the  ground  be 
tween  undulating,  but  nowhere,  except  far  down 
the  valley,  badly  cut  up  by  ravines  or  water 
courses.  Indeed,  better  ground  for  a  fair  stand- 
up  fight  it  would  be  hard  to  find ;  for  all  between 
the  two  ridges  is  so  clear  and  open  that  neither 
army  could  stir  out  toward  its  opponent  without 
being  detected  at  once  —  the  extreme  southern 
part  of  the  valley  excepted.  In  this  respect  I 
take  the  liberty  of  observing  that  the  actual  state 
of  things  proved  very  different  from  that  con 
veyed  in  some  of  the  published  accounts,  wherein 
Cemetery  Ridge  is  represented  as  a  sort  of  Gib 
raltar. 

A  very  brief  survey,  however,  suggests  that  an 
army  could  be  perfectly  hid  behind  the  trees  of 


1 8  THE   BATTLE  OF   GETTYSBURG 

Seminary  Ridge,  as  well  as  better  sheltered  from 
artillery  fire,  while  one  stretched  out  along  the 
bare  and  treeless  summit  of  Cemetery  Ridge 
would  be  without  such  screen  or  protection. 

The  description  must  be  a  little  farther  pur 
sued,  if  the  battle  is  to  be  at  all  intelligently 
followed. 

Enough  for  the  two  main  ridges  enclosing 
Gettysburg  and  its  valley.  We  come  now  to  that 
most  striking  feature  of  the  landscape,  notably  on 
the  side  of  Cemetery  Ridge,  but  more  or  less 
characteristic  of  both  sides  of  the  valley.  This  is 
the  group  of  hills  standing  off  from  Cemetery 
Ridge  at  either  end,  just  as  if,  at  some  remote 
time,  this  ridge  had  formed  a  continuous  chain,  the 
summits  of  which  had  been  cleanly  shaved  off  at 
the  centre,  leaving  these  isolated  clusters  to  show 
where  the  wasting  forces  had  passed.  From 
different  points  of  view  we  may  see  one  or  both 
of  them  rising  above  the  ridge  like  giant  watch- 
towers  set  at  the  extremities  of  some  high  em 
battled  wall. 

Let    us    first    take    the    northernmost   cluster, 
formed  of  Wolfs,  McAllister's,  and  Gulp's  hills, 


GETTYSBURG  19 

It   is  seen  to  be  thrown  back    behind 

Gulp's  Hill. 

Cemetery  Hill,  to  which  Gulp's  Hill 
alone  is  slenderly  attached  by  a  low  ridge,  so 
making  an  elbow  with  it,  or,  in  the  military  phrase, 
a  refused  line.  Between  Gulp's  Hill  and  Wolfs 
Hill  flows  Rock  Creek,  the  shallow  stream  so 
often  mentioned  in  connection  with  the  battle,  its 
course  lying  through  a  shaggy  ravine.5  The 
ravine  and  stream  of  Rock  Creek 
threw  Wolf's  Hill  somewhat  out  of 
the  true  line  of  defence,  but  the  merest  novice  in 
military  art  sees  at  a  glance  why  the  possession  of 
Gulp's  Hill  was  all-essential  to  the  security  of 
Cemetery  Hill,  since  there  is  little  use  in  shutting 
the  front  door  if  the  back  door  is  to  be  left 
standing  open. 

The  same  is  just  as  true  of  the  southernmost 
group,  composed  of  Little  and  Great  Round  Tops, 
two  exceedingly  picturesque  summits,  standing  up 
above  the  generally  monotonous  contours  about 
them  in  strong  relief.  They  also  were  wooded 
The  Round  ^rom  ^>ase  to  summit,  and  they  show, 
Tops.  even  more  distinctly  than  the  first 

group,  where  the  crushing  out  or  denuding  forces 


2O  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

have  been  at  work,  in  shelves  or  crevices  of  broken 
ledge  at  the  highest  points,  in  ugly  bowlders  crop- 

The  Devil's        P'm£  Out  °n    t^1G    sl°Pes>  m  mirv  gulllCS 

Den>  crawling  at  their  feet,  but  most  of  all  in 

the  deformed  heap  of  ripped-up  ledges,  topped 
with  coppices  and  scattered  trees,  thrust  out  from 
Little  Round  Top  and  known  as  the  Devil's  Den.6 

When  it  is  added  that  the  way  is  open  between 
the  two  Round  Tops  to  the  rear  of  Cemetery 
Ridge,  the  importance  of  holding  them  firmly  be 
comes  self-evident ;  and  inasmuch  as  the  greatest 
natural  strength  of  this  ridge  lay  at  its  extremi 
ties,  or  flanks,  so  its  weakness  would  result  from  a 
neglect  to  occupy  those  flanks. 

This  line  was  assailable  at  one  other  point.     As 

it  approaches  Little   Round  Top  the  ridge  sinks 

away  to  the  general  level  around  it,  or  so  as  to 

break  its  continuity,  thus  leaving  a  gap 

The  Swale. 

more  or  less  inviting  the  approach 
of  an  enemy.  The  whole  extent  of  this  crooked 
line,  at  which  we  have  just  glanced,  is  about  two 
and  a  half  miles. 

Down  below,  in  the  valley,  there  is  another 
swell  of  ground,  hardly  worth  dignifying  by  the 


GETTYSBURG  2 1 

name  of  ridge,  yet  assuming  a  certain  importance, 
Emmettsburg  nevertheless,  first  because  it  starts  from 
Road.  the  town  close  under  Cemetery  Hill, 

thence  crossing  the  valley  diagonally  till  it  be 
comes  merged  in  Seminary  Ridge,  at  a  point 
nearly  opposite  to  the  Round  Tops,  and  next 
because  the  Emmettsburg  road  runs  on  it.  In 
brief,  its  relation  to  the  battle  was  this :  it  ran  from 
the  Union  right  into  the  Confederate  right,  so 
traversing  the  entire  front  of  both  armies.  It  had 
an  important  part  to  play  in  the  second  day's 
battle,  as  we  shall  soon  see,  for,  though  occupying 
three  days,  Gettysburg  was  but  a  series  of  combats 
in  which  neither  army  employed  its  whole  force 
at  any  one  time. 

1  Gettysburg  is  the  county  seat  of  Adams  County ;  is  one  hundred 
and  fourteen  miles    west  of  Philadelphia.      Pennsylvania  College  is 
located  here. 

2  The    National    Cemetery    was   dedicated  by   Abraham   Lincoln, 
Nov.  19,  1863 ;  it  is  a  place  of  great  and  growing  interest  and  beauty. 
The   National   Monument  standing  on  this  ground,  where  sleeps  an 
army,  was    dedicated    by   General    Meade   in  1869.     The  monument 
itself  was  designed  by  J.  G.  Batterson,  of  Hartford,  Conn.,  the  statuary 
by   Randolph  Rogers.     In    1872  the  cemetery  was  transferred  to  the 
national  government.    A  large  part  of  the  adjoining  ridge  is  in  charge 
of  the   Gettysburg    Battlefield    Memorial    Association,  a   corporation 
formed  under  the  laws  of  Pennsylvania  for  the  preservation  of  the  field 


22  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

and  its  landmarks.     No   other  battle-ground   was  ever  so  distinctly 
marked  or  so  easily  traced  as  this. 

3  Shells  remain  sticking  in  the  walls   of  some    buildings  yet.    A 
memorial  stone  at  the  steps  in    front    of  the  Lutheran    church,   on 
Chambersburg  street,  indicates  the  spot  where  Chaplain  Howell,  of  the 
90th  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  was  shot  dead  while  entering  the  church, 
then  being  used  as  a  hospital. 

4  The  Lutheran  Seminary  was  used  both  as  a  hospital  and  observa 
tory  by  the  Confederates.      Lee's  headquarters  were  in  a  little  stone 
house  quite  near   the  seminary  buildings,  which  are  not  more  than 
half  a  mile  from  the  centre  of  Gettysburg. 

5  In  1863  all  these  hills  were  much  more  densely  wooded  than  now, 
so  forming  an  impenetrable  screen  to  their  defenders. 

6  The  bowlder-strewn  strip  of  ground  lying  between  Devil's  Den  and 
Little  Round  Top  is  the  most  impressive  part  of  the  field,  I  think. 


THE  MARCH   INTO   PENNSYLVANIA  23 


II 

THE   MARCH   INTO    PENNSYLVANIA 

IT  is  in  no  way  essential  to  relate  in  detail  how 
Lee's  army,  slipping  away  from  ours  on  the 
Rappahannock,1  and  after  brushing  out  of  its 
Lee  in  path  our  troops  posted  in  the  Shen- 

Maryiand.  andoah  Valley,  had  been  crossing  the 
Potomac  into  Maryland  since  the  2ist  of  June, 
by  way  of  the  Cumberland  Valley,  without  firing 
a  shot.2 

A  very  unusual  thing  in  war  it  is  to  see  an 
army  which  has  just  been  acting  strictly  on  the 
His  Bold  defensive  suddenly  elude  its  adversary 
strategy.  for  fae  purpose  of  carrying  the  war 
into  that  enemy's  country !  It  marks  a  new 
epoch  in  the  history  of  that  war,  and  it  supposes 
wholly  altered  conditions.  In  this  particular  in 
stance  Lee's  moves  were  so  bold  as  almost  to 
savor  of  contempt. 

It   is  enough  to  know    that    Lee   was    now    in 


24  THE   BATTLE  OF   GETTYSBURG 

Pennsylvania,  at  the  head  of  seventy  thousand 
men,  before  our  army  reached  the  Potomac  in 
pursuit  of  him,  if  following  at  a  respectful  distance 
be  called  a  pursuit. 

At  no  period  of  the  war,  their  own  officers  said, 
had  the  Confederates  been  so  well  equipped,  so 
state  of  well  clothed,  so  eager  for  a  fight,  or  so 
his  Army.  confident  of  success ;  and  we  may 
add  our  own  conclusions,  that  never  before  had 
this  army  taken  the  field  so  strong  in  numbers,  or 
with  such  a  powerful  artillery.3 

The  infantry  were  armed  with  Enfield  rifles, 
fresh  from  British  workshops,  and  it  is  probable 
that  no  equal  number  of  men  ever  knew  how  to 
use  them  better.  Indeed,  we  consider  it  indis- 

• 

putable  that  the  Confederates  greatly  excelled  the 
Union  soldiers  as  marksmen.  Most  of  them  were 
superiority  accustomed  to  the  use  of  firearms  from 
as  Marks-  boyhood ;  in  some  sections  they  were 
noted  for  their  skill  with  the  rifle.  The 
Confederates,  therefore,  were  nearly  always  good 
shots  before  they  went  into  the  army,  while  the 
Union  soldiers  mostly  had  to  acquire  what  skill 
they  could  after  going  into  the  ranks.  In  the 


THE  MARCH   INTO  PENNSYLVANIA  2$ 

South  the  habit  of  carrying  arms  was  almost  uni 
versal  :  in  the  North  it  was  not  only  unusual,  but 
unpopular  as  well  as  unlawful. 

Man  for  man,  the  Confederate  cavalry  was  also 
superior  to  the  Union  horse,  because  in  one  sec- 
Superiority  tion  riding  is  a  custom,  in  the  other  a 
in  cavalry.  pastime  rarely  indulged  in.  Conse 
quently,  it  took  months  to  teach  a  Union  cavalry 
man  how  to  ride,  —  a  costly  experiment  when  your 
adversary  is  already  prepared,  —  whereas  if  there 
is  anything  a  Southerner  piques  himself  upon,  it 
is  his  horsemanship. 

Lee's  cavalry  had  preceded  the  infantry  by 
nearly  a  week,  reaching  Chambersburg  on  the 
cavalry  1 6th,  seizing  horses  and  provisions  for 

Advance.  faG  use  of  ^g  army  behind  them,  and 

spreading  consternation  to  the  gates  of  Harris- 
burg  itself.  Having  loaded  themselves  with 
plunder  unopposed,  they  then  fell  back  upon  the 
main  army,  thus  leaving  it  in  some  doubt  whether 

Cumberland  ^hlS  ra^  h&d  accomplished  all  it  de- 
Valley  signed,  or  was  only  the  prelude  to 

raided. 

something    for   which    it   was    serving 
as  a  mask.5 


26  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

All  doubts  were  set  at  rest,  however,  when,  on  the 
23d,  Swell's  dust-begrimed  infantry  came  tramp 
ing  into  Chambersburg,  regiment  after  regiment, 
hour  after  hour,  until  the  streets  fairly  swarmed 
Eweii  at  Cham- with  them.  Though  the  houses  were 
bersburg.  g^t  Up?  a  few  citizens  were  in  the 
streets,  or  looking  out  of  their  windows  at  the 
passing  show,  as  men  might  at  the  gathering 
of  a  storm-cloud  about  to  burst  with  destructive 
fury  upon  them ;  and  though  the  time  was  hardly 
one  for  merriment,  we  are  assured  that  some  of 
these  lookers-on  could  not  refrain  from  "  pointing 
and  laughing  at  Hood's  ragged  Jacks "  as  they 
marched  along  to  the  tune  of  "  Dixie's  Land." 
"  This  division,"  remarks  the  partial  narrator,  "  well 
known  for  its  fighting  qualities,  is  composed  of 
Hood's  Texans,  Alabamians,  and  Arkansians, 

Soldiers.  ancj   ^Qy  certainly  are  a   queer  lot  to 

look  at.  They  carry  less  than  any  other  troops ; 
many  of  them  have  only  got  an  old  piece  of 
carpet  or  rug  as  baggage ;  many  have  discarded 
their  shoes  in  the  mud ;  all  are  ragged  and  dirty, 
but  full  of  good-humor  and  confidence  in  them 
selves  and  their  general.6  They  answered  the 


THE  MARCH   INTO   PENNSYLVANIA  2/ 

numerous  taunts  of  the  Chambersburg  ladies  with 
cheers  and  laughter."  To  the  scowling  citizens 
the  Confederates  would  call  out  from  the  ranks, 
"Well,  Yank,  how  far  to  Harrisburg?  How  far  to 
Baltimore?  What's  the  charge  at  the  Continen 
tal?"  or  some  such  innocuous  bits  of  irony  as  came 
into  heads  turned,  no  doubt,  at  the  thought  of 
standing  unchallenged  on  Northern  soil,  where 
nothing  but  themselves  recalled  war  or  its  terrors, 
or  at  sight  of  the  many  evidences  of  comfort  and 
thrift  to  which  they  themselves  were  strangers. 
But  we  shall  meet  these  exultant  ragamuffins  ere 
long  under  far  different  circumstances. 

This  was  Lee's  corps  of  observation,  destined 
to  do  most  of  the  hard  marching  and  fighting 
which  usually  falls  to  the  lot  of  the  cavalry,  as  it 
was  mostly  composed  of  old,  well-seasoned  soldiers, 
who  had  been  accustomed,  under  the  lead  of  Jack 
son,  to  win  their  victories  largely  with  their 
legs.  Part  marched  through  the  town,  and  went 
into  camp  on  the  Carlisle  road,  part  occupied 
the  pike  leading  toward  Gettysburg ;  sentries  were 
posted  in  the  streets,  a  military  commandant 
was  appointed,  and  for  the  time  being  Chambers- 


28  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

burg  fell  wholly  under  rebel  rule,  which,  so  long  as 
it  remained  the  army  headquarters,  we  are  bound 
to  say  does  not  appear  to  have  been  more  onerous 
than  circumstances  would  warrant. 

Ewell's  corps  was  followed,  at  one  day's  march, 
by  the  main  body,  comprising  Hill's  and  Long- 
Main  Army  street's  corps,  with  whom  marched  Lee 
comes  up.  himself,  the  man  on  whom  all  eyes, 
North  and  South,  were  now  turned. 

As  soon  as  the  main  body  had  come  up  Ewell 
moved  straight  on  toward  Carlisle  and  Harrisburg 
Eweii  to  with  two  divisions,  while  his  third  turned 
Carlisle.  off  to  fae  east>  toward  York,  with  the 

view  of  drawing  attention  away  from  the  main 
object  by  seeming  to  threaten  Baltimore  or  Phila- 
Eariyto  delphia.7  It  was  to  strike  the  Susque- 
York.  hanna  at  Columbia,  and  get  possession 

of  the  railway  bridge  there,  as  a  means  of  passing 
over  to  the  north  side  of  that  river  to  Harrisburg. 

This  division  (Early's)  passed  through  Gettys 
burg  on  the  26th,8  reaching  York  the  next  day. 
On  the  28th  his  advance  arrived  at  the  Susque- 
Eariy  at  hanna  too  late  to  save  the  railway  bridge 
Gettysburg.  from  the  flames>9  Qn  this  same  day 


THE  MARCH    INTO   PENNSYLVANIA  29 

Ewell's  advance  encamped  within  four  miles  of 
Harrisburg,  where  some  skirmishing  took  place. 

Here,  then,  was  Lee  firmly  installed  within  strik 
ing  distance  of  the  capital  of  the  great  Keystone 
State,  and  by  no  means  at  so  great  a  distance 
Region  seized  from  Philadelphia  or  Washington  as 
by  Lee.  not  to  make  his  presence  felt  in  both 

cities  at  once. 

If  he  had  not  come  prepared  to  fight  every 
soldier  that  the  Federal  government  could  bring 
against  him  —  to  fight  even  against  odds  —  what 
was  he  doing  here  in  the  heart  of  Pennsylvania? 

The  army  which  followed  Lee  into  Pennsylvania 
was  brave  and  devoted  —  none  more  so.  It 
looked  up  to  him  with  a  species  of  adoration, 
born  of  an  abiding  faith  in  his  genius.  Reason- 
Spirit  of  his  ing  fr°m  experience,  the  belief  that 
Army-  it  would  continue  to  beat  the  Union 

army  was  not  unfounded.  At  any  rate,  it  was 
universal.  Thus  led,  and  imbued  with  such  a 
spirit,  no  wonder  the  Confederate  army  consid 
ered  itself  invincible. 

Thus  followed,  Lee,  or  Uncle  Robert,  as  he  was 
familiarly  called  by  his  soldiers,  though  no  man 


3<D  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

could  be  more  aristocratic  in  his  tastes  or  man 
ners,  was  accustomed  to  exact  greater  efforts  from 
them,  both  in  marching  and  fighting,  than  the 
Union  generals  ordinarily  could  from  their  better- 
fed,  better-clothed,  and  better-disciplined  troops. 

A  pen  portrait  of  General  Lee  himself,  as  he 
appeared  at  this  time,  seems  necessary  to  the 
historical  completeness  of  this  sketch.  It  is  drawn 
by  a  British  colonel,10  on  leave  with  Lee's  army, 
where  he  found  himself  quite  at  home.  He  says: 
Lee's  "  General  Leejs,  almost  without  excep- 

Portrait.  tion,  the  handsomest  man  of  his  age  I 
ever  saw.  He  is  fifty-six  years  old,  tall,  broad- 
shouldered,  very  well  made,  well  set  up — a 
thorough  soldier  in  appearance ;  and  his  manners 
are  courteous  and  full  of  dignity.  He  generally 
wears  a  well-worn  long  gray  jacket,  a  high  black 
felt  hat,  and  blue  trousers  tucked  into  his  Wel 
lington  boots.  I  never  saw  him  carry  arms,  and 
the  only  marks  of  military  rank  are  the  three  stars 
on  his  collar.  He  rides  a  handsome  horse  which 
is  extremely  well  groomed.  He  himself  is  very 
neat  in  his  dress  and  person,  and  in  the  most 
arduous  marches,  as  after  the  retreat  from  Gettys- 


THE  MARCH   INTO   PENNSYLVANIA 


burg,  when    everybody  else    looked  and  was  ex 
tremely  dirty,  he  always  looked  smart  and  clean." 
In    an  order  commending   the  behavior  of  his 


Positions,  June  28th. 

men  while  on  the  march,  Lee  called  attention  to 
certain  excesses  which  he  declared  his  intention 
of  repressing  in  a  summary  manner. 

The  region  to  which  the  Confederate  operations 
were  now  confined  is  indicated  by  the  accompany- 


32  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

ing  map.     It  will  be  seen  that  Lee  had  not  hesi 
tated  to  scatter  his  army  considerably. 

Leaving  Ewell  before  Harrisburg,  Early  at 
York,  and  Lee  himself  at  Chambersburg,  we  will 
look  first  at  the  state  of  feeling  brought  about 
by  this  daring  invasion,  which  had  been  urged 
from  Richmond  on  the  theory  that  the  road  to 
peace  lay  through  Pennsylvania,  via  Washington. 

1  He  withdrew  two  corps,  by  his  left,  to  Culpepper,  leaving  one  in 
the  trenches  of  Fredericksburg.  Had  this  corps  been  crushed  while 
thus  isolated,  as  it  ought,  Lee's  invasion  must  have  ended  then  and 
there. 

*  A  glance  at  the  map  shows  how  the  northerly  bend  of  the  Potomac 
facilitated  an  invasion  by  this  route.  The  outposts  at  Harper's  Ferry 
and  Winchester  having  been  forced,  there  was  nothing  to  stop  the 
enemy's  advance. 

3  The  Confederate  army  comprised  three  infantry  corps,  and  one  of 
cavalry.     Each  corps  had  three  divisions,  each  division  averaged  a  little 
over  four  brigades,  of  which  there  were  thirty-seven  present  at  Gettys 
burg.     The  British  Colonel  Freemantle,  who  accompanied  Lee's  army, 
puts  the  strength  of  these  brigades  at  two  thousand  eight  hundred  men 
each.    The  relative  strength  of  the  army  corps  was  more  nearly  equal 
than  in  those  of  the  Union  army.     The  Confederates  brought  with  them 
two  hundred  and  seventy  pieces  of  artillery. 

4  The   main  body,  under  Stuart,  had  gone   around  the  rear  of  the 
Union  army,   by  Lee's  permission,  in  the  expectation   of  harassing  it 
while  on  the  march,  and  of  then  rejoining  Ewell,  on  the  Susquehanna. 
It  failed  to  do  either,  and  many  attribute  all  of  Lee's  misfortunes  in  this 
campaign  to  the  absence  of  Stuart. 


THE  MARCH   INTO   PENNSYLVANIA  33 

5  Jenkins,  who  commanded,  was  paid  in  his  own  coin  at  Chambers- 
burg,  by  the  proffer  of  Confederate  scrip  in  payment  for  some  alleged 
stolen  horses.  He  himself  had  been  professedly  paying  for  certain 
seized  property  in  this  same  worthless  scrip. 

6 Contrast  this  with  the  generous,  even  prodigal,  way  the  Union 
soldiers  were  provided  for,  and  who  can  doubt  the  devotion  of  these 
ragged  Confederates  to  their  cause? 

7  So  long  as  this  division  remained  at  York ,  the  question  as  to  where 
Lee  meant  to  concentrate  would  be  still  further  confused.    See  diagram. 

8  Early  levied  a  contribution  on  the  borough,  which  the  town  council 
evaded  by  pleading  poverty. 

9  A  small  Union  force  which  had  been  holding  the  bridge  set  it  on 
fire  on  the  approach  of  the  Confederates. 

10  This  was  Colonel  Freemantle,  who  has  a  good  word  for  everything 
Confederate.     On  being  courteously  received  within  the  Union  lines 
after  Gettysburg,  he  was  much  surprised  to  find  that  the  officers  were 
gentlemen. 


34  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 


III 

FIRST   EFFECTS    OF  THE   INVASION 

MEANTIME,  from  before  and  behind  the  Con 
federate  columns,  two  streams  flowed  out  of  the 
doomed  valley :  one  to  the  north,  an  army  of  fugi 
tives  hurrying  their  flocks,  herds,  and  household 
goods  out  of  the  enemy's  reach ;  the  other  carry 
ing  off  to  Virginia  the  plunder  of  towns  and  vil 
lages. 

As  the  swarm  of  fugitives  made  straight  for 
Harrisburg,  it  was  but  natural  that  the  inpouring 
of  such  panic-stricken  throngs,  all  declaring  that 
the  enemy  was  close  behind  them,  should  throw 
Harrisburg  that  city  into  the  wildest  commotion, 
alarmed.  which  every  hour  tended  to  increase. 
We  will  let  an  eye-witness  describe  the  events  of 
a  single  day. 

"The  morning  broke  upon  a  populace  all  astir, 
who  had  been  called  out  of  bed  by  the  beat  of 
the  alarming  drum,  the  blast  of  the  bugle,  and 


FIRST  EFFECTS   OF  THE  INVASION  35 

the  clanging  of  bells.  The  streets  were  lively  with 
men,  who  were  either  returning  from  a  night's 
work  on  the  fortifications  or  going  over  to  relieve 
those  who  were  toiling  there.  As  the  sun  rose 
higher  the  excitement  gathered  head.  All  along 
the  streets  were  omnibuses,  wagons,  and  wheel 
barrows,  taking  in  trunks  and  valuables  and  rush 
ing  them  down  to  the  dep6t  to  be  shipped  out  of 
rebel  range.  The  stores,  the  female  seminaries, 
and  almost  every  private  residence  were  busy  all 
of  the  forenoon  in  swelling  the  mountain  of  freight 
that  lay  at  the  dep6t.  Every  horse  was  impressed 
into  service  and  every  porter  groaned  beneath  his 
burdens. 

"  The  scene  at  the  depots  was  indescribable,  if 
not  disgraceful.  A  sweltering  mass  of  humanity 
People  desert  thronged  the  platforms,  all  furious  to 
the  city.  escape  from  the  doomed  city.  At  the 
bridge  and  across  the  river  the  scene  was  equally 
exciting.  All  through  the  day  a  steady  stream  of 
people,  on  foot  and  in  wagons,  young  and  old, 
black  and  white,  was  pouring  across  it  from  the 
Cumberland  Valley,  bearing  with  them  their  house 
hold  goods  and  live-stock.  Endless  trains,  laden 


36  THE  BATTLE  OF   GETTYSBURG 

with  flour,  grain,  and  merchandise,  hourly  emerged 
from  the  valley  and  thundered  across  the  bridge 
and  through  the  city.  Miles  of  retreating  bag 
gage-wagons,  filled  with  calves  and  sheep  tied  to 
gether,  and  great,  old-fashioned  furnace-wagons 
loaded  with  tons  of  trunks  and  boxes,  defiled  in 
continuous  procession  down  the  'pike  and  across 
the  river,  raising  a  dust  as  far  as  the  eye  could 
see." 

It  may  be  added  that  the  records  of  the  State 
and  the  money  in  the  bank-vaults  were  also  re 
moved  to  places  of  safety,  a'nd  the  construc- 
Precautions  t^on  °*  defensive  works  was  begun,  as 
taken.  much,  perhaps,  with  the  purpose  of 

allaying  the  popular  excitement  as  from  any  hope 
of  holding  the  city  against  Lee,  since  Harrisburg 
was  in  no  condition  either  to  stand  a  siege  or 
repel  an  assault  at  this  time. 

The  wave  of  invasion  made  itself  felt  even  as 
far  as  Pittsburg  on  the  one  side  and  Baltimore  on 
the  other.1  Governor  Curtin  promptly  called  on 
the  people  of  Pennsylvania  to  arm  and  repel  the 
invader.  Yet  neither  the  imminence  of  the  dan 
ger  nor  the  stirring  appeal  of  the  executive  of  the 


FIRST  EFFECTS  OF  THE  INVASION  37 

State  could  arouse  them   at  first.     In  the  emer 
gency  the   neighboring    States   were   appealed   to 
for  help.     In  response  the  militia  of  those  States 
were      soon     hastening      toward      the 

Militia 

hurried  to  threatened  points  2  by  every  available 
route ;  yet  it  was  only  too  evident  that 
raw  soldiers,  no  matter  how  zealous  or  patriotic, 
would  prove  little  hinderance  to  Lee's  marching 
where  he  would,  or  long  dispute  with  his  veterans 
the  possession  of  Harrisburg  were  it  once  seriously 
attacked. 

But  where  was  the  army  of  the  Potomac  all  this 
time  —  the  army  whose  special  task  it  was  to  stand 
between  this  invader  and  his  prey?  Must  unarmed 
citizens  be  called  upon  to  arise  and  defend  their 
homes  when  a  hundred  thousand  veterans  were  in 
the  field? 

For  more  than  a  week  Lee  had  thus  been  lay 
ing  waste  a  most  rich  and  fertile  section  of 
Pennsylvania  at  his  leisure.  Practically,  indeed, 
the  whole  State  was  in  his  grasp.  Would  Harris- 
burg  or  Philadelphia  be  the  first  fruits  of  his 
audacity?  The  prize  was  indeed  tempting,  the 
way  open.  The  only  real  impediment  was  the 


38  'THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  Lee,  too,  was  now 
anxiously  asking  himself  what  had  become  of  that 
army.3  He  had  foreseen  that  it  must  follow  him 
up;  that  every  effort  would  be  bent  to  compass 
his  destruction ;  and  it  was  a  foregone  conclusion 
that  he  must  fight  somewhere,  if  there  was  either 
enterprise  or  courage  left  on  the  Union  side.  He 
had  even  calculated  on  drawing  the  Union  army 
so  far  away  from  fortified  places  that 

Lee  mystified. 

its  defeat  would  ensure  the  fall  of  Balti 
more  and  Washington.  But  as  regarding  its 
whereabouts  at  the  present  moment,  Lee  was 
completely  in  the  dark.  In  an  evil  hour  he  had 
allowed  the  bulk  of  his  cavalry  to  run  off  on  a 
wild-goose  chase  around  the  rear  of  the  Federal 
army,  so  that  now,  in  his  hour  of  need,  though 
without  his  knowing  it,  the  whole  Federal  army 
interposed  to  prevent  its  return.4  It  is  quite  true 
that  up  to  this  time  Stuart,  who  led  this  cavalry, 
His  cavalry  had  given  so  many  signal  proofs  of  his 
absent.  dexterity  that  Lee  was  perhaps  justified 

in  inferring  that  if  he  heard  nothing  from  Stuart, 
it  was  because  the  Union  army  was  still  in  Vir 
ginia.  And  in  that  belief  he  was  acting. 


FIRST  EFFECTS  OF  THE  INVASION  39 

Moreover,  instead  of  being  among  a  population 
eager  to  give  him  every  scrap  of  information,  Lee 
was  now  among  one  where  every  man,  woman, 
Among  and  child  was  a  spy  on  his  own  move- 

Spies,  ments.  In  the  absence,  then,  of  definite 

knowledge  touching  the  Union  army,  he  decided 
to  march  on  Harrisburg  with  his  whole  force,  and 
issued  orders  accordingly. 

When  there  was  no  longer  a  shadow  of  doubt 
that  Lee's  whole  army  was  on  the  march  up  the 
Cumberland  Valley,  sweeping  that  valley  clean  as 
it  went,  the  Union  army  also  crossed  the  Potomac, 

Union  Army       °n    the    2^h    and    26th    °f  JUne>  and   a* 

crosses  the       once  began  moving  up  east  of  South 

Potomac. 

Mountain,  so  as  to  discharge  the  double 
duty  laid  upon  it  all  along  of  keeping  between  the 
enemy  and  Washington,  while  at  the  same  time 
feeling  for  him  through  the  gaps  of  South  Moun 
tain  as  it  marched.  For  this  task  the  Union 
general  kept  his  cavalry  well  in  hand,  instead  of 
letting  it  roam  about  at  will  in  quest  of  advent 
ures. 

This  order  of  march  threw  the  left  wing  out 
as  far  as  Boonsborough  and  Middletown,  with 


40  THE   BATTLE   OF   GETTYSBURG 

Buford's  cavalry  division  watching  the  passes  by 
which  the  enemy  would  have  to  defile,  should  he 
think  of  making  an  attack  from  that  flank.5  The 
rest  of  the  army  was  halted,  for  the  moment, 
around  Frederick.  The  plan  of  operations,  as 
Hooker's  ^rst  fixed,  did  not  lack  in  boldness  or 
Plan.  originality.  It  was  to  follow  Lee  up 

the  Cumberland  Valley  with  two  corps,  numbering 
twenty  thousand  men,  while  the  rest  of  the  army 
should  continue  its  march  toward  the  enemy  on 
the  east  side  of  South  Mountain,  but  within  sup 
porting  distance.  As  this  would  be  doing  just 
what  Lee6  had  most  reason  to  dread,  it  would 
seem  most  in  accordance  with  the  rules  of  war. 
At  any  rate,  it  initiated  a  vigorously  aggressive 
campaign. 

At  this  critical  moment  the  Union  army  was, 
most  unexpectedly,  deprived  of  its  head. 

In  its  pursuit  of  Lee  this  army  had  been  much 
hampered  by  divided  counsels,  when,  if  ever 
united  counsels  were  imperatively  called  for,  now 
was  the  time.  Worse  still,  it  had  too  many  com 
manders,  both  civil  and  military.  The  President, 
the  Cabinet,  the  General-in-Chief  (Halleck),  and 


FIRST  EFFECTS  OF  THE  INVASION  41 

even  some  others,  in  addition  to  the  actual  corn- 
Hooker  is  mander,  not  to  speak  of  the  newspa- 
thwarted.  pers,  had  all  taken  turns  in  advising  or 
suggesting  what  should,  or  what  should  not,  be 
done.  United  action,  sincere  and  generous  co 
operation,  as  between  government  and  army,  were 
therefore  unattainable  here.  The  government  did 
not  trust  its  general:  the  general  respected  the 
generalship  of  the  Cabinet  most  when  it  was 
silent.  Nobody  in  authority  seemed  willing  to 
grant  Hooker  what  he  asked  for,  let  it  be  ever  so 
reasonable,  or  permit  him  to  carry  out  his  own 
plans  unobstructed,  were  they  ever  so  promising 
or  brilliant.  He  could  not  get  the  fifteen  or 
twenty  thousand  soldiers  who  were  then  dawdling 
about  the  camps  at  Baltimore,  Washington,  and 
Alexandria.  He  was  brusquely  snubbed  when  he 
asked  for  leave  to  break  up  the  post  at  Harper's 
Ferry,  when  by  doing  so  ten  thousand  good 
troops  would  have  been  freed  to  act  against  the 
enemy's  line  of  retreat. 

Harmony  being  impossible,  Lee  seemed  likely 
to  triumph  through  the  dissensions  of  his  enemies. 

Mortified  at  finding  himself  thus  distrusted  and 


42  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

overruled,  Hooker  threw  up  the  command  on  the 
And  leaves  2/th,  and  on  the  28th  General  Meade 
the  Army.  succeeded  him.  So  suddenly  was  the 
change  brought  about,  that  when  the  officer  bearing 
the  order  awakened  Meade  out  of  a  sound  sleep  at 
midnight,  he  thought  he  was  being  put  in  arrest. 

It  is  asserted  by  those  who  had  the  best  means 
of  knowing  —  indeed,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  it 
could  be  otherwise  —  that  the  army  had  lost  faith 
in  Hooker,  and  that  the  men  were  asking  of  each 
spirit  of  the  other,  ''Are  we  going  to  have  another 
Army-  Chancellorsville?"  Be  that  as  it  may, 

there  were  few  better  soldiers  in  that  army  than 
Meade;  none,  perhaps,  so  capable  of  uniting  it 
at  this  particular  juncture,  when  unity  was  so  all- 
important  and  yet  so  lamentably  deficient.  This 
was  the  third  general  the  army  had  known  within 
six  months,  and  the  seventh  since  its  formation. 
It  was  truly  the  graveyard  of  generals ;  and  each 
of  the  disgraced  commanders  had  his  following. 
If,  under  these  conditions,  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac  could  still  maintain  its  efficiency  unimpaired, 
it  must  have  been  made  of  different  stuff  from 
most  armies. 


FIRST  EFFECTS  OF  THE  INVASION  43 

It  was  not  that  the  Union  soldiers  feared  to 
meet  Lee's  veterans.  Lee  might  beat  the  generals, 
but  the  soldiers  —  never  !  Yet  it  can  hardly  be 
doubted  that  repeated  defeat  had  more  or  less 
unsettled  their  faith  in  their  leaders,  if  not  in 
themselves ;  since  even  the  gods  themselves 
struggle  in  vain  against  stupidity.7 

If  the  new  appointment  did  not  silence  all 
jealousies  among  the  generals,  or  infuse  great  en 
thusiasm  into  the  rank  and  file,  —  and  we  are 
bound  to  admit  that  Meade's  was  not  a  name  to 
General  conjure  with,  —  it  is  difficult  to  see  how 

Meade.  a  better  selection  could  have  been 

made,  all  things  considered.  In  point  of  fact, 
there  was  no  one  of  commanding  ability  to 
appoint;  but  every  man  in  the  army  felt  that 
Meade  would  do  his  best,  and  that  Meade  at  his 
best  would  not  fall  far  behind  the  best  in -the  field. 

Meade  could  not  become  the  idol  of  his  soldiers, 
like  Lee,  because  he  was  not  gifted  by  nature  with 
that  personal  magnetism  which  attracts  men  with 
out  their  knowing  why ;  but  he  could  and  did  com 
mand  unhesitating  obedience  and  respect. 

In  point  of  discipline,  however,  the  Union  army 


44  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

was  vastly  the  superior  of  its  adversary,  and  that 
counts  for  much ;  and  in  spite  of  some  friction 
Best-disci-  here  and  there,  like  a  well-oiled  ma- 
piinedArmy.  chine  the  army  was  now  again  in 
motion,  with  a  cool  head  and  steady  hand  to 
guide  it  on.  But  as  no  machine  is  stronger  than 
its  weakest  part,  it  remained  to  be  seen  how  this 
one  would  bear  the  strain. 

Thus  a  triumphant  and  advancing  enemy  was 
being  followed  by  a  beaten  and  not  over-confident 
one,  its  wounds  scarcely  healed,8  not  much  stronger 
than  its  opponent,  and  led  by  a  general  new  to  his 
place,  against  the  greatest  captain  of  the  Confede 
racy.  How  could  the  situation  fail  to  impose  cau 
tion  upon  a  general  so  fully  and  so  recently  im 
pressed  with  the  consequences  of  taking  a  false 
step?  Meade's  every  move  shows  that  from  the 
beginning  this  thought  was  uppermost  in  his  mind. 

With  the  effects  of  Lee's  simple  presence  thus 
laid  before  us,  it  is  entirely  safe  to  ask  what  should 
have  stopped  this  general  from  dictating  his  own 
terms  of  peace,  either  in  Philadelphia  or  Baltimore, 
provided  he  could  first  beat  the  Union  army  in 
Pennsylvania? 


FIRST  EFFECTS  OF  THE  INVASION  45 

1  At  Pittsburg  defensive  works  were   begun.    In  Philadelphia  all 
business  was  suspended,  and  work  vigorously  pushed  on  the  fortifica 
tions  begun  in  the  suburbs.    At  Baltimore  the  impression  prevailed 
that  Lee  was  marching  on  that  city.    The  alarm  bells  were  rung,  and 
the  greatest  consternation  prevailed. 

2  A  great  lukewarmness  in  the  action  of  the  people  of  Pennsylvania 
is  testified  to  on  all  sides.    See  Professor  Jacobs'  "  Rebel  Invasion,"  etc. 
About  sixteen  thousand  men  of  the  New  York  State  militia  were  sent  to 
Harrisburg  between  the  i6th  of  June  and  the  3d  of  July ;  also  several 
thousand  from  New  Jersey  (but  ordered  home  on  the  22d).    General 
Couch  was  put  in  command  of  the  defences  of  Harrisburg. 

3  Hooker  would    not  cross  the  Potomac  until  assured  that  Lee's 
whole  army  was  across.     He  kept  the  Blue  Ridge  between  himself  and 
Lee  in  obedience  to  his  orders  to  keep  Washington  covered. 

4  The  presence  of  Lee's  cavalry  would  have  allowed  greater  latitude 
to  his  operations,  distressed  the  Pennsylvanians  more,  and  enabled  Lee 
to  select  his  own  fighting-ground. 

5  So  long  as  these  passes  were  securely  held,  Lee  would  be  shut  up 
in  his  valley. 

8  Open  to  serious  objections ;  but  then,  so  are  all  plans.  Tied  down 
by  his  orders,  Hooker  would  have  taken  some  risks  for  the  sake  of 
some  great  gains.  By  closing  every  avenue  of  escape,  it  would  have 
ensured  Lee's  utter  ruin,  provided  he  could  have  been  as  badly  beaten 
as  at  Gettysburg. 

7  This  feeling  was  so  well  understood  at  Washington  that  a  report 
was  spread  among  the  soldiers  that  McClellan,  their  old  commander, 
was  again  leading  them,  and  the  report  certainly   served  its  purpose. 

8  The  army  was  not  up  to  its  highest  point  of  efficiency.    It  had  just 
lost  fifty-eight  regiments  by  expiration  of  service.     This  circumstance 
was  known  to  Lee.     The  proportion  of  veterans  was  not  so  great  as  in 
the  Confederate  army,  or  the  character  of  the  new  enlistments  as  high 
as  in  1861  and  1862. 


46  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 


IV 

REYNOLDS 

THE  problem  presented  to  Meade's  mind,  on 
taking  command,  was  this :  What  are  the  enemy's 
plans,  and  where  shall  I  strike  him?  He  knew 
Meade's  that  part  of  Lee's  army  was  at  Cham- 

Probiem.  bersburg,  part  at  Carlisle,  and  part 
at  York.  Was  it  Lee's  purpose  to  concentrate 
his  army  upon  the  detachment  at  York  or  upon 
that  at  Carlisle,  or  would  he  draw  these  two 
detachments  back  into  the  Cumberland  Valley, 
there  to  play  a  merely  defensive  game?  Should 
the  junction  be  at  Carlisle,  it  would  mean  an 
attack  on  Harrisburg :  if  at  York,  or  at  some 
point  between  the  main  body  and  York,  it 
would  indicate  an  advance  in  force  toward  Phil 
adelphia,  Baltimore,  or  Washington.  As  all  these 
things  were  possible,  all  must  be  duly  weighed 
and  guarded  against.  With  a  wily,  brave,  and 
confident  enemy  before  him,  Meade  did  not 


REYNOLDS  47 

find  himself  on  a  bed  of  roses,  truly;  and  he  may 
well  be  pardoned  the  remark  attributed  to  him 
when  ordered  to  take  the  command,  that  he  was 
being  led  to  execution. 

Meade  needed  no  soothsayer  to  tell  him  that  if 
Lee  crossed  the  mountains,  it  would  be  because 
he  meant  to  fight  his  way  toward  his  object 
through  every  obstacle. 

What  was  that  object? 

In  answering  this  question  the  political  consid 
erations  must  be  first  weighed.  In  short,  the  pur 
pose —  the  great  purpose — of  the  invasion  must 
be  penetrated.  That  being  done,  the  military 
problem  would  easily  solve  itself. 

It  was  not  to  be  supposed  that  Lee  had  invaded 
Pennsylvania  solely  for  the  purpose  of  taking  a 
few  small  towns,  or  even  a  large  one,  like  Harris- 
burg,  or  of  filling  up  his  depleted  magazines. 
He  was  evidently  after  larger  game.  His  ultimate 
aim,  clearly,  was  to  capture  Washington,  as  a 
signal  defeat  of  the  Union  army  would  easily 
enable  him  to  do.  It  would  crown  the  campaign 
brilliantly,  would  fulfil  the  hopes,  and  beyond 
doubt  or  cavil  ensure  the  triumph,  of  the  Confed- 


48  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

eracy.  It  is  true  that  Meade's  orders  held  him 
down  to  a  defence  of  the  national  capital  first 
and  foremost;  in  no  sense,  then,  was  he  the 
master  of  his  own  acts :  yet  he  showed  none  the 
less  sagacity,  we  think,  in  concluding  that  Lee 
would  presently  be  found  on  the  east  siple  of  the 
mountains,  and  in  preparing  to  meet  him  there, 
not  astride  the  mountains  as  Hooker  had  proposed 
doing,  but  with  his  whole  army  more  within  his 
reach.  Meade  was  prudent.  He  would  err,  if  at 
all,  on  that  side ;  yet  the  result  vindicated  his 
judgment  sooner  than  was  thought  for. 

This  being  settled,  there  still  remained  the 
question  of  relieving  Pennsylvania.  The  enemy's 
presence  there  was  an  indignity  keenly  enough 
felt  on  all  sides,  but  to  none  was  it  such  a  home- 
thrust  as  to  the  Pennsylvanians  in  the  Union 
army,  at  the  head  of  whom  was  Meade  himself.1 

Though  Hooker's  plan  promised  excellent 
results  here,  Meade  was  fearful  lest  Lee  should 
cross  the  Susquehanna,  and  take  Harrisburg 
before  he  could  be  stopped.  To  prevent  this 
Meade's  tne  army  must  be  pushed  forward. 

Plans.  Meade,  therefore,  at  once  drew  back 


REYNOLDS  49 

the  left  wing  toward  Frederick,  thus  giving  up 
that  plan  in  favor  of  one  which  he  himself  had 
formed ;  namely,  of  throwing  the  army  out  more 
to  the  northeast,  the  better  to  cover  Baltimore 
from  attack,  should  that  be  Lee's  purpose,  as 
Meade  more  than  suspected.  Selecting  West 
minster,  therefore,  as  his  base  from  this  time 
forth,  and  the  line  of  Big  Pipe  Creek,  a  little  to 
the  north  of  that  place,  as  his  battle-ground, 
Meade  now  set  most  of  the  army  in  motion  in 
that  direction,  leaving  Frederick  to  the  protection 
of  a  rear-guard. 

The  army  now  marched  with  its  left  wing 
thrown  forward  toward  South  Mountain,  Buford's 
cavalry  toward  Fairfield,  to  clear  that  flank,  the 

Left  Flank  FirSt  and    Eleventh    Corps  toward    Em- 

Forward,  mettsburg,     the    Third      and     Twelfth 

toward  Middleburg,  the  Fifth  to  Taneytown,  the 
Right  Flank  Second  to  Uniontown,  and  the  Sixth, 
refused.  On  the  extreme  right,  to  New  Windsor. 

Two  other  divisions  of  Union  cavalry,  Kilpat- 
rick's  and  Gregg's,  marched  one  on  the  right  flank, 
the  other  in  front,  with  orders  to  keep  the  froni-  and 
flanks  of  the  army  well  scouted  and  protected. 


5<D  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

It  will  be  seen  from  this  order  of  march  that,  in 
proportion  as  they  went  forward,  Buford's  cavalry, 
with  the  three  infantry  corps  forming  the  left 
wing,  were  approaching  the  enemy's  main  body  at 
Chambersburg.  South  Mountain  was,  therefore, 
the  wall  behind  which  the  two  contending  armies 
were  playing  at  hide-and-seek.2 

Lee  had  only  just  given  orders  for  his  whole 
force  to  move  on  Harrisburg,  when,  late  in  the 
night  of  the  28th,  a  scout  brought  news  to  him  of 
Lee  hears  ^e  Union  army  being  across  the  Po- 
Meade  is  tomac,  and  on  the  march  toward  South 
Mountain.3  This  report  could  not  fail 
to  throw  the  Confederate  headquarters  into  a 
fever  of  excitement,  ignorant  to  that  hour  of  that 
army's  being  across  the  Potomac.  The  mystery 
was  cleared  up  at  last.  In  a  moment  the  plan  of 
campaign  was  changed.4  Lee  soon  said  to  some 
of  the  officers  about  him,  "  To-morrow,  gentlemen, 
we  will  not  move  to  Harrisburg  as  we  expected, 
but  will  go  over  to  Gettysburg  and  see  what  Gen 
eral  Meade  is  about." 

By  placing  himself  on  the  direct  road  to  Balti 
more,  Lee's  purpose  of  first  drawing  the  Union 


REYNOLDS  5 1 

army  away  from  his  line  of  retreat,  and  of  then 
assailing  it  on  its  own,  stands  fully  revealed.  The 
previous  orders  were  therefore  countermanded  on 
the  spot.  Hill  and  Longstreet  were  ordered  from 
March  on  Chambersburg  to  Gettysburg,5  Ewell 
Gettysburg  was  called  back  from  Carlisle,  and 
begun'  Early  from  York. 

If  Meade  had  known  Lee's  whereabouts,  it  is 
safe  to  assume  that  the  Union  army  would  have 
Fault  been  massed  toward  its  left  rather  than 

Tactics.  its  right;    and  if  Lee    had    been  cor 

rectly  informed  on  his  part,  it  is  unlikely  that  he 
would  have  risked  throwing  his  columns  out  at 
random  against  the  Union  army,  as  he  was  now 
doing.  Only  the  fatuity  of  the  Union  generals 
saved  Lee's  vanguard  on  the  1st  of  July.  Yet 
he  held  the  very  important  advantage  of  having 
already  begun  the  concentration  of  his  army  —  an 
easy  thing  for  him  to  do,  inasmuch  as  but  one  of 
his  three  corps  was  separated  from  the  others  — 
before  Meade  discovered  by  chance  what  was  so 
near  proving  his  ruin.  One  day's  march  would 
bring  all  three  up  within  supporting  distances, 
two  in  position  for  giving  b'attle. 


• 
52  THE  BATTLE  OF   GETTYSBURG 

Heth's  division  of   Hill's   Corps   got   as  far  as 

Cashtown,   eight   miles   from    Gettysburg,   on  the 

29th  ;     Rodes'     division     of    Ewell's     Corps     was 

coming  down  by  the  direct  road  from 

Confederate 

Positions  Carlisle,  east  of  South  Mountain  ;  Ear- 
ly's  division  of  this  corps  began  its 
march  back  from  York  to  Gettysburg  on  the 
morning  of  the  3Oth.  These  three  divisions,  or 
one-third  of  Lee's  whole  army,  therefore,  formed 
the  enemy's  vanguard  which  would  first  strike  an 
approaching  force.  But,  as  we  have  seen,  the 
whole  army  was  in  march  behind  it,  and  by  the 
next  day  well  closed  up  on  the  advance. 

Leaving  them  to  pursue  their  march,  which  was 
by  no  means  hurried,  let  us,  to  borrow  Lee's  very 
expressive  phrase,  "  see  what  General  Meade  was 
about." 

On  the  29th  all  seven  of  the  Union  corps  were 

advancing  northward  like  fingers  spread  apart,  and 

exactly  in  an  inverse  order  from  Lee's 

Union 

positions         three,  which   were    converging   on  the 

June  3oth. 


divergent    order   of  march   continued   to   conduct 
the  corps  still  farther  apart,  with  the  result  also, 


REYNOLDS  53 

considering  Gettysburg  as  the  ultimate  point  of 
concentration,  that  the  bulk  of  the  army  was  away 
off  to  the  right  of  Gettysburg.6  Moreover,  Meade's 
efforts  to  get  the  army  up  to  this  position,  or  in 
front  of  his  chosen  line  of  defence  on  Pipe  Creek, 
had  covered  the  roads  with  stragglers,  and  com 
pelled  at  least  one  corps  to  halt  for  nearly  a  whole 
day.7 

It  was  not  until  nightfall  of  the  3oth,  or  forty- 
eight  hours  after  it  was  begun,  that  Meade  knew 
of  the  enemy's  movement  toward  Gettysburg; 
and  even  then  he  did  not  feel  at  all  sure  of  having 
detected  the  true  point  of  concentration.  Indeed, 
his  want  of  accurate  information  on  this  head 
seems  surprising.  By  that  time  his  own  army  was 
stretched  out  from  Emmettsburg,  on  the  northwest, 
scattered  to  Manchester  at  the  east,  thus  putting 
condition  it  out  of  Meade's  power  to  concentrate 

of  the  Army.        e  . 

it  at  Gettysburg  in  one  day.  By  en 
deavoring  to  cover  too  much  ground  his  army  had 
been  dangerously  scattered.  Even  without  cavalry 
Lee  had  fairly  stolen  a  march  on  him.  And  it  is 
not  improbable  that  Hooker  might  now  have  been 
"  shocked,"  in  his  turn.8 


54  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

Our  present  business  is  now  wholly  with  the  left 
wing  of  the  Union  army,  —  its  right  being  quite 
union  out  °f  reacn>  —  that  is  to  say,  with  the 

Left  wing       three  infantry  and    one  %  cavalry  corps 

in  Advance. 

commanded  by  that  thorough  soldier, 
so  beloved  by  the  whole  army,  General  Reynolds, 
the  actual  chief  of  the  First  Corps. 

Buford  had  spent  the  2Qth  in  scouring  the  passes 
of  South  Mountain  as  far  north  as  Monterey, 
without  getting  sight  of  the  enemy,  however,  until 
Buford  finds  ^e  na^ed  for  the  night  at  Fountaindale, 
the  Enemy.  when  he  then  perceived  the  camp-fires 
of  a  numerous  body  of  troops  stretching  along  in 
his  front  and  lighting  up  the  road  toward  Gettys 
burg.  Evidently  they  had  just  crossed  South 
Mountain  from  the  valley. 

To  Buford  this  sight  was  indeed  as  a  ray  of  light 

in  a  dark   place.     No    friendly  force  could  be  in 

that    quarter.     He  determined  to  know  who  and 

what  it  was  without  loss  of  time.     Before  dawn  his 

troopers    were    again    in    the    saddle. 

He  attacks. 

They  soon  fell  in  with  a  strong  col 
umn  of  infantry  moving  toward  Gettysburg  on  the 
Fairfield  (Hagerstown)  road.  After  exchanging  a 


REYNOLDS  5  5 

few  shots,  and  having  learned  what  he  wanted  to 
know,  Buford  hastened  back  to  Reynolds,  at 
Emmettsburg,  with  the  news. 

Reynolds  immediately  sent  Buford  back  to 
Gettysburg,  in  order,  if  possible,  to  head  off 
the  enemy  before  he  should  reach  that  place,  for 
which  he  was  evidently  making.  A  courier  was 
also  despatched  to  headquarters.  This  was  the 
first  trustworthy  intelligence  of  Lee's  movement 
to  the  east  that  Meade  had  thus  far  received. 
Could  the  enemy  be  massing  on  his  left?  It 
certainly  looked  like  it.  After  this  night  there 
was  only  one  word  on  the  tongues  of  all  men 
in  that  army  —  Gettysburg  !  Gettysburg  ! 

The    First   Corps,    also    marching    for    Gettys- 

Reynoids  burg,  went  into  camp  some  five  miles 
marches  up.  short  Qf  ^  town .  the  Eleventh  iay 

at  Emmettsburg;  the  Third  at  Taneytown.  It 
is  with  them  alone  that  we  shall  have  to  deal  in 
what  follows. 

We  have  already  seen  that  Meade  had  not 
designed  advancing  one  step  farther  than  might 
be  found  effectual  for  turning  Lee  back  from 
overrunning  the  State.  This  was  the  first  great 


56  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

object  to  be  attained.  And  this  had  now  been 
done.  To  avoid  being  struck  from  behind,  Lee 
had  been  forced  to  halt,  face  about,  and  look  for 


«*> 


Positions,  June  3oth. 

a   place    to    fight    in.      When    the    enemy  should 
be    fairly    in     motion    southward,    Meade    meant 


REYNOLDS  57 

to  take   up    the    position    along  Pipe   Creek,  and 
await   an    attack    there.      But    he    no 

Pipe  Creek. 

longer  had  the  disposing  of  events 
In  order  to  gain  this  position  now,  Reynolds 
must  have  fallen  back  one  or  two  marches ;  nor 
could  Meade  know  that  Lee  was  then  coming  half 
way  to  meet  him  ;  or  that  —  strange  confusion  of 
ideas  ! —  Lee  had  promised  his  generals  not  to  fight 
a  pitched  battle  except  on  ground  of  his  own 
choosing;  certainly  not  on  one  his  adversary 
had  chosen  for  him ;  least  of  all  where  defeat 
would  carry  down  with  it  the  cause  of  the 
Southern  Confederacy  itself. 

Reynolds,  therefore,  held  the  destinies  of  both 
armies  in  his  keeping  on  that  memorable  last 
night  of  June.  He  now  knew  that  any 
further  advance  on  his  part  would  prob 
ably  result  in  bringing  on  a  combat —  a  combat, 
moreover,  in  which  both  armies  might  become  in 
volved,  for  his  military  instinct  truly  foreshadowed 
what  was  coming.  There  was  .still  time  to  fall 
back  on  the  main  army,  to  avoid  an  engagement. 
But  Reynolds  was  not  that  kind  of  general.  He 
was  the  man  of  all  others  to  whom  the  whole 


58  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

army  had  looked  in  the  event  of  Hooker's  inca 
pacity  from  any  cause,  as  well  as  the  first  whom 
the  President  had  designed  to  replace  him. 
He  now  shared  Meade's  confidence  to  the  fullest 
extent.  He  was  a  soldier  of  the  finest  temper, 
a  Pennsylvanian,  like  Meade  himself,  neither 
rash  on  the  one  hand,  nor  weighed  down  by 
the  feeling  that  he  or  his  soldiers  were  over 
matched  in  any  respect  on  the  other.  To  him, 
at  least,  Lee  was  no  bugbear.  Having  come 
there  expressly  to  find  the  enemy,  he  was  not 
going  to  turn  his  back  now  that  the  enemy  was 
found.  Reynolds  was,  therefore,  emphatically  the 
man  for  the  hour.  He  knew  that  Meade  would 
support  him  to  the  last  man  and  the  last  cartridge. 
He  fall  back?  There  was  no  such  word  in  Rey 
nolds'  vocabulary.  His  order  was  "  Forward  !  " 

So  history  has  indissolubly  linked  together 
the  names  of  Reynolds  and  of  Gettysburg,  for 
had  he  decided  differently  there  would  have  been 
no  battle  of  Gettysburg. 

Thus  it  was  that  all  through  the  silent  watches 
of  that  moonlit  summer's  night  the  roads  lead 
ing  to  Gettysburg  from  north  and  south,  from  east 


REYNOLDS  59 

and  west,  were  lighted  up  by  a  thousand  camp- 
fires.  Without  knowing  it,  the  citizens  of  that 
peaceful  village  were  sleeping  on  a  volcano. 

1  Besides  Meade,  there  were  Hancock,  Reynolds,  and  Humphreys  — 
a  triumvirate  of  some  power  with  that  army.     Pennsylvania  had  also 
seventy-three  regiments  and  five  batteries  with  Meade. 

2  While  thus  feeling  for  Lee  along  the  mountain  passes  with  his  left 
hand,  Meade  was  reaching  out  the  right  as  far  as  possible  toward  the 
Susquehanna,  or  toward  Early  at  York. 

3  This  was   Longstreet's  scout,   Harrison.     "  He  said    there  were 
three  corps  near  Frederick  when  he  passed  there,  one  to  the  right  and 
one  to  the  left ;  but  he  did  not  succeed  in  getting  the  position  of  the 
other."  —  Longstreet. 

4  This  shows  how  little  foundation  exists  for  the  statements  of  the 
Comte  de  Paris  and  others  that  Hooker's  strategy  compelled  Lee  to 
cross  the  mountain,  when  it  is  clear  that  he  knew  nothing  whatever  of 
Hooker's   intentions.    This  is  concurred   in  by  both  Lee   and   Long- 
street.    Moreover,  Hooker  had  scarcely  put  his  strategy  in  effect  when 
he  was  relieved. 

e  In  point  of  fact,  the  concentration  was  first  ordered  for  Cashtown, 
"  at  the  eastern  base  of  the  mountain."  —  Lee.  Ewell  and  Hill  took  the 
responsibility  of  going  on  to  Gettysburg,  after  hearing  that  the  Union 
cavalry  had  been  seen  there. 

6  On  the  night  of  June  3oth,  Meade's  headquarters  and  the  artillery 
reserve  were  at  Taneytown,  the  First  Corps  at  Marsh  Run,  Eleventh 
at  Emmettsburg,  Third  at  Bridgeport,  Twelfth  at  Littlestown,  Second  at 
Uniontown,  Fifth  at  Union  Mills,  Sixth  and  Gregg's  Cavalry  at  Man 
chester,  Kilpatrick's  at  Hanover  —  a  line  over  thirty  miles  long. 

7  By  being  compelled   to  ford   streams  without  taking  off  shoes  or 
stockings,  the  men's  feet  were  badly  blistered. 

8  Upon  taking  command,  Meade  is  said  to  have  expressed  himself 
as  "shocked  "  at  the  scattered  condition  of  the  army. 


6O  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 


THE   FIRST   OF  JULY 

SINCE  early  in  the  afternoon  of  June  3Oth,  the 

inhabitants    of     Gettysburg     had     seen    pouring 

through    their   village,    taking    position    on    the 

heights  that  dominate  it,   and    spread- 

Buford. 

ing  themselves  out  over  all  the  roads 
leading  into  it  from  the  west  and  north,  squadron 
after  squadron  of  horse,  dusty  and  travel-stained, 
but  alert,  vigilant,  and  full  of  ardor  at  the  pros 
pect  of  coming  to  blows  with  the  enemy  at  last. 

This  was  a  portion  of  that  splendid  cavalry 
which,  under  the  lead  of  Pleasonton,  Buford, 
Gregg,  and  Kilpatrick,  at  last  disputed  the 
boasted  superiority  of  Stuart's  famous  troopers. 
At  last  the  Union  army  had  a  cavalry  force. 
These  men  formed  the  van  of  that  army  which 
was  pursuing  Lee  by  forced  marches  for  the  pur 
pose  of  bringing  him  to  battle. 

Forewarned    that  he  must  look  for  the  enemy 


THE  FIRST   OF  JULY  6 1 

to  make  his  appearance  on  the  Chambersburg  and 
Carlisle  roads,1  and  feeling  that  there  was  warm 
work  ahead,  Buford  was  keeping  a  good  lookout 
in  both  directions.  To  that  end  he  had  now 
Oak  taken  post  on  a  commanding  ridge 

Ridge.  over  which  these  roads  passed  first  to 

Seminary  Ridge,  and  so  back  into  Gettysburg. 
First  causing  his  troopers  to  dismount,  he 
formed  them  across  the  two  roads  in  question  in 
skirmishing  order,  threw  out  his  vedettes,  planted 
his  horse-artillery,  and  with  the  little  valley  of 
wnioughby  Willoughby  Run  before  him,  the 
Seminary  and  Gettysburg  behind  him, 
and  the  First  Corps  in  bivouac  only  five  miles 
away  toward  Emmettsburg,  this  intrepid  soldier 
calmly  awaited  the  coming  of  the  storm,  con 
scious  that  if  Gettysburg  was  to  be  defended  at 
all  it  must  be  from  these  heights. 

A  pretty  little  valley  was  this  of  Willoughby 
Run,  with  its  green  banks  and  clear-flowing 
waters,  its  tall  woods  and  tangled  shrubbery,  so 
soon  to  be  torn  and  defaced  by  shot  and  shell, 
so  soon  deformed  by  drifting  smoke  and  the  loud 
cries  of  the  combatants. 


62  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

The  night  passed  off  quietly.  Nevertheless, 
some  thirty  thousand  Confederates,  of  all  arms, 
were  lying  in  camp  within  a  radius  of  eight  miles 
from  Gettysburg.  Their  vanguard  had  discovered 
the  presence  of  our  cavalry,2  and  was  waiting  for 
the  morning  only  to  brush  it  away. 

Next  morning  Heth's  division  was  marching 
down  the  Chambersburg  pike,  looking  for  this 
cavalry,  when  its  advance  fell  in  with  Buford's 
Heth  comes  vedettes.  While  they  halted  to  recon- 
downthe  noitre,  these  vedettes  came  back  with 

Pike. 

the  news  that  the  enemy  was  advancing 
in  force,  infantry  and  artillery  filling  the  road 
as  far  as  could  be  seen.  Warned  that  not  a 
moment  was  to  be  lost,  Buford  at  once  sent  off 
word  to  Reynolds,  who,  after  ordering  the  First 
Corps  under  arms,  and  sending  back  for  the 
Eleventh,  himself  set  off  at  a  gallop  for  Gettys 
burg,  followed  only  by  his  staff. 

Buford's  bold  front  had  thus  caused  the  enemy 
to  come  to  a  halt;  but  soon  after  nine,  supposing 
he  had  to  do  with  cavalry  alone,  Heth  deployed 
He  drives  his  skirmishers  across  the  pike,  forming 
Buford.  njs  two  iea(jing  brigades  at  each  side 


THE  FIRST  OF  JULY  63 

of  it ;  these  troops  then  pushed  forward,  and  soon 
the  crack  of  a  musket  announced  that  the  battle 
of  Gettysburg  had  begun. 

After  an  hour's  stubborn  fighting,  Buford  was 
being  slowly  but  surely  pushed  back  over  the  first 
ridge,  when  a  column  of  the  Union  infantry  was 
seen  coming  up  the  Emmettsburg  road  at  the 
wadsworth  double-quick.  It  was  Wadsworth's  di- 
comes  to  vision  arriving  in  the  nick  of  time,  as 
the  enemy's  skirmishers,  followed  by 
Archer's  brigade,  were,  even  then,  in  the  act  of 
fording  the  run  unopposed,  and  unless  promptly 
stopped  would  soon  be  in  possession  of  the  first 
range  of  heights.  It  was  really  a  neck-and-neck 
race  to  see  who  would  get  there  first. 

Reynolds  was  impatiently  awaiting  the  arrival 
of  his  troops,  who  were  making  across  the  fields 
for  the  ridge  he  was  so  desirous  of  holding  on  the 
run.  It  was  plain  as  day  that  he  had  determined 
to  contest  the  enemy's  possession  of  Gettysburg 
here.  Cutler's  brigade  was  the  first  to  arrive. 
Reynolds  Hurrying  this  off  to  the  right  of  the 
forms  the  pike,  where  it  formed  along  the  crest 

Division* 

of  the  ridge  under  a  shower  of  balls, 


64  THE  BATTLE  OF   GETTYSBURG 

Reynolds  ordered  the  next,  as  it  came  up,  to 
charge  on  over  the  ridge  in  its  front,  and  drive 
Archer's  men  out  of  a  wood  that  rose  before  him 
crowning  the  crest  and  running  down  the  opposite 
slopes.  It  was  done  in  the  most  gallant  manner, 
charge  of  the  eacn  regiment  in  turn  breaking  off  from 
iron  Brigade.  t^e  jjne  of  marcn  to  join  in  the  charge 

under  the  eye  of  Reynolds  himself,  who,  heedless 
of  everything  except  the  supreme  importance  of 
securing  the  position,  rode  on  after  the  leading 
regiment  into  the  fire  where  bullets  were  flying 
thickest.  Not  only  was  the  enemy  driven  out  of 
the  wood,  but  back  across  the  run,  with  the 
loss  of  about  half  the  brigade,  including  Archer 
Reynolds  himself.  At  the  very  moment  success 
falls'  had  crowned  his  first  effort,  Reynolds 

fell  dead  with  a  bullet  in  his  brain.3 

Nothing  could  have  been  more  unfortunate  at 
this  time.  With  Reynolds  fell  the  whole  inspira 
tion  of  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  but,  worst  of  all, 
Eviiconse-  w^  ^l5  ^a^  both  the  directing  mind 
quentes.  ancj  faat  unquestioned  authority  so  es 
sential  to  bring  the  battle  to  a  successful  issue 
vanished  from  the  field.  He  had  been  struck 


I 

THE  FIRST   OF  JULY  65 

down  too  suddenly  even  to  transmit  his  views  to  a 
subordinate.  Disaster  was  in  the  air. 

This  dearly  bought  success  on  the  left  was  more 
than  offset  by  what  was  going  on  at  the  right, 
where  Davis'  Confederate  brigade,  after  getting 
cutler  is  round  Cutler's  flank,  was  driving  all 
driven.  before  it.  Cutler  had  to  fall  back  to 

the  Seminary  Ridge  in  disorder. 

Having  so  easily  cleared  this  part  of  the  line, 
Davis'  men  next  threw  themselves  astride  the 
ridge,  and  seeing  nothing  before  them  but  Hall's 
battery,  which  was  then  firing  down  the  Cham- 
bersburg  pike,  they  came  booming  down  upon 
the  guns,  yelling  like  so  many  Comanche  Indians. 
Before  the  battery  could  be  limbered  up  the 
enemy  were  among  the  guns,  shooting  the  can 
noneers  and  bayoneting  the  horses.  It  was 
finally  got  off  with  the  loss  of  one  of  the 
pieces.4 

This  success  put  the  enemy  in  possession  of  all 
the  Union  line  as  far  down  as  the  pike,  and 
threatened  that  part  just  won  with  a  like  fate. 
We  had  routed  the  enemy  on  the  left,  and  been 
routed  on  the  right. 


66  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

Fortunately,  the  Sixth  Wisconsin  had  been 
left  in  reserve  near  the  Seminary  a  little  earlier, 
and  it  was  now  ordered  to  the  rescue.  Colonel 
Dawes  led  his  men  up  on  the  run.  This  regiment, 
with  two  of  Cutler's  that  had  turned  back  on  see- 
The  Ridge  mg  the  diversion  making  in  their  favor, 
recovered.  drove  the  enemy  back  again,  up  the 
ridge,  to  where  it  is  crossed  by  a  railroad  cut, 
some  two  hundred  yards  north  of  the  pike.  To 
escape  this  attack  most  of  them  jumped  down 
into  the  cut ;  but  as  the  banks  are  high  and  steep 
and  the  outlet  narrow,  this  was  only  getting  out  of 
the  frying-pan  into  the  fire,  since  while  one  body 
Davis  in  °f  pursuers  was  firing  down  into  them 
a  Trap.  from  above,  still  another  had  thrown  it 

self  across  the  outlet  and  was  raking  the  cut  from 
end  to  end.  This  proved  more  than  even  Davis' 
Mississippians  could  stand,  and  though  they 
fought  obstinately  enough,  all  were  either  killed, 
taken,  or  dispersed. 

Heth's  two  attacking  brigades  having  thus  been 
practically  used  up  after  a  fierce  conflict,  not  with 
cavalry  alone,  with  whom  they  had  expected  to 
have  a  little  fun,  but  with  infantry,  in  whom  they 


THE  FIRST  OF  JULY  6? 

recognized  their  old  antagonists  of  many  a  hard- 
fought  field,  and  who  fought  to-day  with  a  deter 
mination  unusual  even  to  them,  Heth  hesitated 
about  advancing  to  the  attack  again  in  the  face  of 
such  a  check  as  he  had  just  received,  without 
Heth  strong  backing  up ;  but  sending  word 

brought  to       Of  his  encounter  to  Lee,  he  set  about 

a  Standstill. 

forming  the  fragments  of  the  two  de 
feated  brigades  on  two  fresh  ones,  where  they 
could  be  sheltered  from  the  Union  fire. 

Yet  Hill,  his  immediate  chief,  had  told  him 
only  the  night  before  there  was  no  objection  in 
the  world  to  his  going  into  Gettysburg  the  next 
day. 

This  success  also  enabled  Doubleday5  to  reform 
his  line  in  its  old  position.  The  troops  on  the 
left  had  not  been  shaken,  and  Cutler's  men  were 
now  coming  back  to  the  front  eager  to  wipe  out 
the  disgrace  of  their  defeat. 

If  the  enemy's  van  had  not  been  without  cavalry 
to  clear  its  march,  Heth  must  inevitably  have  got 
into  Gettysburg  first.  As  it  was,  the  unexpected 
resistance  he  had  met  with  made  Heth  cautious. 
Lee's  orders  to  his  lieutenants  were  not  to  force 


68  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

the  fighting  until  the  whole  army  should  be  up. 
Fender  was  therefore  forming  behind  Heth,  the 
artillery  set  at  work,  and  all  were  impatiently  look 
ing  out  for  Rodes'  appearance  on  the  Carlisle  (or 
Mummasburg)  road,  before  renewing  the  action. 

This  proved  a  most  fortunate  respite  to  the 
small  Union  force  on  Oak  Ridge,  as,  in  conse 
quence  of  it,  —  the  state  of  things  just  pointed 
out,  —  some  hours  elapsed  before  there  was  any 
more  fighting  by  the  infantry,  though  the  artillery 
kept  up  its  annoying  fire.  Meanwhile  the  two 
Eleven  remaining  divisions  of  the  First  Corps 

o'clock.  came  on  the  ground.     Robinson's  was 

left  in  reserve  at  the  Seminary,  with  orders  to 
throw  up  some  breastworks  there;  Doubleday's, 
now  Rowley's,  went  into  line  partly  to  the  right 
and  partly  to  the  left  of  the  troops  already  there, 
thus  extending  both  flanks  considerably;  and 
at  the  extreme  left,  which  was  held  by  Biddle's 
brigade,  two  companies  of  the  Twentieth  New 
York  were  even  thrown  out  across  the  run,  into 
the  Harman  house  and  out-buildings,  where  they 
did  good  service  in  keeping  down  the  enemy's 
skirmish  fire.6 


THE  FIRST  OF  JULY  69 

Meantime,  also,  Fender's  division  had  got  into 
line.  When  formed  for  the  attack  it  considerably 
outflanked  the  Union  left.  And  a  little  later  Rodes 
was  seen  coming  down  the  Mummasburg  road, 
Rodes  on  or  out  quite  beyond  the  right  of  the 
union  Flank.  First  Corps.  Clearly,  the  combat  just 
closed  was  child's  play  in  comparison  with  what 
was  about  to  begin. 

These  troops  gave  notice  that  they  were  shortly 
coming  into  action  by  opening  a  sharp  cannonade 
from  Oak  Hill,  the  commanding  eminence  situ- 
OakHiii  ated  just  beyond  and  in  fact  forming 
seized.  a  continuation  of  Oak  Ridge,  where 

the  First  Corps  stood,  though  separated  from  it 
somewhat. 

This  artillery  fire  from  Oak  Hill  enfiladed  the 
Union  position  so  completely  that  nothing  was 
left  for  the*  right  but  to  fall  back  to  Seminary 
Ridge,  so  as  to  show  a  new  front  to  this  attack. 
The  centre  and  left,  however,  kept  its  former 
position,  with  some  rearrangement  of  the  line 
here  and  there,  which  had  now  become  a  very 
crooked  one. 

Twenty  odd    thousand   men  were   thus  waiting 


7<3  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

for  the  word  to  rush  upon  between  ten  and  eleven 
thousand. 

Before  the  battle  could  be  renewed,  however, 
the  Eleventh  Union  Corps  came  up  through 
Gettysburg.7  Howard,  its  actual  head,  was 
now  in  chief  command  of  the  field,  as  next  in 
Eleventh  corps  rank  to  Reynolds.  He  sent  forward 
comes  up.  Schurz's  and  Barlow's  divisions  of 
this  corps  to  confront  Rodes,  leaving  Steinwehr's 
in  reserve  on  Cemetery  Hill. 

Having  preceded  his  corps  to  the  field,  How 
ard  had  already  notified  Meade,  too  hastily  by  half, 
that  Reynolds  was  killed  and  the  First  Corps 
routed  —  a  report  only  half  true,  and  calculated 
Howard  calls  to  do  much  mischief,  as  it  soon  spread 
for  Help.  throughout  the  entire  army.  He  also 
sent  off  an  urgent  request  to  Slocum,  who  was 
halted  in  front  of  Two  Taverns,  not  filte  miles  off, 
to  come  to  his  assistance  with  the  Twelfth  Corps. 

Supposing  the  day  lost  from  the  tenor  of 
Howard's  despatch,  lacking  perhaps  the  fullest 
confidence  in  that  general's  ability  and  expe 
rience,  and  thinking  only  of  how  he  should  save 
what  was  left,  Meade  forthwith  posted  Hancock 


THE  FIRST  OF  JULY  7 1 

off  to  Gettysburg,  with  full  authority  to  take 
Hancock  command  of  all  the  troops  he  might 
comes  to  the  find  there,  decide  whether  Gettysburg 
should  be  held  or  given  up,  and  to 
promptly  report  his  decision,  to  the  end  that 
proper  steps  might  be  taken  to  counteract  this 
disaster  if  yet  possible. 

Slocum  would  not  stir  from  Two  Taverns  with 
out  orders,  though  it  is  said  the  firing  was  dis 
tinctly  heard  there,  and  he  could  have  reached 
Gettysburg  in  an  hour  and  a  half.  A  second  and 

siocum  and  sti11  more  urgent  appeal  decided  that 
sickles.  commander,  late  in  the  afternoon,  to 

set  his  troops  in  motion.  It  was  then  too  late. 
Sickles,  who  might  have  been  at  Gettysburg 
inside  of  three  hours  with  the  greater  part  of 
his  corps,  appears  to  have  lingered  in  a  deplor 
able  state  of  indecision  until  between  two  and 
three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  before  he  could 
make  up  his  mind  what  to  do.  It  was  then  too 
late.8 

By  contrast  we  find  Ewell  promptly  going  to 
Hill's  assistance  upon  a  simple  request  for  such 
cooperation,  though  Ewell  was  Hill's  senior; 


72  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

and    we    further    find    that   his    doing   so    proved 
the  turning-point  of  this  very  battle. 

Was    there  a   want    of  cordiality   between    the 


Union  Positions,  July  i,  3  P.M. 

Union    commanders?       Was    it    really     culpable 
negligence,    or   was    there    only    incapacity? 

While,  therefore,  one  corps  certainly,  two 
probably,  might  easily  have  got  to  the  field  in 
season  to  take  a  decisive  part  in  the  battle,  but 


THE  FIRST  OF  JULY  73 

remained  inactive,  the  Confederates  were  hur 
rying  every  available  man  forward  to  the  point 
of  danger.  This  was  precisely  where  Reynolds' 
fall  proved  supremely  disastrous,  and  where  an 
opportunity  to  acquire  a  decisive  superiority  on 
the  field  of  battle  was  most  unfortunately  thrown 
away  for  want  of  a  head.9 

The  Union  line,  lengthened  out  by  the  arrival 
of  the  Eleventh  Corps,  had  now  been  carried  in 
a  quarter  circle  around  Gettysburg,  or  from  the 
New  union  Hagerstown  road  on  the  left  to  near 
Line-  Rock  Creek  on  the  right,  the  Eleventh 

Corps  being  deployed  across  the  open  fields 
extending  from  the  Mummasburg  to  the  Harris- 
burg  road,  with  Barlow's  division  on  the  extreme 
right.  When  this  corps  formed  front  in  line  of 
battle,  there  was  a  gap  of  a  quarter  of  a  mile  left 
wide  open  between  it  and  the  First  Corps. 
Furthermore,  it  was  drawn  up  on  open  ground 
which,  if  not  actually  level,  is  freely  overlooked 
by  all  the  surrounding  heights. 

That  this  corps  was  badly  posted  was  demon 
strated  after  a  very  brief  trial. 

Having  got  into  line  facing  southward,   Rodes 


74  THE  BATTLE  OF   GETTYSBURG 

began  his  advance  against  the  right  of  the  First 
Corps  and  left  of  the  Eleventh  shortly  before 
Rodes  three  o'clock,  supported  by  a  tremen- 

attacks.  dous  artillery  fire  from  Oak  Hill. 

Our  troops  stood  firm  against  this  new  onslaught. 
It  was  only  fairly  under  way,  however,  when 
Heth  and  Fender  joined  in  the  attack. 

The  fighting  now  begun  was  on  both  sides  of 
the  most  determined  character. 

On  his  side,  Rodes  was  quick  to  take  advan 
tage  of  the  break  existing  between  the  two  Union 
corps,  and  promptly  pushed  his  soldiers  into  it; 
but  they  were  not  to  get  possession  so  easily, 
Bloody  f°r  Doubleday  now  ordered  up  his  last 

Fighting.  division  to  stem  the  tide  surging  in 
upon  his  uncovered  flank.  These  troops  gallantly 
rushed  into  the  breach,  where  a  murderous  con 
test  began  at  close  quarters,  with  the  result  that, 
failing  to  close  up  the  gap,  the  division  was  finally 
drawn  around  the  point  of  the  ridge,  where  the 
Mummasburg  road  descends  into  the  plain,  so 
forming  a  natural  bastion  from  which  the  Union 
soldiers  now  drove  back  their  assailants  with 
great  slaughter.  Many  of  Iverson's  brigade  were 


THE  FIRST  OF  JULY  75 

literally  lying  dead  in  their  ranks  after  this  re 
pulse. 

In  front  of  Meredith,  who  still  held  the  wood, 
and  Stone's  "  Bucktails,"  who  lay  at  their  right, 
"  no  rebel  crossed  the  run  for  one  hour  and 
lived."  Beyond  them  Biddle  was  still  holding  his 
own  at  the  left,  though  his  ranks  were  fast  thin 
ning.  On  both  sides  the  losses  were  enormous. 
In  twenty-five  minutes  Heth  had  lost  two  thousand 
seven  hundred  out  of  seven  thousand  men.  This 
division  having  been  fought  out,  Fender's  was 
brought  up,  the  artillery  redoubled  its  fire,  Rodes 
pushed  his  five  brigades  forward  again,  and  a  gen 
eral  advance  of  comparatively  fresh  troops  was 
begun  all  along  the  line. 

But  it  was  on  the  right  that  disaster  first  fell 
with  crushing  force. 

Here  Rodes'  assault  on  the  left  of  the  Eleventh 
Corps  met  stout  resistance.  But  while  the  troops 
here  were  fighting  or  shifting  positions  to  repel 
Rodes'  rapid  blows,  Early's  division  was  seen 
Early  advancing  down  the  Harrisburg  road 

strikes  in.  against  the  right,  which  it  almost  im 
mediately  struck.  Thus  reinforced  and  connected, 


76  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

not  quite  one-half  of  Lee's  whole  army  was  now 
closing  in  around  two-sevenths  of  the  Union  army. 

Obstinate  fighting  now  took  place  all  along  the 
line.  The  First  Corps  held  out  some  time  longer 
against  repeated  assaults,  losing  men  fast,  but  also 
inflicting  terrible  punishment  upon  their  assailants, 
Rodes  alone  losing  two  thousand  five  hundred 
men  before  he  could  carry  the  positions  before 
him.  The  Confederate  veterans,  though  not  used 
to  praising  their  opponents,  freely  said  that  the 
First  Union  Corps  did  the  fiercest  fighting  on  this 
day  of  which  they  ever  had  any  experience. 

But  Early's  attack  on  the  right,  though  sternly 
resisted  by  Barlow,  proved  the  last  straw  in  this 
case.  The  right  division  being  rolled  back  in  dis 
order  by  an  assault  made  both  in  front  and  flank, 
the  left  also  gave  way  in  its  turn,  and  soon  the 
His  Attack  whole  corps  was  in  full  retreat  across 

is  decisive.          the  fiejds  to  fae    town>  which    the  CXult- 

ant  enemy  entered  along  with  them,  picking  up  a 
great  many  prisoners  on  the  way  or  in  the  streets, 
notwithstanding   a   brigade  of   the    reserve    came 
down  from  Cemetery  Hill  to  check  the  pursuit. 
The  Eleventh  Corps  being  thus  swept  away,  the 


THE  FIRST  OF  JULY  77 

First  fell  back  rather  forsaken  than  defeated,  a  few 
regiments  on  the  left  making  a  final  stand  at  the 
seminary  to  enable  those  on  the  right  to  shake  off 
A11  in  their  pursuers.  But  at  last  the  winding 

Retreat.  lines  came  down  from  Seminary  Ridge 
into  the  plain.  Buford's  cavalry  again  came  to  the 
rescue  in  this  part  of  the  field,  riding  with  drawn 
sabres  between  pursuers  and  pursued,  so  that  the 
Confederates  hastily  formed  some  squares  to  repel 
a  charge,  while  the  wreck  of  the  Union  line,  dis 
daining  to  run,  doggedly  fell  back  toward  the 
town,  halting  now  and  then  to  turn  and  fire  a 
parting  volley  or  rally  its  stragglers  round  their 
colors.  It  was  not  hard  pushed  except  at  the  ex 
treme  right,  where  some  of  Robinson's  division 
fell  into  the  enemy's  hands;  nor  did  resistance 
cease  until  its  decimated  battalions  again  closed 
up  their  ranks  on  the  brow  of  Cemetery  Hill  — 
noble  relic  of  one  of  the  hardest-fought  battles  of 
this  war.  Of  the  eight  thousand  two  hundred 
men  who  had  g6ne  into  action  in  the  morning, 
union  five  thousand  seven  hundred  and  fifty 

Losses.  kac}  keen  left  on  the  blood-dyed  sum 

mit  of  Oak  Ridge,  or  in  the  enemy's  hands.     The 


/8  THE  BATTLE  OF   GETTYSBURG 

losses  wefe  frightful.  In  one  brigade  alone,  one 
thousand  two  hundred  and  three  men  had  fallen. 
In  all,  the  losses  more  than  equalled  half  the  ef 
fective  strength. 

The  Eleventh  Corps  also  lost  heavily,  though 
mostly  in  prisoners.  In  both  corps  ten  thousand 
soldiers  were  missing  at  roll-call. 

Early's  soldiers  were  now  swarming  about 
Gettysburg  in  great  spirits.  Hays'  brigade  alone 
entered  the  town,  Avery  going  into  a  field  on  the 
East,  and  the  others  out  on  the  York  road.  Rodes 
presently  came  up  at  the  west,  much  disordered 
from  his  pursuit  of  Robinson.  These  Confederates 
then  set  about  re-forming  their  shattered  ranks, 
The  Enemy  under  the  fire  of  the  Union  artillery 
in  Gettysburg.  from  Cemetery  Hill  and  of  the  sharp 
shooters  posted  in  the  houses  along  its  slopes. 
This  fire  became  so  galling  that  the  enemy's 
infantry  were  obliged  to  get  under  cover  of  the 
nearest  ridges  or  houses.  In  this  way  Ewell's 
Corps  came  to  be  planted  nearest  the  approaches 
to  Cemetery  Hill. 

Heth  and  Fender  did  not  advance  beyond  Semi 
nary  Ridge.  They  had  had  fighting  enough  for 


THE  FIRST  OF  JULY  79 

one  day.10  Lee  was  also  there  examining  the  new 
Union  position  through  his  glass.  Notwithstanding 
Hethand  ^e  general  elation  visible  about  him, 
Render.  the  victory  did  not  seem  quite  complete 

to  Lee  so  long  as  the  Federals  still  maintained 
their  defiant  attitude  at  the  Cemetery.  There  was 
evidently  more,  and  perhaps  harder,  work  ahead. 

There  is  no  evading  the  plain,  if  unwelcome, 
truth  that  this  battle  had  been  lost,  and  two  corps 
of  the  Union  army  nearly  destroyed,  for  want  of 
a  little  more  decision  when  decision  was  most 
urgently  called  for,  and  a  little  more  energy  when 
activity  was  all-important.  The  fate  of  most  great 
battles  has  been  decided  by  an  hour  or  two,  more 
or  less.  Two  of  indecision  decided  this  one. 

1  Buford's  information  was  quite  exact.    "  June  30,  10.30  P.M.      I 
am  satisfied  that  A.  P.  Hill's  corps  is  massed  just  back  of  Cashtown, 
about  nine  miles  from  this  place.     Fender's  division  of  this  corps  came 
up  to-day,  of  which  I  advised  you.     The  enemy's  pickets,  infantry  and 
artillery,  are  within  four  miles  of  this  place,  at  the  Cashtown  road."  — 
Buford  to  Reynolds. 

2  Colonel  Chapman   Biddle  puts   the  Confederate  force  in  camp 
around  Cashtown  or  Heidlersburg,  each  eight  miles  from  Oak  Ridge,  at 
thirty-five  thousand  of  all   arms ;  perhaps  rather  an   over-estimate   of 
this  careful  writer. 

3  His  horse  carried  him  a  short  distance  onward  before  he  fell.     His 


8O  THE  BATTLE  OF   GETTYSBURG 

body  was  carried  to  the  rear,  in  a  blanket,  just  as  Archer  was  being 
brought  in  a  prisoner. 

4  When  attacked  in  this  way  a  battery  is  at  the  mercy  of  its  assail 
ants. 

5  General  Abner   Doubleday  succeeded   to  the  command  of   the 
First  Corps  on  Reynolds'  death. 

c  The  First  Corps  finally  held  a  line  of  about  a  mile  and  a  half,  from 
the  Hagerstown  to  the  Mummasburg  road. 

7  The  head  of  this  corps  arrived  at  about  1245  and  the  rear  at  1.45 
P.M.     It  would  take  not  less  than  an  hour  to  get  it  into  position  from  a 
half  to  three-fourths  of  a  mile  out  of  Gettysburg. 

8  It  is  a  well-settled  principle  of  war  as  well  as  of  common  sense 
that  a  corps  commander  may  disregard  his  orders  whenever  their  literal 
execution  would   be    in  his  opinion  unwarranted    by  conditions  un 
known  to,  or  unforeseen  by,  the  general  in  command  of  the.,army  when 
he  issued  them.    This  refers,  of  course,  to  an  officer  exercising  a  sep 
arate  command,  and  not  when  in  the  presence  of  his  superior. 

9  The  positions  of  the  several  corps  that  afternoon  were  as  follows, 
except  the  First  and  Eleventh  :  Second  at  Taneytown,  Third  at  Emmetts- 
burg,  Fifth  at   Hanover,  Sixth  at  Manchester,  and  Twelfth  at  Two 
Taverns. 

10  Heth,  Rodes,  and  Early  admit  a  loss  of  five  thousand  eight  hundred 
without  counting  prisoners.    The  prisoners  taken  by  the  First  Corps 
would  swell  this  number  to  about  eight  thousand. 


CEMETERY  HILL  8 1 


VI 


CEMETERY   HILL 

WE  have  seen  Lee  arriving  on  the  field  his 
troops  had  carried  just  as  ours  were  streaming 
over  Cemetery  Hill  in  his  plain  sight.  Seeing 
Lee  wants  to  EWC^  already  established  within  gun- 
push  Things,  shot  of  this  hill,  Lee  wished  him  to 
push  on  after  the  fugitives,  seize  Cemetery  Hill, 
and  so  reap  all  the  fruits  of  the  victory  just  won. 

Ewell  hesitated,  and  the  golden  opportunity 
slipped  through  Lee's  fingers.  At  four  o'clock 
he  would  have  met  with  little  resistance :  at  six  it 
was  different. 

By  riding  hard,  Hancock1  got  to  Gettysburg 
soon  after  Lee  did.  The  road  leading  from  the 
Hancock  battlefield  was  thronged  with  fugitives, 
arrives.  wounded  men,  ammunition  wagons,  and 

ambulances,  all  hurrying  to  the  rear  (the  unmis 
takable  debris  of  a  routed  army),  as  Hancock 


82  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

spurred  up  Cemetery  Hill.  His  trained  eye  took 
in  the  situation  at  a  glance.  Everywhere  he  saw 
Finds  situa-  tne  gloom  of  defeat.  A  few  disor- 
tion  gloomy,  dercd  battalions  sullenly  clung  around 
their  colors,  but  the  men  seemed  stunned  and 
disheartened,  not  so  much  by  defeat  as  by  the 
palpable  fact  that  they  had  been  abandoned  to 
defeat  for  want  of  a  scrap  of  paper,  more  or  less. 
Instead  of  cheers,  set  faces  and  haggard  eyes 
greeted  Hancock  as  he  rode  along  the  diminished 
ranks.  He  saw  divisions  reduced  to  brigades; 
brigades  to  battalions ;  battalions  to  companies ; 
batteries  to  a  single  gun.  One  of  Steinwehr's 
brigades  and  some  of  his  batteries,  with  a  regi 
ment  of  the  First  Corps  that  had  not  been  in 
action,2  was  the  only  force  remaining  intact. 
These  guns  were  sending  an  occasional  shot  down 
into  the  streets  of  Gettysburg ;  while  more  to  the 
left  —  cheering  sight !  —  Buford's  cavalry  stood 
drawn  up  before  the  heights  steady  as  on  parade, 
first  in  the  field  and  last  out  of  it. 

Hancock's  animating  presence  gradually  put 
heart  into  the  men.  He  saw  just  what  ought 
to  be  done,  and  instantly  set  about  doing  it. 


CEMETERY  HILL  83 

A  swift  and  comprehensive  view  of  the  ground  — 
and  his  grasp  of  its  capabilities  was  singularly  just 
—  seems  to  have  convinced  Hancock  that  no  better 
place  to  fight  in  was  likely  to  be  found,  even 
order  is  should  the  enemy  allow  them  the  time 
restored.  to  concentrate  in  the  rear,  which  was 
become  the  all-important  question  just  then.  He 
gave  his  orders  rapidly,  broken  ranks  were  re 
formed,  fugitives  brought  back  to  their  colors,3 
the  tide  of  retreat  stayed.  As  the  last  gun 
was  fired  from  Cemetery  Hill,  Stannard's  Ver 
mont  brigade4  came  marching  up  the  Emmetts- 
burg  road,  and  was  at  once  put  in  line  south 
First  Rein-  of  the  Cemetery,  with  pickets  thrown 

forcements.         out    jn    fron|-4        Though    Small,    this    T6- 

inforcement  was  thrice  welcome  at  a  time  when 
it  could  not  be  known  whether  the  enemy  would 
attack  or  not,  and  it  had  a  good  effect. 

In  riding  up,  Hancock  had  not  failed  to  notice — 

indeed,  no  one  could  —  a  wooded  hill  standing  off  at 

some  distance  to  the  right  of  Cemetery  Hill,  from 

which  it  was  separated  by  a  wide  and 

Gulp's  Hill. 

deep    hollow,    yet   at   the    same    time 
joined  by  a  ridge  so    low  and    narrow  as   to  be 


84  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

hardly  seen  when  looking  down  from  above. 
This  low,  connecting  ridge  is  several  hundred 
yards  in  extent,  and,  forming  as  it1  does  a  natural 
parapet  for  infantry,  was  all  that  stood  in  the  way 
of  pushing  a  force  through  between  Cemetery 
and  Gulp's  Hill  to  the  rear  of  the  Union  troops. 

Commands         Of  the     tWO    hills     Jt    is    enough    to     sa7 

cemetery.  that  as  Gulp's  Hill  is  much  the  higher, 
whoever  held  Gulp's  Hill  would  also  hold  the  key 
to  the  Union  position,  as  Hancock  found  it. 

The  enemy  had  not  been  slow  to  perceive  this 
on  his  part,  and  while  hesitating  what  to  do  Early 
had  pointed  it  out  to  Ewell,  his  chief,  who  fully 
agreed  with  him  that  it  should  be  seized  as  soon 
as  Johnson's  fresh  division  got  up.5  But  while 
Eweii  they  were  hesitating  Hancock  was 

sees  it  too.  sending  what  was  left  of  Wadsworth's 
division,  reinforced  by  the  Seventh  Indiana,  with  a 
battery,  to  occupy  Gulp's  Hill ;  so  that  when 
Johnson's  scouts  went  there  after  dark,  instead  of 
finding  the  hill  unoccupied  and  undefended,  they 
fell  into  the  hands  of  Wadsworth's  men.  Mere 
dith's  worn  but  undaunted  brigade  dropped  into 
position  behind  the  narrow  strip  of  ridge  spoken 


CEMETERY  HILL  85 

of,  a  sure  guaranty  that  no  enemy  would  break 
But  Hancock  through  at  that  place.  In  this  instance 
seizes  it.  Hancock's  eagle  glance  and  no  less 
prompt  action  undoubtedly  saved  the  whole 
position,  since  if  Ewell  had  succeeded  in  estab 
lishing  himself  on  Gulp's  Hill,  it  would  have 
taken  the  whole  Union  army  to  drive  him  out. 
Considered  merely  as  a  rallying  point  for 
broken  troops,  Cemetery  Hill  had  now  served  its 
purpose.  Hancock  could  now  say  to  Meade, 
not  that  the  position  was  the  best  they  could  have 
taken  for  disputing  the  enemy's  progress,  but  that 
all  was  safe  for  the  present,  or  equally 

Hancock  7 

reports  aii        in    train    for    the    withdrawal    of    the 
troops,    should    that   be   the    decision. 
In  a  word,  he  would  not  commit  himself  unreserv 
edly  to  a  simple  yes  or  no.6 

It  was  now  Meade's  turn,  and  right  nobly  did 
he  rise  to  the  crisis.  Such  as  it  was,  Hancock's 
report  enabled  him  to  come  to  a  quick  decision. 
Instead  of  ordering  a  retreat,  he  instantly  ordered 
Meade's  a^  ^e  corps  to  Gettysburg.  From  the 
Decision.  moment  he  became  satisfied  that  there 
was  a  fighting  chance  in  front,  Meade's  conduct 


86  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

was  anything  but  that  of  a  defeated  or  even  timid 
general ;  he  seems  never  to  have  looked  behind 
him.  Had  he  been  so  unalterably  wedded  to  his 
own  chosen  line  of  defence  as  some  critics  pro 
fess  to  believe,  it  is  difficult  to  see  what  stronger 
excuse  could  have  offered  itself  for  falling  back 
than  the  defeat  he  had  just  suffered.  And  if  he 
had  shrunk  from  the  hazard  of  fighting  so  far 
from  his  base  before,  how  much  more  easily 
could  he  have  justified  his  refusal  to  do  so  after 
the  loss  of  ten  thousand  men,  the  sudden  disrup 
tion  of  his  plans,  with  the  increased  sense  of 
responsibility  all  this  involved !  We  think  few 
would  deny  that  the  bringing  up  of  four-sevenths 
of  the  army  over  distances  varying  from  thirteen 
to  thirty-six  miles  must  appear  a  far  bolder  act, 
even  to  the  unmilitary  mind,  than  causing  three- 
sevenths  to  fall  back  some  fifteen  miles.  Fortu 
nately  Meade  was  one  in  spirit  with  his  soldiers, 
who  with  one  voice  demanded  to  be  led  against 
the  enemy.  The  shock  of  battle  seems  to  have 
aroused  all  the  warrior's  instinct  within  him. 
Reynolds  may  have  forced  the  fighting,  Hancock 
suggested,  or  even  advised,  but  it  was  Meade,  and 


CEMETERY  HILL  8/ 

Meade  alone,  on  whose  deliberate  judgment  the 
battle  of  Gettysburg  was  renewed,  and  who  there 
fore  stands  before  history  as  its  undoubted 
sponsor. 

To  return  to  the  now  historic  Cemetery  Hill. 
Here  the  right,  reinforced  by  at  least  three  thou 
sand  fresh  troops,7  had  been  strongly  occupied. 
Everything  appeared  in  surety  on  this  side.  But 
all  the  way  from  the  Taneytown  Road  to  Little 
Round  Top  there  was  not  one  solitary  soldier  or 
gun  except  some  cavalry  pickets.  By  the  time, 
however,  that  Hancock  had  succeeded  in  bringing 
order  out  of  this  chaos  and  courage  out  of  despair, 
the  whole  situation  was  changed  by  the  arrival  of 
Twelfth  *^e  Twelfth  Corps  from  Two  Taverns, 
corps  comes  As  it  came  up  by  the  Baltimore  pike 
the  leading  division  (Williams')  turned 
off  to  the  right,  feeling  its  way  out  in  this  direc 
tion  as  far  as  Wolf's  Hill  and  the  Hanover  road ; 
but  on  finding  the  enemy  already  installed  on  that 
side,  the  division  was  massed  for  the  night  on  the 
Baltimore  pike,  so  rendering  secure  our  extreme 
right  at  Gulp's  Hill.  There  was  no  longer  any 
thing  to  apprehend  on  this  side.  We  cannot 


88  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

refrain  from  asking  what  would  have  been  the 
effect  of  the  appearance  of  these  troops  on 
Early's  flank  an  hour  or  two  earlier  in  the  after 
noon? 

Geary's  division  of  this  corps  having  kept 
straight  on  up  the  pike  to  Cemetery  Hill,  Han 
cock  turned  it  off  to  the  extreme  left,  partly  to 
make  some  show  in  that  as  yet  unguarded  quarter, 
Geary  at  about  which  he  felt  by  no  means  easy, 
Little  partly  to  hold  control  of  the  Emmetts- 

burg  and  Taneytown  roads  (see  map), 
by  which  more  of  the  Union  troops  were  march 
ing  to  the  field.  Stretching  itself  out  in  a  thin 
line  as  far  as  Little  Round  Top,  and  after  sending 
one  regiment  out  on  picket  toward  the  Emmetts- 
burg  road,  and  just  to  the  right  of  the  Devil's 
Den,  the  division  slept  on  its  arms,  in  a  position 
Fix  this  on  destined  to  become  celebrated,  first  on 
the  Map.  account  of  Hancock's  foresight  in  seiz 
ing  it,  next  by  reason  of  its  desertion  by  the  gen 
eral  intrusted  with  its  defence. 

Hancock  had  the  satisfaction  of  feeling  that  the 
position  was  safe  for  the  present  when  he  rode 
back  to  Taneytown,  first  to  meet  his  own  corps  on 


CEMETERY   HILL  89 

the  road,  and  next  to   find  that  the  whole  army 
Second  ^a<^  already  been  ordered  up.     Throw- 

corps  ing    Gibbon    an    order    to    halt    as    he 

nearly  up. 

passed,  Hancock  kept  on  to  head 
quarters.  His  work  was  done. 

Nothing  but  the  importance  which  this  critical 
period  of  the  battle  has  assumed  to  our  own 
mind  could  justify  the  giving  of  all  these  details 
by  which  the  gradual  patching  up  and  lengthening 
union  Line  out  of  the  line,  until  it  took  the  form  it 
at  Dark.  subsequently  held,  and  from  a  front  of 
a  few  hundred  yards  grew  to  be  two  miles  long, 
may  be  better  followed. 

As  regards  the  rest  of  the  army,  some  part  of 
the  Third  Corps  had  now  reached  the  ground  by 
Part  ^e  Emmettsburg  road,  though  too 


of  Third          iate     to     get    into    line;     its     pickets, 

Corps  up. 

however,  were  thrown  out  on  that 
road  as  far  to  the  left  as  a  cross-road  leading 
Find  down  from  Sherfy's  house  to  Little 

sherfy-s  Round  Top.     The    rest    of  this   corps 

on  Map. 

would  come  up  by  this  same  road  in 
the  morning.  The  Second  Corps  was  halting  for 
the  night  three  miles  back,  also  in  a  position  to 


QO  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

guard  the  left  of  the  line.  Nominally,  therefore, 
five  of  the  seven  corps  were  up  at  dark  that  night, 
other  corps  °r  at  least  near  enough  to  go  into 
where?  position  by  daybreak.  The  Fifth  being 

then  at  Hanover,  twenty-four  miles  back,  and  the 
Sixth,  which  was  the  strongest  in  the  army,  at 
Manchester,  thirty-five  miles  from  Gettysburg,  it 
still  became  a  question  whether  the  whole  Union 
army  could  be  assembled  in  season  to  overcome 
Lee's  superiority  on  the  field.8 

Indeed,  when  Meade  did  finally  order  the  whole 
army  to  Gettysburg;,  the  chances  were 

Chances  J 

against  as  ten  to  one  against  its  getting  up  in 

time  to  fight  as  a  unit. 

Would  that  portion  of  the  Union  forces  found 
on  Cemetery  Hill  on  the  morning  of  the  second 
be  beaten  in  detail,  as  the  First  and  Eleventh  had 
been  the  day  before? 

This  seems,  in  fact,  to  have  been  Lee's  real  pur 
pose,  as  he  told  Longstreet  at  five  o'clock,  when 
they  were  looking  over  the  ground  together,  that 
if  Meade's  army  was  on  the  heights  next  day  it 
must  be  dislodged.  Knowing  that  but  two  Union 
corps  had  been  engaged  that  day  against  him,  Lee 


CEMETERY   HILL  9 1 

seemed  impressed   with    the    idea  that   he    could 
beat  Meade  before  the  rest  of  his  army 

Lee's  Plan. 

could  arrive.  Longstreet  strongly  op 
posed  making  a  direct  attack,  though  without 
Longstreet  shaking  his  chiefs  purpose.  As  Lee 
demurs.  now  j^j  ^js  whole  army  well  in  hand, 

one  division  only  being  absent,9  he  seemed  little 
disposed  to  begin  a  new  series  of  combinations, 
when,  in  his  opinion,  he  had  the  Union  army  half 
defeated,  half  scattered,  and  wholly  at  a  disad 
vantage.  And  we  think  he  was  right. 

We  have  seen  that  Lee's  conclusions  with  re 
spect  to  the  force  before  him  were  so  nearly  cor 
rect  as  to  justify  his  confidence  in  his  own  plans. 
Ever  since  crossing  South  Mountain  he  had  ex 
pected  a  battle.  It  is  true  he  found  it  forced 
upon  him  sooner  than  he  expected,  yet  his  own 
army  had  been  the  first  to  concentrate,  his  troops 
chances  had  gained  a  partial  victory  by  this 
favor  Lee.  Very  means,  and  both  general  and  sol 
diers  were  eager  to  consummate  it  while  the 
chances  were  still  so  distinctly  in  their  favor. 
Even  if  Lee  was  somewhat  swayed  by  a  belief  in 
his  own  genius,  as  some  of  his  critics  have  sug- 


92  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

* 

gested,  —  a  belief  which  had  so  far  carried  him 
from  victory  to  victory,  —  we  cannot  blame  him. 
War  is  a  game  of  chance,  and  Lee  now  saw  that 
chance  had  put  his  enemy  in  his  power. 

At  the  close  of  the  day  Lee  therefore  rode  over 
to  see  if  Ewell  could  not  open  the  battle  by  carry 
ing  Cemetery  Hill.  Ewell  bluntly  declared  it 
Eweii  to  be  an  impossibility.  The  Union 

says  NO.  troops,  he  said,  would  be  at  work 
strengthening  their  already  formidable  positions 
there  all  night,  so  that  by  morning  they  would  be 
found  well-nigh  impregnable.  Gulp's  Hill  had 
been  snatched  from  his  grasp.  The  rugged 
character  of  these  heights,  the  impossibility  of 
using  artillery  to  support  an  attack,  the  exposure 
Cemetery  Hiii  of  the  assaulting  columns  to  the  fire 
too  strong.  Qf  ^Q  \jn'lon  batteries  at  short  range, 
were  all  forcibly  dwelt  upon  and  fully  concurred 
in  by  Ewell' s  lieutenants.  In  short,  so  many  ob 
jections  appeared  that,  willing  or  unwilling,  Lee 
found  himself  forced  to  give  over  the  design  of 
breaking  through  the  Union  line  at  this  point  and 
taking  the  road  to  Baltimore. 

It  was  then  suggested  that  the  attack   should 


CEMETERY  HILL  93 

begin  on  the  Union  left,  where,  to  all  appearances, 
the  ridge  was  far  more  assailable  or  less  strongly 
Eweiisays,  occupied,  because  the  Union  troops 
try  the  Left,  seemed  massed  more  with  the  view  of 
repelling  this  projected  assault  toward  their  right. 

Inasmuch  as  Evvell  was  really  ignorant  of  what 
force  was  in  his  front  at  that  moment,  his  advice 
to  Lee  may  have  sprung  from  a  not  unnatural 
desire  to  see  that  part*  of  the  army  which  had  not 
been  engaged  do  some  of  the  work  cut  out  for 
him  and  his  corps. 

Be  that  as  it  may,  Lee  then  and  there  proposed 
giving  up  Gettysburg  altogether,  in  order  to  draw 
Ewell  over  toward  his  right,  thus  massing  the 
Confederate  army  in  position  to  strike  the  Union 
left,  as  well  as  materially  shortening  his  own  long 
line. 

But  to  this  proposal  Ewell  as  strongly  demurred 
again.  After  losing  over  three  thousand  men  in 
taking  it,  he  did  not  want  to  give  up  Gettysburg, 
what,  give  up  It  involved  a  point  of  honor  to  which 
Gettysburg.  Jackson's  successor  showed  himself 
keenly  sensitive.  His  arrival  had  decided  the  day; 
and  at  that  moment  he  held  the  bulk  of  the  Union 


94  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

army  before  him,  simply  by  remaining  where  he 
was.  If  he  moved  off,  that  force  would  be  freed 
also.  So  where  would  be  the  gain  of  it? 

"Well,  then,  if  I  attack  from  my  right,  Long- 
street  will  have  to  make  the  attack,"  said  Lee  at 
last;  adding  a  moment  later,  and  as  if  the  admis 
sion  came  from  him  in  spite  of  himself,  "  but  he  is 
so  slow." 

Finding  that  Ewell  was  'averse  to  making  an 
attack  himself,  averse  to  leaving  Gettysburg ;  that 
Hill  was  averse  to  putting  his  crippled  corps  for 
ward  so  soon  again ;  and  that  Longstreet  was 
averse  to  fighting  at  all  on  that  ground,  —  Lee  may 
Lee.s  well  have  thought,  like  Napoleon  dur- 

Diiemma.  ing  the  Hundred  Days,  that  his  gen 
erals  were  no  longer  what  they  had  been.10  There 
was  certainly  more  or  less  pulling  at  cross  pur 
poses  in  the  Confederate  camp. 

Meade  did  not  reach  the  field  until  one  in  the 
morning.  It  was  then  too  early  to  see  the  ground 
he  was  going  to  fight  on. 

It  thus  appears  that  Lee  had  well  considered  all 
his  plans  for  attacking  before  Meade  could  so 
much  as  begin  his  dispositions  for  defence.  And 


CEMETERY  HILL  95 

this  same  unpreparedness,  this  fatality  of  having 
always  to  follow  your  adversary's  lead,  had  so  far 
distinguished  every  stage  of  this  most  unpromising 
campaign. 

In  the  mellow  moonlight  of  a  midsummer's 
night,  looking  down  into  the  unlighted  streets  of 
Gettysburg,  the  tired  soldiers  dropped  to  rest 
among  the  graves  or  in  the  fields  wet  with  falling 
dew,  while  their  comrades  were  hurrying  on  over 
the  dusty  roads  that  stretched  out  in  long,  weary 
miles  toward  Gettysburg,  as  if  life  and  death  were 
in  their  speed. 

1  It  seems  plain  that  next  to  Reynolds  Hancock  was  the   one  in 
whom  Meade  reposed  most  confidence. 

2  This  was  the  Seventh  Indiana,  which  had  been  acting  as  escort  to 
the  trains.    It  brought  five  hundred  fresh  men  to  Wadsworth's  division. 

3  By  General  Morgan's  account,  one  thousand  five  hundred  fugitives 
were  collected  by  the  provost  guard  of  the  Twelfth  Corps,  some  miles 
in  rear  of  the  field. 

4  This  was  a  brigade  of  nine  months'  men,  called  in  derision  the 
"  Paper  Collar  Brigade."     No  troops  contributed  more  to  the  winning 
of  this  battle,  though  only  three  of  its  five  regiments  were  engaged. 

0  Johnson  was  then  coming  up.  This  is  equivalent  to  an  admission 
that  Ewell  did  not  feel  able  to  undertake  anything  further  that  night  with 
the  two  divisions  that  had  been  in  action. 

6  While  conveying  the  idea  that  the  position  was  good,  Hancock's 
message  was,  in  reality,  sufficiently  ambiguous.  It,  however,  served 
Meade's  turn,  as  his  mind  was  more  than  half  made  up  already. 


96  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

7  The  Seventh  Indiana  brought  up  five  hundred  men ;  Stannard's 
brigade  two  thousand  five  hundred  more. 

8  The  Union  corps  would  not  average  ten  thousand  men  present  in 
the  ranks,  although  the  Sixth  bore  sixteen  thousand  on  its  muster  rolls. 
Some   corps   had  three,  some  two  divisions.     There  were   too   many 
corps,  and  in  consequence  too  many  corps  commanders,  for  the  best 
and  most  efficient  organization. 

9  This  was  Pickett's,  left  at  Chambersburg  to  guard  the  trains. 

10  Lee's  corps  commanders  in   council  seem  more  like  a  debating 
society :  Meade's  more  like  a  Quaker  meeting. 


THE  SECOND   OF  JULY  97 


VII 

THE   SECOND    OF  JULY 

WITH  similar  views  each  of  the  other's  strength 

or  weakness,  Meade  and  Lee  seem  to  have  arrived 

at  precisely  the  same  idea.     For  instance,  we  have 

Lee  seriously  thinking  of  giving  up  Get- 

Deliberating. 

tysburg,  after  hearing  Ewell's  objec 
tions  to  attacking  from  this  side ;  and  we  have 
Meade  first  meditating  a  stroke  against  Lee  from 
this  very  quarter,  until  dissuaded  from  it  by  some 
of  his  generals.  Yet  no  sooner  has  Lee  turned 
his  attention  to  the  other  flank,  than,  as  if  in 
formed  of  what  was  passing  in  his  adversary's 
mind,  Meade  sets  about  strengthening  that  flank 
too.  Wary  and  circumspect,  each  was  feeling  for 
his  adversary's  weak  point. 

With  the  first  streak  of  day  the  hostile  camps 
were  astir.  Meade  was  riding  along  the  ridge, 
giving  orders  for  posting  his  troops.  All  of  the 


98  THE  BATTLE  OF   GETTYSBURG 

Twelfth  Corps  (Geary's  division  having  vacated  the 
Little  Round  position  it  had  held  during  the  night) 

Top   deserted.     plantecj     itsejf   stJH     more    firmly    on    the 

slopes  of  Gulp's  Hill,  at  the  extreme  right  of  the 
line.  Wadsworth's  division  of  the  First  Corps 
carried  the  line  across  the  dip  toward  Cemetery 
Hill,  where  the  Eleventh  Corps  had  stood  since 
the  afternoon  before.  The  Second  Corps  now  fell 
in  along  the  ridge,  at  the  left  of  the  Eleventh,  rest- 
union  Line,  ing  its  right  on  Ziegler's  Grove,  a  little 
Morning.  clump  of  trees  hardly  worth  the  name, 
growing  out  at  the  edge  of  the  ridge,  and  where 
it  bulges  out  somewhat  brokenly.  Next  to  the 
Second,  the  Third  Corps  lay  massed  behind  the 
ridge,  awaiting  orders ;  it  now  held  the  left.  The 
First  was  in  reserve.  The  Fifth  and  Sixth  were 
nearing  the  ground,  but  the  pace  was  telling  on 
the  men. 

Since  this  day's  battle  was  to  be  fought  mostly 
on  ground  lying  to  the  left  (or  south)  of  Han 
cock's  position,  it  may  be  well  to  glance  at  its 
general  features. 

Three  roads  leave  Gettysburg  by  way  of  Ceme 
tery  Hill,  for  Baltimore,  Taneytown,  and  Emmetts- 


THE  SECOND    OF  JULY  99 

burg,  respectively.  Those  going  to  Baltimore  and 
Left  Flank  Emmettsburg  part  just  as  they  begin  to 
Features.  mount  the  slope  of  Cemetery  Hill,  the 
first  keeping  off  to  the  left  over  the  hill,  past  the 
Cemetery,  and  down  the  opposite  slope,  or  wholly 
within  the  Union  lines ;  the  last  bearing  off  to  the 
right,  along  the  foot  of  the  hill,  or  wholly  outside 
Emmettsburg  tne  Union  lines,  though  at  first  within 
Road.  musket  range.  All  of  the  Union  army, 

now  assembled,  lay  between  these  two  roads  ex 
cept  that  part  posted  at  the  east  of  the  Cemetery 
and  along  Gulp's  Hill.  As  for  these  troops,  the 
Baltimore  Baltimore  pike  passed  close  by  their 
Turnpike.  rearj  faQ  jjne  herQ  taking  such  a  sharp 

backward  sweep  that  the  soldiers  posted  on  Gulp's 
Hill  actually  turned  their  backs  on  those  forming 
the  front  line.  While  the  Baltimore  pike  cut  the 
Union  position  in  two,  or  nearly  so,  the  Taney- 
town  road  traversed  it  from  end  to  end,  thus 
greatly  facilitating  the  moving  of  troops  or  guns 
from  one  part  of  the  line  to  the  other. 

Though  the  Emmettsburg  road  closely  hugged 
the  Cemetery  Heights  in  going  out  of  Gettysburg, 
its  general  direction  carried  it  farther  and  farther 


IOO        THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

off,  in  proportion  as  it  went  on  its  way ;  so  that,  al 
though  actually  starting  from  Cemetery  Hill,  this 
road,  in  going  two  or  three  miles,  eventually  struck 
across  to  Seminary  Ridge,  or  from  the  Union  right 
to  the  enemy's  right.1  On  the  morning  of  the 
second  it  therefore  formed  debatable  ground  be 
longing  to  neither  army,  though  offering  a  hazard 
ous  way  still  to  belated  troops,  because  the  enemy 
had  not  yet  occupied  it.  This  Emmettsburg  road 
was  destined  to  play  an  important  part  in  the  events 
of  this  day. 

After  keeping  its  high  level  for  some  distance, 
Cemetery  Ridge  falls  away  for  the  space  of  several 
hundred  yards,  to  rise  again  by  a  gradual  slope 
to  a  rugged,  bowlder-strewn,  rather  thinly  wooded 

Little  Round  hill»  called  Little  Round  Top,  which 
Top.  see  finely  overlooks  all  that  part  of  the  field. 

Chap.  I. 

Thus,  what  Gulp's  Hill  was  to  the  right 
Little  Round  Top  was  to  the  left  of  the  Union 
position  —  at  once  bulwark  and  warder.  Still 
beyond  Little  Round  Top,  out  across  a  little 
valley  opening  a  passage  between  them,  rose  a 
Big  Round  much  loftier  eminence,  called  Big 
Top-  Round  Top.  Strangely  enough,  neither 


THE  SECOND   OF  JULY  IOI 

of  these  commanding  hills  was  occupied  in  the 
morning;  for  though  Geary's  pickets  lay  out 
before  Little  Round  Top  all  night,  they  had  been 
called  in  at  daybreak,  when  the  division  itself 
marched  off  to  rejoin  its  corps  at  Gulp's  Hill.2 
Most  unfortunately,  too,  the  Union  cavalry  was 
no  longer  there  to  watch  the  enemy's  movements 
in  this  quarter  and  promptly  report  them  at  head 
quarters,  as  Meade  himself  had  sent 
off  Buford  to  the  rear  of  the  army.3 
In  military  phrase,  the  whole  Union  left  was  in 
the  air. 

Up  to  nine  in  the  morning,  therefore,  this  part 
of  the  field  where  Lee  designed  to  strrke  his  most 
telling  blow  was  anybody's  position,  so  far  as  the 
dispositions  for  its  defence  are  concerned ;  but  at 
that  hour  Sickles 4  began  deploying  the  Third 
Corps  toward  Round  Top.  Presently  two  of  his 
brigades  that  had  been  left  behind  were  seen 
marching  down  the  Emmettsburg  road,  under 
fire  from  the  enemy's  skirmishers ;  5  so  giving 
them  sharp  notice  that  this  road  was  no  longer 
open. 

Little     Round     Top,    however,    still     remained 


IO2         THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

unoccupied,  save  by  a  handful  of  men  belonging 
to  the  Signal  Corps  of  the  army. 

The  men  of  the  Third  Corps  watched  the  march 
of  their  comrades  in  breathless  expectation  of 
hearing  the  enemy's  cannon  open  upon  them,  or 
of  seeing  some  body  of  infantry  suddenly  pour 
Dangerous  a  withering  volley  into  them  from  the 
Marching.  cover  Qf  fae  woocjs.  But  whether  the 

enemy  were  too  much  confounded  by  the  very 
audacity  of  the  thing,  or  purposely  refrained  from 
hostilities  that  might  expose  and  frustrate  their 
own  movements,  now  in  progress  under  the  mask 
of  these  very  woods,  neither  of  these  things 
happened.  These  two  lost  brigades  of  Kearney's 
Peninsula  veterans  simply  closed  up  their  ranks, 
and  strode  steadily  on  between  the  two  armies, 
without  quickening  their  pace.  In  vain  Sickles 
looked  round  him  for  some  cavalry  to  escort  them 
into  his  lines.  There  was  no  longer  a  single  sabre 
on  the  ground. 

Those  of  Sickles'  soldiers  who  had  thrown 
themselves  down  upon  the  grass  behind  the 
stacks  now  breathed  more  freely  at  seeing  their 
comrades  turn  off  from  the  main  road,  at  a  short 


THE  SECOND  OF  JULY  IO3 

mile    out,  where  the    roofs  of  a    farmhouse  and 

out-buildings  glistened  in  the  morning  sun.     This 

was   the    Sherfy   place  —  a   very  para- 

Sherfy  Place. 

disc  in  appearance  to  these  fasting  and 
footsore  soldiers,  to  whom  its  ripening  fruits  and 
luxuriant  golden  wheat,  tall  and  nearly  ripe  for 
the  sickle,  seemed  the  incarnation  of  peace  and 
plenty.  Many  a  wistful  glance  was  cast  at  the 
peach  orchard,  as  these  troops  turned  the  corner 
where  it  stood.  The  cross-road  then  came  straight 
down  toward  Little  Round  Top,  so  that  in  a 
The  cross-  quarter  of  an  hour  more  the  marching 
road.  column  heard  the  welcome  orders  to 

"  Halt !  "  "  Stack  arms  !  "  "  Rest !  " 

If  the  comparison  be  not  too  far-fetched,  this 
Sherfy  farm  and  the  angle  formed  by  these  two 
divergent  roads  were  destined  to  be  the  La  Haie 
Sainte  of  this  Waterloo.  One  word  more  is  essen 
tial  to  the  description.  The  ground  out  there, 
over  which  the  cross-road  passed  on  toward  the 
The  Enemy  Union  lines,  swells  handsomely  up  to 
covet  it.  a  rounde(i  knoll  that  makes  a  very 
pretty  as  well  as  noticeable  object  in  the  land 
scape.  The  field-glasses  of  General  Lee  and  of 


IO4        THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

his  staff  had  already  determined  this  knoll  to  be 
a  splendid  position  for  their  artillery. 

That  peach-orchard  angle  with  the  adjoining 
knoll — in  reality  the  highest  point  lying  between 
the  two  armies  —  was,  for  this  reason,  the  first 
object  of  the  Confederates'  attention  on  this  day. 
It  was  a  stepping-stone  toward  Cemetery  Ridge. 
It  was  now  in  possession  of  Sickles'  skirmishers, 
posted  there  the  night  before,  and  already  ex 
changing  shots  with  those  of  the  enemy.6 

Uneasy  at  seeing  no  enemy  in  front  of  him, 
Sickles  decided  to  push  his  skirmishers  still  far 
ther  out.  They  accordingly  went  forward  into  the 
woods  of  Seminary  Ridge,  where  the  enemy  was 
supposed  to  be.  They  had  scarcely  arrived  there 
when  they  fell  in  with  some  Confederates,  by  whom, 
after  a  sharp  encounter,  they  were  driven  back, 
but  not  before  they  had  seen  heavy  columns 
moving  off  to  gain  the  Union  left  under  cover  of 
the  woods.  This  information  made  Sickles  still 
more  uneasy,  impressed  as  he  was  with  the  belief 
that  an  attack  upon  him  was  imminent,  and  that 
he  would  have  to  receive  it  where  the  low  ground 
he  then  occupied  7  offered  little  chance  for  mak- 


THE  SECOND   OF  JULY  IO5 

ing  a  successful  defence.  Little  Round  Top  rose 
on  his  left,  his  front  stretched  across  the  adjoining 
hollow,  the  peach-orchard  knoll  loomed  threaten 
ingly  before  him  in  the  distance,  the  skirmish  fire 
The  swaie  was  growing  hotter  out  there,  his  or- 
agam.  ders  were  either  vague  or  unsatisfac 

tory,  and  so  Sickles,  commanding  a  single  corps 
of  the  army,  having  convinced  himself  that  the 
line,  as  formed,  was  defective,  determined  in  his 
own  mind  to  abandon  it  for  one  of  his  own  choos 
ing,  orders  or  no  orders. 

This  movement  to  the  left,  first  detected  by 
Sickles'  skirmishers,  was  Longstreet  getting  into 
position  for  the  attack  that  Lee  had  ordered. 
When  Longstreet's  guns  should  be  heard,  Ewell 
Longstreet  was  t°  assault  Gulp's  Hill  and  Cemetery 

at  Work.  HiU  .     while    pjj}^   in    the    centre)    was  to 

follow  up  Longstreet's  attack  as  it  progressed  from 
right  to  left.  In  short,  a  simultaneous  assault  on 
the  two  wings  of  Meade's  army  was  to  be  con 
nected  by  a  second  and  cumulative  wave  gather 
ing  headway  as  it  rolled  on,  until  this  billow  of 
fire  and  steel  should  engulf  and  sweep  the  whole 
Union  line  out  of  existence. 


IO6        THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

By  this  plan  of  battle  Lee  expected  to  discon 
cert  any  attempt  to  reinforce  either  flank,  or 
should  Meade  dare  weaken  his  centre  for  that 
purpose,  Hill  could  then  push  in  there,  and  cut 
the  Union  army  in  twain. 

Splendid  conception !  magnificent  plan !  none 
the  less  because  too  complicated  for  the  execution 
of  generals  who  either  could  not  or  would  not 
comprehend  what  was  required  of  them.  Con 
soling  thought,  that  not  all  the  stupidity  or  blun 
dering  was  on  the  Union  side  ! 

Lee  had  pointed  out  the  peach  orchard  to 
Longstreet,  with  the  injunction  that  it  should  be 
seized  first  of  all. 

Though  he  had  received  his  orders  at  eleven 
o'clock,  it  was  not  until  after  half-past  three 
that  Longstreet  was  ready  to  open  the  battle. 
Sluggish  by  nature,  he  was  well  de 
scribed  by  his  chief  as  slow  to  act: 
once  in  the  thick  of  the  fight,  he  rose  with  com 
manding  power  as  the  peerless  fighter  of  that  army ; 
and  in  that  part  of  the  field  where  Longstreet 
fought,  the  dead  always  lay  thickest.  The  confi 
dence  reposed  in  him  by  Lee  is  fully  attested  by 


THE  SECOND   OF  JULY  IO/ 

the  fact  of  his  having  assigned  the  conduct  of 
the  battles,  both  on  the  second  and  third,  to 
General  Longstreet. 

We  have  seen  how,  after  some  hours  of  waver 
ing,  Sickles  had  at  length  decided  to  choose  a 
new  position  for  himself.  Yesterday  he  had 
not  been  able  to  convince  himself  that  it  would 
be  right  to  move  his  corps  out  of  line,  even  that 
he  might  go  to  the  aid  of  his  immediate  chief 
and  when  his  doing  so  would  have  saved  the  day. 
Restrained  then  by  the  strict  letter  of  his  orders,8 
he  had  remained  in  a  state  of  feverish  uncertainty 
sickles'  f°r  some  hours,  though  at  length  con- 

Idea-  eluding  to  disobey  them.  To-day 

when  he  was  without  real  responsibility,  being 
now  in  the  presence  of  the  general  commanding 
the  army,  Sickles  sets  both  orders  and  chief  at 
defiance.  The  acts  of  the  two  days  are,  how 
ever,  in  striking  accord.  Sickles  disobeys  orders 
in  both  instances. 

At  about  three  o'clock  the  Union  army  saw 
with  astonishment,  not  unmixed  with  dismay, 
the  whole  of  the  Third  Corps  moving  out  to 
the  front  in  magnificent  order,  not  as  troops  go 


IO8        THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

into  battle  with  skirmishers  well  advanced  to  the 
front,  but  as  confidently  as  if  going  to  a  review 
with  two  grand  armies  for  spectators.  It  was 
The  Third  indeed  a  gallant  sight  to  see  these 
Corps  moves  solid  columns  go  forward,  brigade  after 

out. 

brigade,  battery  following  battery,  as, 
with  flags  fluttering  in  the  breeze  and  bayonets 
flashing  in  the  sun,  the  two  divisions  of  Hum 
phreys  and  Birney  began  deploying  along  the 
Emmettsburg  road  in  front  and  taking  position 
between  the  peach  orchard  and  the  Devil's  Den 
to  their  rear,  thus  putting  an  elbow  in  the 
general  line. 

In  vain  we  try  to  imagine  one  of  Napoleon's 
or  Wellington's  marshals  taking  it  upon  himself 
to  post  his  troops  independently  of  his  com 
mander.  It  now  appears  that  General  Sickles  did 
this  regardless  of  whether  he  was  thwarting  the 
plans  of  the  general-in-chief  or  not,  or  whether 
indeed  by  so  doing  he  was  overthrowing  the  whole 
theory  of  delivering  a  strictly  defensive  battle. 
Instead  of  allowing  Meade  his  initiative,  we  find 
Sickles  actually  compelling  his  superior  to  follow 
his  lead,9  not  under  the  stress  of  some  sudden 


THE  SECOND   OF  JULY  1 09 

emergency,  but  deliberately,  defiantly.  Not  that 
he  had  penetrated  Lee's  designs.  By  no  means. 
Had  he  done  so  we  should  be  all  the  more 
amazed  at  his  hardihood  in  going  out  with  his 
ten  thousand  men  to  resist  the  onslaught  of 
twenty  thousand  or  more. 

But  the  whole  corps  was  not  enough  to  occupy 
the  ground  selected.  When  the  right  div.ision 
(Humphreys')  reached  the  road,  it  had  left  a 
space  of  not  less  than  three-fourths  of  a  mile 
between  itself  and  the  left  of  the  Second  Corps. 
That  flank  was  therefore  in  the  air.  The  left 
division  (Birney's),  or  most  of  it,  was  formed 
nearly  at  right  angles  with  the  first,  showing  a 
front  of  three  brigades  facing  south,  and  posted 
in  a  line  much  broken  by  the  natural  features 
of  the  ground,  which  grow  more  and  more  rugged 
in  proportion  as  Round  Top  is  neared.  Though 
stronger,  by  reason  of  the  natural  defences,  this 
flank  was  a  fourth  of  a  mile  from  Round  Top. 

While  this  was  going  on  out  at  the  front,  the 
Sixth  and  last  Union  Corps  (Sedgwick's)  was 
coming  up  behind  the  main  position,  worn  down 
with  marching  thirty-six  miles  almost  without  a 


HO  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

halt.  The  Fifth  had  already  arrived,  also  with 
its  men  greatly  fatigued.  The  situation,  there 
fore,  had  so  far  improved,  in  that  the  enemy's 
delays10  had  given  time  for  the  whole  Union 
army  to  assemble,  though  the  two  belated  corps 
were  scarcely  in  fighting  trim. 

Scarcely  had  Birney's  men  time  to  look  about 
them  when  the  booming  of  a  single  gun  gave 
notice  that  the  long-expected  battle  had  begun. 

1  On  the  night  of  the  first,  the  Confederate  right  did  not  extend  much, 
if  any,  south  of  the  Hagerstown,  or  Fairfield,  road.    As  the  fresh  troops 
came  up  they  were  used  in  extending  the  line  southward.    Anderson's 
division  was  the  first  to  move  down  to  Hill's  left.    It  was  his  skirmishers 
that  first  became  engaged  with  Sickles'. 

2  We  have  seen  Meade  first  planning  an  attack  on  that  side,  which 
was  why  he  was  drawing  troops  over  there.     He  designed  having  the 
Third  Corps  occupy  the  position  vacated  by  Geary,  however,  and  so 
directed. 

3  In  consequence  of  his  exhausted  condition,  from  incessant  march 
ing  and  fighting,  Buford  was  to  be  relieved  by  other  troops. 

*  General  Daniel  E.  Sickles,  commanding  the  Third  Corps. 
B  The  enemy  were  seeking  to  mask  their  movements  to  the  Union 
left  behind  these  skirmishers. 

6  The  peach-orchard   knoll  was  Sickles'  bugbear.     He   thought  it 
much  to  be  preferred  to  the  position  he  was  in.     It  was,  however,  fully 
commanded  from  Little  Round  Top. 

7  This  refers  to  the  swale  next  north  of  Little  Round  Top. 

8  Though  forming  part  of  Reynolds'  command,  Sickles  was  halted 
between  Taneytovvn  and  Emmettsburg  by  Meade's  order. 


THE  SECOND   OF  JULY  III 

9  Sickles  claimed  at  first  that  he  could  not  find  the  position  assigned 
him,  namely,  that  vacated  by  Geary.    The  force  of  this  plea  will  be  best 
appreciated  by  old  soldiers.    But  in  the   following  remarks  all  such 
clumsy  pretexts  are  thrown  to  the  winds;    he  here  takes  praise  to 
himself  for  ignoring  his  commanding  officer.     It  might  be  called  a  plea 
for  insubordination. 

"  It  may  have  been  imprudent  to  advance  and  hold  Longstreet  at 
whatever  sacrifice,  but  wasn't  it  worth  a  sacrifice  to  save  the  key  of  the 
position?  What  were  we  there  for?  Were  we  there  to  count  the  cost 
in  blood  and  men,  when  the  key  of  the  position  at  Gettysburg  was 
within  the  enemy's  grasp  ?  "  (How  did  Sickles  know  this  ?)  "  What 
little  I  know  of  conduct  on  a  battlefield  I  learned  from  Hooker  and 
Kearney."  (Kearney  was  a  strict  disciplinarian.)  "  What  would  Hooker 
or  Kearney  have  done,  finding  themselves  in  an  assailable,  untenable 
position,  without  orders  from  headquarters  as  to  their  dispositions  for 
battle,  when  they  saw  masses  of  the  enemy  marching  to  seize  a  vital 
point  ?  Would  they  have  hesitated  ?  Would  they  have  sent  couriers 
to  headquarters  and  asked  for  instructions  what  to  do  ?  Never,  never ! 
Well,  I  learned  war  from  them,  and  I  didn't  send  any.  I  simply  ad 
vanced  on  to  the  battlefield  and  seized  Longstreet  by  the  throat  and 
held  him  there."  —  Sickles'  Music  Hall  Speech,  Boston,  1886. 

10  John  Stark's  famous  maxim,  that  one  fresh  man  in  battle  is  worth 
two  fatigued  ones,  will  be  heartily  endorsed  by  all  who  have  seen  it  put 
to  the  test. 


I  I  2  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 


VIII 

THE    SECOND    OF   JULY Continued 

AT  this  signal  all  the  enemy's  batteries  opened 
in  succession,  and  for  a  space  a  storm  of  shot  and 
shell  tore  through  Sickles'  lines  with  crushing 
Fighting  effect.  His  own  guns,  posted  partly  in 
begins.  the  orchard,  partly  along  the  cross 

road,  on  the  high  knoll  behind  it,  —  that  is  to  say, 
in  the  very  spot  selected  by  Lee  in  advance  for  his 
own,  —  began  to  lose  both  horses  and  men,  nor  were 
the  infantry  able  to  shelter  themselves  from  the 
cross-fire  of  fifty-four  pieces  of  artillery,  some  of 
which  were  killing  men  at  both  sides  of  the  angle 
with  the  same  shot.1 

Not  many  minutes  had  elapsed  before  every 
man  on  the  ground,  from  general  to  private  soldier, 
felt  that  a  wretched  blunder  had  been  committed 
in  thrusting  them  out  there. 

By  and  by  the  cannonade  slackened.  This  was 
sufficient  "notice  to  old  soldiers  that  something 


114         THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

more  was  coming.     Before  its  echoes  had  died  away 
see  M  Tr  o  s  Longstreet's  first  assaulting  column,  led 
described,        by  Hood   himself,   came   down   with   a 
crash  upon  Birney,  three  lines  deep. 

The  enemy  was  about  to  repeat  his  old  tactics, 
employed  at  Chancellorsville  with  so  much  effect, 
of  getting  around  the  Union  left  and  then  rolling 
it  up  endwise.2  That  his  calculations  in  this  case 
were  not  quite  accurate  was  soon  made  manifest. 

Since  noon  Longstreet  had  been  working  his 
way  round  through  the  woods  toward  Little 
Round  Top,  making  a  wide  circuit  to  avoid  dis 
covery.3  Having  remonstrated  in  vain  against 
this  movement,  he  was  probably  in  no  great  hurry 
to  execute  it.  It  was  therefore  four  o'clock  before 
he  was  ready  to  begin.  But  if  slow  he  was  sure. 

Longstreet's  line  crossed  the  Emmettsburg 
road  at  an  acute  angle  with  it,  Hood's  division 
stretching  off  to  the  right,  McLaws'  mostly  to  the 
left.  Longstreet  was  thus  about  to  throw  eight 
brigades,  or,  by  his  own  account,  thirteen  thousand 
men,  against  the  three  brigades  of  Ward,  De  Tro- 
briand,  and  Graham,  numbering  about  five  thou 
sand  men.  Hood  was  to  begin  by  attacking  from 


THE  SECOND  OF  JULY  115 

the  wheat-field  to  the  Devil's  Den,  McLaws  to  follow 
him  up  from  the  wheat-field  to  the  orchard.  It  was 
not  until  they  had  got  into  line,  however,  that  the 
Confederates  were  undeceived  about  the  Union 
force  before  them.  Until  then  they  thought  the 
Union  left  stopped  at  the  orchard. 

At  four  o'clock  the  Union  signal-station  on 
Little  Round  Top  saw  and  reported  these  move 
ments  to  headquarters.  The  Confederate  advance 
began  soon  after  four.  By  the  first  fire  Hood 
was  wounded  and  had  to  leave  the  field  almost 
before  his  troops  had  fairly  come  into  action. 

The  first  shock  fell  upon  Ward's  brigade,  which 
held  the  extreme  left  at  the  Devil's  Den.  Ward's 
line  would  not  reach  to  Little  Round  Top,  so  that 
there  was  a  wide  space  between  him  and  this  hill, 
with  not  a  man  in  it — a  fact  that  Hood's  men  were 
Combat  at  •  not  slow  either  in  perceiving  or  taking 
Devil's  Den.  advantage  of.  But,  what  was  far  worse, 
it  led  to  the  discovery  of  the  defenceless  condition 
of  Little  Round  Top  itself,  and,  quickly  grasping 
its  commanding  importance,  the  enemy  instantly 
sent  one  of  his  brigades  to  seize  it. 

The    conflict    thus    established     at    this    point, 


Il6        THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

which  Sickles  had  so  imprudently  vacated,  be 
came  of  supreme  importance  to  the  Union  army, 
while  that  about  to  begin  at  the  peach  orchard 
degenerated  into  a  struggle  to  save  Sickles'  corps 
from  annihilation. 

Fortunately  for  Ward,  the  ground  he  held  was 
just  the  place  for  a  protracted  defence',  provided 
he  should  not  be  out-flanked.  Weird  and  grisly, 
it  looked  as  if  some  huge  excrescent  mass  of 
earth,  rocks,  and  trees  had  some  time  slid  off  the 
flank  of  Little  Round  Top  into  the  low  ground 
below,  whence  its  own  momentum  had  carried  it 
still  farther  on  —  a  misshapen  heap,  deeply  seamed 
by  rents  and  splits,  thick-set  with  bowlders  and 
filled  with  holes  and  hiding-places,  among  which 
Ward's  men  now  found  excellent  cover. 

Ward  was  firmly  planted  on  and  around  the 
Devil's  Den,  with  his  sharp-shooters  loading  and 
firing  from  behind  the  scattered  bowlders,  when 
the  enemy  made  their  rush  upon  him,  whooping 
and  yelling  like  so  many  fiends  come  to  reoccupy 
The  Danger  their  own  legitimate  abode.  Some 
portion  soon  found  themselves  in  the 
unguarded  hollow  below.  Seeing  the  enemy 


THE  SECOND   OF  JULY  I  I/ 

crowding  into  it,  Ward  sent  first  one  regiment 
there,  and  then  another,  on  the  run.  A  combat 
at  .close  quarters  ensued. 

The  regiments  of  Hood's  division  were  now 
either  trying  to  scale  Little  Round  Top,  push 
through  the  hollow,  or  capture  the  Devil's  Den 
with  its  guns.  The  left  brigade,  however,  which 
extended  beyond  the  Den,  was  being  very  roughly 
handled  ;  the  centre  only  had  made  progress,  while 
the  right  was  engaged  in  a  murderous  conflict,  to 
be  presently  described.  Hood's  effort  had,  there 
fore,  exhausted  itself,  and  his  division  had  to  halt 
simply  because  it  could  advance  no  farther. 

McLaws  now  came  to  Hood's  assistance.  His 
right  brigade  (Kershaw's)  now  struck  De  Trobri- 
and's,  which  stood  next  in  line  along  the  edge  of 
a  wheat-field,  back  of  and  adjoining  the  Devil's 
Atthe  Den.  De  Trobriand  had  a  little  muddy 

wheat-field.  ravine  in  front  of  him,  into  which  the 
enemy  boldly  plunged.  His  men  waited  until 
their  assailants  had  got  within  twenty  yards, 
when  they  poured  in  such  a  close  and  deadly  fire 
that  the  gully  was  speedily  vacated  by  all  save 
the  dead  and  the  dying.  The  attack  here  not 


Il8         THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

only  completely  failed,  but  three  of  Kershaw's 
regiments  were  nearly  destroyed  while  attacking 
the  peach  orchard.  This  brigade  fell  back  and 
was  rallied  about  the  Rose  house. 

Semmes'  brigade  had  followed  close  behind 
Kershaw's,  and  now  took  its  place.  Its  com 
mander  speedily  fell,  mortally  wounded.  Barks- 
dale  rushed  upon  Graham,  followed  by  Wofford. 
This  onset  brought  the  whole  Confederate  force 
into  action.  The  odds  were  as  two  to  one. 

That  part  of  the  enemy  whom  we  left  working 
their  way  up  the  hollow  to  Little  Round  Top  also 
met  with  stubborn  resistance,  and  as  this  was 
more  and  more  seen  to  be  the  critical  point,  the 
enemy  redoubled  their  efforts  to  force  their  way 
through.  Our  soldiers  who  had  gone  into  ambus 
cade  behind  the  bowlders  there  were  being  grad 
ually  driven  back  from  cover  to  cover,  so  yielding 
up  as  they  retired  the  approaches  to  Little  Round 
Top. 

Having  gained  this  vantage-ground  the  Confed 
erates  now  made  a  second  onset  against  Ward 
and  De  Trobriand.  This  time  it  proved  more 
successful.  After  an  hour's  obstinate  righting, 


THE  SECOND  OF  JULY  I  1 9 

Ward  was  driven  out  of  his  fastness,4  De  Tro- 
Devii'sDen  briand  forced  back  across  the  wheat- 
taken.  fieid.  Sickles'  left  was  thus  completely 
broken  up,  the  fragments  drifting  backward  in 
search  of  some  point  of  support. 

Little  Round  Top  was  about  to  fall  into  the 
enemy's  hands.  Once  in  his  possession,  the 
Union  line  on  Cemetery  Ridge  would  have  to  be 
abandoned  or  swept  to  the  winds.  Fortunately 
the  turning-point  had  been  reached  before  the 
rebels  could  reap  the  reward  of  Ward's  repulse. 
Little  Round  Shortly  before  Hood's  onset  began, 
Top  in  Pern.  General  Warren,  of  the  Engineers,  had 
seen  from  his  signal-station  on  Little  Round  Top 
the  enemy's  line  advancing  to  the  attack.  In  one 
moment  his  experienced  eye  took  in  all  the 
danger.  Ordering  the  signal  officers  to  keep  on 
waving  their  flags,  Warren  first  sent  for  and  then 
dashed  off  in  search  of  assistance  himself.  In 
deed,  not  a  moment  was  to  be  lost.  By  a  fortunate 
chance  some  troops  were  met  moving  out  to  re 
inforce  Sickles.  Detaching  a  regiment,  Warren 
hurried  it  off  to  the  threatened  point.  Meantime, 
in  response  to  his  request,  though  without  his 


120        THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

knowing  it,  Vincent's  brigade  was  climbing  the 
rearmost  slopes  off  Little  Round  Top,  arriving  just 
in  time  to  save  the  hill  with  the  bayonet.5 

A  murderous  hand-to-hand  conflict  now  began 
among  the  rocks  and  trees,  with  those  of  the 
enemy  who  were  trying  to  scale  the  slopes  regard 
less  of  death  or  wounds.  Sometimes  the  assail 
ants  were  firing  at  each  other  from  behind  the 
same  bowlder;  sometimes  both  fell  at  the  same 
instant.  The  strife  was  still  unequal.  A  battery 
was  dragged  to  the  summit;  6  three  of  the  cannon 
eers  were  shot  in  succession  before  the  fourth  suc 
ceeded  in  firing  off  the  piece.  Another  regiment 
was  brought  up.  The  rebels  fought  as  if  deter 
mined  to  take  that  hill  or  die :  the  Union  soldiers 
as  if  they  had  made  up  their  minds  to  perish  to 
the  last  man  in  its  defence.  On  both  sides  men 
fell  fast,  the  bravest  first  of  all.  Vincent  was 
killed  outright,  Weed  mortally  wounded,  and  only 
a  moment  later  Hazlett,  who  had  so  gallantly 
scaled  with  his  guns  slopes  seemingly  inaccessi 
ble,  was  struck  down  while  in  the  act  of  stooping 
over  his  commander's  prostrate  body.  O'Rorke 
was  killed  while  encouraging  his  men.  All  the 


THE  SECOND   OF  JULY  121 

superior  officers  were  down.  Never  were  rifles 
wielded  by  such  deadly  marksmen  as  those 
Texans  of  Hood's  ! 

Finding  all  their  efforts  to  carry  the  hill  by 
storm  useless,  the  rebels  next  made  a  rush  up 
through  the  little  valley  separating  the  two 
Round  Tops,  with  the  view  of  taking  the  de 
fenders  in  the  rear.  The  2Oth  Maine  met  this 
assault.  "  Stand  firm,  men  !  "  was  the  command. 
As  if  maddened  to  desperation,  the  enemy  flung 
themselves  upon  the  hardy  backwoodsmen  from 
the  Pine  Tree  State.  Twice  they  were  forced 
backward  over  the  crest,  and  twice  they  rallied 
and  drove  their  assailants  back  in  their  turn.  But 
the  emergency  had  now  been  perceived  and  was 
Little  Round  being  provided  for.  Fresh  troops 
Top  saved.  dashed  over  the  hill  to  the  aid  of  those 
who  were  fighting.  A  final  charge  sent  the 
rebels  reeling  down  into  the  hollow,  and  out  of 
it  by  the  way  they  came,  leaving-  five  hundred 
prisoners  in  the  hands  of  the  defenders,  through 
whose  gallantry  the  danger,  though  perilously 
imminent,  had  been  averted. 

Meantime  the   peach    orchard  was   being  furi- 


122        THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

ously  attacked.  Exposed  here  to  a  severe  cross- 
McLaws  fire>  ^e  Union  line  crumbled  away 
assaults.  a^  eveiy  discharge.  The  resistance  was 
stubborn,  as  might  be  expected  from  such  good 
soldiers  as  Graham's,  but  even  they  could  not 
long  maintain  such  a  disadvantageous  position, 
and  though  the  attacking  brigades  were  badly  cut 
up,  the  enemy  broke  through  there  after  a  bloody 
contest.  Barksdale  swept  on  over  the  guns, 
Wofford  gathered  up  what  he  left  behind.  All 
that  men  could  do  to  stem  the  tide  was  done,  and 
sickles  a^  m  vam-  Graham  was  wounded  and 

wounded.  taken  prisoner,  Sickles  himself  carried 
off  the  field,  shot  through  the  leg.  In  less  than 
two  hours  Birney's  line  was  clean  gone. 

As  the  infantry  fell  back  from  the  orchard,  the 
artillery  posted  along  the  cross-road  behind  them 
became,  of  course,  the  enemy's  object.  Many  of 
these  guns  had  to  be  abandoned,  some  sacrificed  in 
the  effort  to  delay  the  enemy's  progress.  Bige- 
low's  battery  obeyed  the  order  to  fight  to  the  last 
with  a  constancy  as  worthy  of  lasting  commemora 
tion  as  Perry's  famous  "  Don't  give  up  the  ship  !  " 

Though  the  position  itself  was  scarcely  worth 


THE  SECOND   OF  JULY  123 

the  sacrifice  of  a  single  soldier,  it  was  felt  that 
Sickles'  troops  must  be  extricated  at  any  cost; 
and  since  a  battle  had  been  forced  we  must  not 
be  the  losers. 

So    after   sending   Vincent's    brigade    to    Little 
Round  Top,  the  rest  of  Barnes'  division  went  out 
to    ^e^      mamtain    the    line  where   De 


Efforts 

to  help  Trobriand     had    been     fighting  ;     and 

Sickles 

Caldwell's  division  of  the  Second  Corps 
also  went  to  Ward's  assistance. 

Repulsed  from  Little  Round  Top,  the  enemy  fell 
upon  Caldwell.  The  struggle  was  brief  but  bitter. 
Half  a  score  of  general  and  field  officers  went 
down  on  the  Union  side.  But  Caldwell  finally 
succeeded  in  driving  the  enemy  back  across  the 
ravine  from  which  Ward  had  been  dislodged,  and 
two  brigades  of  regulars  firmly  closed  the  gap 
toward  Little  Round  Top. 

But  the  point  of  support  at  the  orchard  being 
gone,  all  these  troops  were  in  turn  driven  back 
after  repeated  charges  and  countercharges  made 
across  the  wheat-field  had  piled  it  with  the  slain  of 
both  armies. 

Anderson's  Confederate  division  now  advanced 


124  THE  BATTLE  OF   GETTYSBURG 

to  perform  its  share  of  the  work  cutout  for  it; 
namely,  of  continuing  the  assault  from  right  to 
left. 

One  side  of  the  angle  being  swept  away,  being 
violently  assaulted  both  in  front  and  flank,  Hum- 
Humphreys  phreys  also  had  to  fall  back  from  the 
driven  off.  Emmettsburg  road  to  the  main  position, 
or  be  cut  off  from  it.  Everything  that  had  been 
fighting  on  Sickles'  new  line  was  now  going  to 
the  rear  in  more  or  less  confusion.  The  enemy 
were  now  masters  of  the  whole  of  that  line,  had 
inflicted  serious  losses  upon  the  Third  and  Fifth 
Corps,  and  had  taken  some  of  Sickles'  guns. 
We  had  only  Round  Top  to  show  for  the  terrible 
struggle  resulting  from  Sickles'  advance. 

These  disasters  could  not  make  our  generals 
give  up  beaten  yet.  Crawford's  "  Pennsylvania 
Reserves,"  a  splendid  body  of  well-seasoned  sol 
diers,  were  now  ordered  to  drive  the  victorious 
enemy  beyond  the  wheat-field.  Seizing  a  color, 
the  general  himself  led  the  charging  column 
Crumbs  of  across  this  thrice-fought  field,  clearing 
Comfort.  jj.  jn  the  most  gallant  manner.  Two 
brigades  of  the  Sixth  Corps  followed  this  move- 


THE  SECOND   OF  JULY  125 

ment.  These  prompt  measures  completely  dis 
couraged  all  further  efforts  on  the  enemy's  part 
in  this  quarter.  Longstreet  withdrew  his  shattered 
forces  to  the  peach  orchard.  In  these  unavailing 
assaults  he  had  lost  upwards  of  five  thousand  men. 
Hood  was  wounded,  Barksdale  killed,  and  Semmes 
mortally  wounded.7 

After  this  repulse,  some  of  Doubleday's  division 
went  out  to  the  Emmettsburg  road,  capturing  the 
enemy's  post  at  the  Rogers  house  on  that  road. 

It  was  now  growing  dark.  Lee's  brilliant  plan 
of  consecutive  attack  from  right  to  left  had 
dwindled  to  a  series  of  isolated  combats  —  a  blow 
here  and  a  blow  there,  instead  of  those  combined 
and  telling  strokes  he  had  designed  giving  all 
along  the  Union  line.8 

In  falling  back  upon  Cemetery  Ridge,  which 
was  done  in  admirable  order,  Humphreys  was 
followed  up  by  three  of  Hill's  brigades,  one  of 
which,  Wright's,  actually  succeeded  in  reaching  the 
cemetery  crest,  and  had  even  seized  some  of  the 
Ridge  guns  there,  before  troops  could  be 

pierced. 

brought   up    to    check    it.      The  other 
brigades  having  failed  to  support  it,  this  one  was 


126  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

easily  driven  off,  though  its  having  pierced  the 
Union  centre  with  so  little  opposition  undoubtedly 
led  Lee  to  think  the  thing  not  so  difficult,  after  all. 
We  think  it  was  the  controlling  motive  for  his 
attack  on  the  third. 

One  other  conflict  remains  to  be  noticed.  The 
peril  menacing  his  left  had  induced  Meade  to 
nearly  strip  Gulp's  Hill  of  its  defenders.  All  of 
the  Twelfth  Corps,  which,  it  will  be  remembered, 
held  Gulp's  Hill  and  its  approaches,  had  been 
hurried  over  to  the  left,  except  one  brigade,  thus 
abandoning  the  rude  but  substantial  breastworks 
that  these  troops  had  raised  with  felled  trees,  earth, 
Gulp's  Hm  or  loose  stones,  against  an  attack.  As 
deserted.  yet  ajj  seemed  quiet  on  this  side ;  but 
when,  shortly  after  sunset,  Ewell's  corps  tardily 
began  the  part  assigned  it  by  pouring  out  of  the 
woods  in  which  it  had  lain  concealed,  to  begin  a 
furious  assault  upon  Gulp's  Hill,  his  men  found 
nothing  before  them  except  the  undefended  works 
just  spoken  of  on  that  part  of  the  hill  bordering 
And  is  upon  Rock  Creek.  Finding  the  door 

occupied.  standing  open,  as  it  were,  they  had 
only  to  walk  in  and  take  possession. 


THE  SECOND  OF  JULY  I2/ 

Trifling  as  it  seems  when  relating  it,  this  was  by 
far  the  most  important,  we  might  say  the  only 
real,  advantage  gained  by  the  enemy  in  all  this 
day's  fighting,  with  its  frightful  losses  in  men  and 
material  —  and  for  this  reason:  The  point  seized 
The  Danger  was  within  short  musket-shot  of  the 
ofit-  Baltimore  pike,  and  quite  near  that 

part  of  it  where  the  reserve  Union  artillery  was 
parked.  This  might  be  seized  or  stampeded. 
More  than  this,  the  pike  led  first  to  Westminster, 
where  Meade  had  fixed  his  base  of  supplies  before 
moving  up  to  Gettysburg,  so  making  it  from  ne 
cessity  his  line  of  retreat  in  case  of  a  reverse  to  the 
army.  In  short,  this  was  one  of  those  desperate 
cases  that  admit  only  of  desperate  remedies; 
either  the  Confederates  must  be  driven  out  before 
they  could  look  about  them,  or  the  army  must 
retreat.  Again,  night  undoubtedly  saved  the 
Union  army  from  a  great  disaster. 

Farther  to  the  left  Greene's  brigade  met  and 
repulsed  every  assault  made  upon  them.  The 
combat  took  place  in  the  thick  woods,  already 
darkened  by  the  approach  of  night. 

While  this  was  happening   at    Gulp's  Hill,  the 


128        THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

rest  of  Early's  Confederate  division  came  on  in 
the  early  twilight  to  the  assault  of  Cemetery  Hill. 
The  day  had  worn  itself  out,  the  west  only  glowed 
a  sullen  red  upon  the  battlefield.  Early's  dusky 
Cemetery  lines  could  scarce  be  made  out  except 
stormed.  by  the  flashes  of  musketry  seen  here 
and  there.  One  of  his  brigades  struck  the  side 
nearest  Gulp's  Hill  (the  gap  side),  where  the 
Union  infantry  were  kneeling  behind  stone  walls, 
waiting  with  guns  cocked  for  them  to  get  up 
nearer ;  the  other  brigade,  with  a  third  in  reserve, 
marched  on  the  right  of  the  first.  Thirty  odd 
guns  flamed  and  thundered  upon  them  from  the 
Cemetery.  The  hillside  was  lighted  up  by  flashes 
of  musketry.  It  was  one  incessant  blaze  and 
roar.  The  left  brigade  was  mowed  down  in 
swaths,  and  had  to  give  way;  but  that  on  the 
right  forced  its  way  through  the  ranks  of  the 
infantry,  swarmed  up  around  the  guns  that  were 
dealing  death  among  them,  and  began  a  hand-to- 
hand  fight  with  the  artillery-men,  in  which  men 
were  beaten  to  death  with  handspikes  and  ram 
mers. 

The  Confederates  enjoyed  a  short-lived  triumph. 


THE  SECOND  OF  JULY  129 

An  ominous  silence  succeeded  the  struggle  around 
Enemy  is  tne  guris.  Word  was  passed  that  the 
repulsed.  enemy  was  in  our  works.  Orders  were 
given  in  whispers,  for  it  was  now  too  dark  to 
tell  friend  from  foe.  The  steady  tramp,  tramp  of 
armed  men  was  now  heard  approaching.  Pres 
ently,  out  of  the  darkness,  a  brigade  of  the  Second 
Corps  rushed  in  with  a  cheer.  Being  joined  by 
other  troops,  all  fell  upon  the  exultant  Con 
federates,  who,  finding  themselves  left  without 
support,  saved  themselves  as  they  could.  As  it 
was,  not  half  of  them  got  back  to  their  own 
lines. 

This  ended  the  fighting  for  the  day.  Darkness 
and  exhaustion  summoned  the  weary  soldiers  of 
both  armies  to  a  much-needed  rest.  Thus  far  the 
two  days'  fighting  had  proved  indecisive.  On  the 
left  the  enemy  had  taken  a  somewhat  closer  hold, 
yet  the  Union  position  was  everywhere  practically 
intact  except  at  Gulp's  Hill.9  It  is  true  that  both 
armies  were  much  weakened  from  loss  of  blood, 
although  their  relative  strength  remained  much  as 
before.  Perhaps  the  Union  army  had  suffered 
most,  because  its  reinforcements  were  thrown  in 


I3O        THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

piecemeal,  and  badly  cut  up   before    they    could 
render  effective  assistance. 

It  now  began  to  be  understood  that  if  the 
Union  army  had  not  sustained  a  defeat,  it  was  not 
so  much  because  of  any  natural  strength  of  the 
ground,  since  the  Confederates  had  twice  forced  a 
way  to  it,  as  because  its  form  enabled  troops  to 
concentrate  upon  the  threatened  point  with  great 
rapidity.  To  lengthen  it  out,  as  Sickles  had  done, 
was  to  throw  away  this  advantage.  He  had 
finally  been  forced  to  retake  his  natural  posi 
tion.  Herein,  we  think,  lies  the  whole  secret  of 
Meade's  successful  defence.  The  first  of  July  was 
an  accident:  the  second,  a  blunder. 

1  The  two  roads,  Emmettsburg  and  cross-road,  lay  on  converging 
ridges,  which  formed  the  angle  at  the  orchard.     It   was  a  very  irregu 
lar  line,  however,  running  first  round  the  orchard,  then  along  a  ravine 
at  the  edge  of  the  wheat-field  to  the  Devil's  Den,  and  again  across  this 
to  the  hollow,  where  it  swung  back  so  as  to  embrace  the  Den. 

2  Lee's  order  of  battle  had  been  made  in  the  belief  that  by  throwing 
Longstreet  across  the  Emmettsburg  road  he  would  envelop  the  Union 
army's  proper  left,  whereas  we  have  seen  that  he  was  wholly  at  fault, 
until  Sickles  made  a  condition  where  it  did  not  exist  before. 

3  In  their  effort  to  keep  out  of  sight  the  enemy  lost  two  hours.     Two 
hours  sooner  they  would  have  occupied  the  orchard  without  hinder- 
ance. 

4  The  enemy  took  three  guns  here  that  could  not  be  got  off. 


THE  SECOND   OF  JULY  13! 

6  Vincent's  and  Weed's  brigades  of  the   Fifth   Corps   were  thrown 
upon  Little  Round  Top  in  succession,  each  regiment  going  in  under 
fire. 

6 "  The  battery  went  up  that  rocky  hill,  through  the  woods  on  the 
east  side,  at  a  trot,  with  spurs  and  whips  vigorously  applied.  I  do  not 
believe  a  piece  barked  a  tree  ...  we  went  there  at  a  trot,  each  man 
and  horse  trying  to  pull  the  whole  battery  by  himself."  — Lieut.  Ritten- 
house. 

7  Kershaw  and  Semmes  were  both  driven  back  to  the  Rose  house, 
the  former  losing  over  six  hundred  men,  the  latter  being  killed ;  but 
Barksdale,  supported  by    Wofford,   bore    down  all  opposition,    thus 
allowing  the  defeated  brigades  to  rally  and  come  up  again. 

8  The  whole  history  of  this  day  shows  that  Hill's  corps  had  been  too 
badly  hurt  on  the  first  to  take  any  efficient  part  on  the  second.     Practi 
cally  Longstreet  was  left  to  fight  it  out  alone. 

9  At  the  close  of  the  day  the  enemy  held,  on  the  left,  the  base  of  the 
Round  Tops,  Devil's  Den,  its  woods,  and  the  Emmettsburg  road ;  on 
the  right  he  had  effected  a  lodgement  at  Gulp's  Hill. 


132        THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 


IX 

THE  THIRD    OF  JULY 

THE  events  of  the  second  seem  to  have  im 
pressed  the  two  generals  quite  differently.  In 
Lee  the  combative  spirit  rose  even  higher.  To 
Meade  the  result  seemed,  on  the  whole,  discourag 
ing.  The  enemy  held  a  strong  vantage-ground 
on  his  right;  his  line  had  been  twice  pierced. 
Would  he  be  better  able  to  hold  it  now  that  the 
army  was  weakened  by  the  loss  of  eight  to  ten 
thousand  men? 

At  nightfall  a  council  of  war  was  called,  and 
the  situation  discussed.  Meade  desired  to  know 
first  the  condition  of  the  troops,  and  next  the  tem 
per  of  his  officers.  To  this  end  they  were  sepa 
rately  asked  whether  they  favored  a  removal  of  the 
Meade's  army  to  some  other  position,  or  waiting 
Council.  another  attack  where  they  now  were. 

The  general  voice  was  in  favor  of  fighting  it  out 
to  the  bitter  end,  and  it  was  so  determined. 


THE  THIRD   OF  JULY  133 

A  strong  force  of  infantry  and  artillery  was 
therefore  moved  over  to  the  right,  in  readiness  to 
expel  the  enemy  there  at  break  of  day. 

Deeming  the  result  of  the  day's  operations  to 
be  on  the  whole  favorable  to  him,  Lee  was  equally 
determined  to  fight  to  a  finish.  As  Napoleon  had 
said  before  him,  in  a  similar  spirit  of  impulsive  ex- 
Lee  not  ultation,  when  satisfied  that  Wellington 
beaten  yet.  was  awaiting  his  onslaught  at  Water 
loo,  "  I  have  them  now,  those  English !  "  so  Lee 
now  replied  to  all  Longstreet's  remonstrances  by 
shaking  his  clenched  fist  at  Cemetery  Hill,  ex 
claiming  as  he  did  so,  "  The  enemy  is  there,  and  I 
am  going  to  strike  him !  " 

He  too,  therefore,  strongly  reinforced  his  left  at 
Gulp's  Hill,  with  the  view  of  having  a  heavy  force 
well  in  hand  there,  ready  to  strike  in  upon  the 
Union  right  and  rear,  while  a  formidable  column 
of  wholly  fresh  troops,  charging  it  in  the  centre, 
should  cut  that  in  two,  seize  the  Baltimore  pike, 
and  with  Ewell's  help  crush  everything  on  that 
side.  In  order  to  reap  to  the  utmost  the  advan- 
pian  of  tages  looked  for  as  certain,  Stuart's  cav- 

Attack.  a.lryf  now  back  with  the  army,  was  sent 


134        THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

far  round  to  the  Union  rear,  with  orders  to  strike 
the  Baltimore  pike  as  soon  as  the  retreat  should 
begin. 

To  guard  against  some  such  movement,  or  in 
fact  any  demonstration  towards  its  rear,  the  Union 
cavalry  was  posted  on  this  pike,  a  few  miles  back 
of  Cemetery  Ridge.  Still  another  cavalry  force 
was  guarding  the  Union  left,  beyond  Round  Top. 

These  dispositions  present,  in  brief,  the  prepa 
rations  both  generals  were  making  for  the  third 
day's  conflict. 

Lee  had  silenced  Longstreet's  objections  by  or 
dering  him  to  get  ready  Pickett's  fresh  division  for 
the  decisive  charge  on  Cemetery  Ridge.  These 
soldiers,  Virginians  all,  bitterly  complained  be- 
pickett  to  cause  they  were  only  the  rear-guard  of 
lead  it.  tjiat  armv  which  they  were  told  was 

driving  the  Yankees  before  them  in  utter  rout. 
Their  charge  was  to  be  preceded  and  sustained  by 
turning  every  gun  in  the  Confederate  army  upon 
the  point  of  attack. 

With  the  first  streak  of  day  the  struggle  for  the 
possession  of  Gulp's  Hill  began  again.  As  both 
sides  had  orders  to  attack,  there  was  no  delay  in 


THE  THIRD   OF  JULY  135 

commencing.  Soon  from  every  commanding  spot 
the  Union  batteries  were  sending  their  shot  crash 
ing  and  tearing  through  the  woods  in  which  the 
Confederates  lay  hid,  smiting  the  forest  with  a 
tempest  of  iron,  throwing  down  branches,  and 
plowing  up  the  earth  in  great  furrows.1  Stirred 
up  by  this  shower  of  missiles,  Ewell's  men  poured 
forth  from  the  valley  of  Rock  Creek,  and  rushed 
up  the  hillside  in  front,  to  begin  anew  the  san 
guinary  struggle  they  had  only  ceased  from  on 
the  previous  night.  Here  among  the  gray  rocks 
and  aged  oaks  — the  pleasure-ground,  in  fact,  of 
the  people  of  Gettysburg  —  a  contest  raged  for 
hours,  similar  to  that  which  Little  Round  Top 
had  witnessed  on  the  previous  afternoon. 

One  piece  of  hopeless  heroism  deserves  com 
memoration  in  all  accounts  of  this  battle.  In  the 
height  of  the  engagement  an  order  was  brought 
for  two  regiments,  the  Second  Massachusetts  and 
the  Twenty-seventh  Indiana,  to  charge  across  the 
meadow  stretching  between  Gulp's  Hill  and  Mc 
Allister's  Hill,  on  the  other  side  of  which  the  ene 
my  lay  in  the  old  intrenchments.  To  try  to  .pass 
that  meadow  was  rushing  to  certain  destruction. 


136        THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

"  Are  you  sure  that  is  the  order?"  was  de 
manded  of  the  officer  who  brought  it.  "  Posi 
tive,"  was  the  reply.  "  Up,  men  —  fix  bayonets — 
forward  !  "  was  the  ringing  command.  One  regi 
ment  reached  the  works,  the  other  faltered  mid 
way  under  the  terrible  fire.  As  many  were  lost 
in  falling  back  as  in  going  forward.  Only  half 
the  men  got  back  to  the  lines  unhurt. 

After  seven  hours  of  this  kind  of  fighting,  the 
assailants  were  finally  driven  beyond  Rock  Creek 
again,  leaving  five  hundred  prisoners,  besides  their 
Gulp's  Hm  dead  and  wounded,  behind  them.  Again 
retaken.  an  essential  part  of  Lee's  plan  of  at 

tack  had  signally  failed,  and  once  more  the  whole 
Union  line  stretched  unbroken  from  Gulp's  Hill 
to  Round  Top. 

But  it  was  only  eleven  o'clock ;  and  though  the 
battle  had  gone  against  him  on  this  side,  Lee 
seems  to  have  felt,  like  Desaix  at  Marengo,  that 
there  was  still  time  to  gain  another.  Was  it  here 
that  Lee  lost  that  moral  equipoise  which  seems 
born  in  really  great  commanders  in  moments  of 
supreme  peril? 

Be  that  as  it  may,  the  order  was  given  for  his 


THE  THIRD  OF  JULY  137 

artillery  to  open.  Longstreet  had  massed  seventy- 
five  guns  in  one  battery,  Hill  sixty-three,  and 
Ewell  enough  more  to  bring  the  number  up  to 
one  hundred  and  fifty  in  all.  At  precisely  one 
The  cannon-  o'clock  the  signal  guns  were  fired. 
ade>  Before  their  echoes  died  away  the 

whole  line  of  Confederate  batteries  was  blazing 
like  a  volcano.  There  seemed  to  be  but  one  flash 
and  one  report,  and  their  simultaneous  discharges, 
pealing  out  deafening  salvos,  went  rolling  and 
rolling  on  through  the  valleys,  and  echoing 
among  the  hills,  in  one  mighty  volume  of  sound, 
vying  with  the  loudest  thunder.  It  was  sub 
limely  grand,  sublimely  terrifying.  Without  a 
moment's  warning,  as  if  the  heavens  above  had 
opened  and  the  earth  below  yawned  beneath  their 
feet,  the  Union  soldiers  found  themselves  in  the 
midst  of  the  pitiless  storm.  A  tornado  of  shot 
and  shell  burst  upon  Cemetery  Hill,  tearing 
the  air,  rending  the  rocks,  plowing  up  the 
ground,  and  dealing  death  on  all  sides  at 
once. 

This  terrific  cannonade,  under  which  the  solid 
earth  shook,  the  sky  was    darkened  at  noonday, 


138        THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

the  valley  filled  with  thick-rolling  smoke,  the  air 
with  explosions  and  nameless  rubbish,  and  which 
seemed  announcing  the  coming  of  the  Last  Day, 
is  thus  described  by  an  eye-witness :  — 

"The  storm  broke  upon  us  so  suddenly  that 
soldiers  and  officers  who  leaped,  as  it  began,  from 
their  tents,  or  from  lazy  siestas  on  the  grass,  were 
stricken  at  their  rising  with  mortal  wounds,  and 
died,  some  with  cigars  between  their  lips,  some 
with  pieces  of  food  in  their  fingers,  and  one  at 
least  —  a  pale  young  German  from  Pennsylvania 
—  with  a  miniature  of  his  sister  in  his  hands. 
Horses  fell  shrieking  out  such  awful  cries  as 
Cooper  told  of,  and  writhing  themselves  about  in 
hopeless  agony.  The  boards  of  fences,  scattered 
by  explosions,  flew  in  splinters  through  the  air. 
The  earth,  torn  up  in  clouds,  blinded  the  eyes  of 
hurrying  men ;  and  through  the  branches  of  the 
trees  and  among  the  gravestones  of  the  cemetery 
a  shower  of  destruction  crashed  ceaselessly.  The 
hill,  which  seemed  alone  devoted  to  this  rain  of 
death,  was  clear  in  nearly  all  its  unsheltered  places 
within  five  minutes  after  the  fire  began." 

Eighty  guns  replied    from   the   Union  position 


THE  THIRD   OF  JULY  139 

* 

almost  as  soon,  so  that  the  very  air  between  the 
two  armies  was  alive  with  flying  missiles.2  Dur 
ing  the  cannonade  the  Union  infantry  were  lying 
down  in  open  ranks  behind  the  crest,  taking  it,  for 
the  most  part,  with  remarkable  steadiness.  As  the 
enemy's  artillerists  mostly  overshot  the  ridge,  the 
ground  behind  was  a  place  of  even  greater  dan 
ger.  The  little  farmhouse  standing  on  the  Taney- 
town  road,  occupied  as  army  headquarters,  was  so 
riddled  that  the  general  was  compelled  to  seek  a 
safer  spot.  Even  as  far  back  as  Gulp's  Hill, 
where  the  Twelfth  Corps  were  still  facing  their 
assailants,  the  enemy's  shot  came  plunging  and 
plowing  through  the  ranks  from  behind,  thus 
killing  men  by  a  fire  in  the  rear. 

After  this  indescribable  uproar  had  lasted  up 
wards  of  two  hours,  the  Union  batteries  were 
ordered  to  cease  firing  in  order  to  husband  their 
ammunition  for  what  every  man  in  the  army  knew 
was  coming. 

It  was  now  three  o'clock.  The  moment  had 
come  for  the  supreme  effort  of  all. 

All  the  Union  generals  now  set  themselves  to 
Work  repairing  the  damages  caused  by  the  can- 


140        THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

nonade  —  re-forming  ranks,  replacing  dismantled 
guns,  rectifying  positions,  exhorting  the  men 
to  stand  firm,  and,  in  short,  themselves  offering 
the  highest  examples  of  coolness  and  soldierly 
conduct. 

We  had  a  first  line  of  infantry  posted  along  the 
foot  of  the  heights,  —  some  behind  stone  walls, 
when  these  followed  the  natural  line  of  defence,  as 
they  now  and  then  did ;  some  behind  rocky  ine 
qualities  of  the  ground,  — with  artillery  above  and 
union  behind  it ;  and  there  was  a  second  line 

Defences.  of  infantry  back  of  the  crest.  Although 
Meade  is  said  to  have  expected,  and  even  told 
some  of  his  officers,  that  Lee's  next  blow  would 
fall  on  the  Union  centre,  we  detect  no  specific 
preparation  to  meet  it. 

The  troops  designated  for  the  assault  were 
waiting  only  for  the  order  to  advance,  Pickett's 
splendid  division  on  the  right,  Pettigrew's,  lately 
Heth's,  on  the  left,  with  two  brigades  in  support 
of  Pickett,  two  in  support  of  Pettigrew,  and  still 
another  marching  at  some  distance  in  the  rear. 
The  storming  Though  the  equals  of  any  in  that  army, 
column.  Heth's  soldiers  had  been  so  much 


THE  THIRD  OF  JULY 

shaken  by  their  encounter  with  the  First  Corps 
that  they  were  far  from  showing  the  same  ardor  as 
Pickett's  men.  All  told,  the  assaulting  force  num 
bered  not  less  than  fifteen  thousand,  and  probably 
more.3 

Pickett  was  watching  the  effect  of  the  artillery- 
fire  when  a  courier  brought  him  word  from  the 
batteries  that  if  he  was  coming  at  all  now  was  his 
time,  as  the  Union  guns  had  slackened  their 
fire.  After  reading  it  himself,  Pickett  handed  the 
note  to  Longstreet  at  his  side.  "  General,  shall 
I  advance  ? "  Pickett  asked  his  chief.  Mastered 
by  his  emotions,  Longstreet  could  only  give  a  nod 
of  assent  and  turn  away.  "  I  shall  lead  my  divis 
ion  forward,  sir,"  was  the  soldierly  reply. 

As  the  charging  column  passed  through  them 
to  the  front,  fifteen  or  eighteen  guns  followed 
close  behind  in  support. 

Friend  and  foe  alike  have  borne  testimony  to 
the  steadiness  with  which  this  gallant  band  met 
the  ordeal  —  by  much  the  hardest  that  falls  to  the 
soldier's  lot  —  of  having  to  endure  a  terrible  fire 
without  the  power  of  returning  it.  No  sooner 
had  the  long  gray  lines  come  within  range  than 


142  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

the  Union  artillery  opened  upon  it,  right  and  left. 
For  a  quarter  of  an  hour  the  march  was  kept 
up  in  the  face  of  a  storm  of  missiles.  Ceme 
tery  Hill  was  lighted  up  by  the  flashes.  Little 
Round  Top  struck  in  sharply.  Smoke  and  flame 
burst  from  the  batteries  along  Cemetery  Ridge. 
Solid  shot  tore  through  the  ranks ;  shells  were 
bursting  under  their  feet,  over  their  heads,  in  their 
faces ;  men,  or  the  fragments  of  men,  were  being 
tossed  in  the  air  every  moment,  but,  closing  up 
the  gaps  and  leaving  swaths  of  dead  and  dying 
in  their  track,  these  men  kept  up  their  steady 
march  to  the  front,  as  if  conscious  that  the  eyes 
of  both  armies  were  upon  them.  They  had  been 
told  that  the  enemy's  artillery  was  silenced ! 

As  soon  as  they  could  do  so  without  injury  to 
their  own  men,  the  Confederate  guns  began  afresh, 
Pickett-s  so  tnat  again  shells  streamed  through 
Advance.  faG  ajr  an(j  ^^5  bounded  over  the  plain 
without  intermission,  dense  smoke  shutting  out  the 
assailants  from  view. 

Protected  by  the  fire  of  this  redoubtable  ar 
tillery,  the  column  continued  its  deliberate  march. 
When  within  five  hundred  yards,  or  about  to 


THE  THIRD   OF  JULY  143 

cross  the  Emmettsburg  road,  it  suddenly  moved 
off  by  the  left  flank  a  short  distance,  as  if  to 
close  up  a  break  in  the  line  or  recover  the  true 
point  of  attack  —  some  say  one  and  some  say 
the  other.  Be  that  as  it  may,  Pickett's  men  first 
received  the  fire  of  Stannard's  Vermont  brigade 
while  making  this  flank  march,  and  again  encoun 
tered  it  on  their  flank  after  facing  to  the  front  for 
the  purpose  of  resuming  their  advance  toward 
the  heights. 

This  must  be  considered,  we  think,  as  the  turn 
ing-point  in  the  assault.  Stannard's  attack,  made 
at  such  close  quarters,  so  shattered  Pickett's  right 
brigade  that  this  flank  of  the  assaulting  column 
never  reached  the  crest  at  all,  but  drifted  more  and 
more  to  the  rear,  lost  to  all  organization.  Thus 
was  repeated  that  memorable  manoeuvre  of  the 
Fifty-second  Regiment  against  the  Imperial  Guard 
at  Waterloo,  and  with  like  results ;  for  before  the 
close  and  deadly  fire  poured  in  upon  them  at 
only  a  few  rods'  distance  —  a  fire  they  were  power 
less  to  return  —  Pickett's  right  was  either  shot  to 
pieces  or  crowded  in  upon  the  centre,  so  throwing 
it  into  disorder  and  checking  its  momentum,  while 


144  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

the  Green  Mountain  boys,  aided  now  by  other 
troops,  clung  to  their  mutilated  flank,  following  it 
up  step  by  step,  and  firing  into  it  as  fast  as  the 
men  could  load. 

Eight  batteries  were  now  pouring  canister  into 
Pickett  at  point-blank  range,  carrying  away  whole 
ranks  of  men  at  every  discharge.  Before  him, 
between  two  little  clumps  of  trees,  which  Lee 
himself  had  carefully  pointed  out  and  Pickett 
was  making  such  heroic  efforts  to  reach,  lay  the 
Second  Union  Corps.  As  the  men  of  this  corps 
realized  that  the  brunt  of  the  charge  was  to  fall 
on  them,  they  grew  restive  and  anxious;  but 
Gibbon,  curbing  their  impatience  with  voice  and 
gesture,  quietly  said,  as  he  passed  along  the 
ranks,  "  Hold  your  fire,  boys  —  they  are  not  near 
enough  yet." 

Pickett's  first  line  had  come  within  a  hundred 
and  fifty  yards  when  the  order  was  given  to  fire. 
It  was  followed  by  a  terrible  volley  before  which 
that  line  went  down  like  grass  before  the  scythe. 
When  the  smoke  rolled  away  the  charging  lines 
were  seen  inextricably  mixed  together,  all  order 
lost  —  a  frantic  mob  covered  with  blood  and  dirt, 


THE  THIRD   OF  JULY 


145 


with  scarce  a  general  officer  left,  but  not  in  retreat. 
On  the  contrary,  with  a  rush  and  a  roar,  heard 
above  the  din  of  cannon  and  musketry,  the  surg 
ing  mass  came  rolling  and  tumbling  on,  like  waves 
The  Final  against  a  rocky  shore,  firing,  screeching, 
charge.  brandishing  swords  and  battle-flags,  one 

moment  swallowed  up  in  smoke,  the  next  emerg- 


Point  where  Pickett's  Charge  was  stopped. 

ing  a  few  paces  nearer.  Officers  became  separated 
from  their  men ;  generals  no  longer  led  their  own 
brigades,  but  with' uplifted  swords  rushed  on  to  the 
front,  calling  on  their  men  to  follow.  One  after 
another  they  fall.  Individual  example  and  heroism 


146        THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

were  the  only  things  that  could  count  here,  and 
neither  was  wanting.  One  thought  and  one  pur 
pose  seemed  to  animate  them,  and  that  was  that 
they  must  either  conquer  or  die.  Sublime  heroism  ! 
Sublime  folly ! 

In  this  manner  one  portion  of  the  Confederates 
struck  and  overwhelmed  the  first  Union  line,  driv 
ing  its  defenders  back  upon  the  second.  Here 
they  turned  and  faced  their  infuriated  assailants, 
who,  led  on  by  Armistead,  had  leaped  the  last 
stone  wall,  shooting  down  or  bayoneting  all  those 
found  crouching  behind  it,  had  then  rushed  up 
to  seize  the  solitary  gun  that  had  just  fired  its  last 
shot  in  their  faces,  and,  as  if  victory  was  assured, 
already  had  raised  their  cry  of  triumph  on  the 
disputed  summit. 

Though  divided  and  thrown  off  by  this  entering 
wedge,  the  Union  soldiers,  who  now  came  sway 
ing  up  from  right  to  left,  soon  seized  it  as  in  a 
vise.  For  a  few  minutes  an  indescribable  m£lee 
raged  here  on  half  an  acre  of  ground,  at  push  of 
bayonet,  hand  to  hand,  muzzle  to  muzzle,  breast  to 
breast.  Gradually  the  enclosing  lines 

The  Repulse.  a 

surged  forward.     Armistead    was    shot 


THE  THIRD  OF  JULY  147 

down  by  the  side  of  the  captured  gun.  The  Confed 
erates  turned  to  fly,  but  found  the  way  barred  to 
them  on  every  side.  Imbedded  by  its  own  force, 
the  living  wedge  could  not  be  withdrawn.  They 
surrendered  in  swarms,  while  those  who  dared  the 
dangers  of  again  crossing  that  fatal  plain,  now 
spread  themselves  out  over  it  in  every  direction. 

When  it  was  all  over  with  Pickett,  the  two  sup 
porting  brigades  came  up  on  the  right,  only  to  be 
repulsed  by  a  few  volleys.  Pettigrew  had  been 
defeated  almost  before  he  could  come  to  close 
quarters,  Pickett  destroyed,  Wilcox  brushed  away. 

From  his  post  of  observation  Longstreet  had 
watched  the  advance  up  the  ridge.  "  I  saw,"  he 
says,  "  the  crest  of  the  hill  lit  up  with  a  solid  sheet 
of  flame.  When  the  smoke  cleared  away  the 
division  was  gone.  Nearly  two-thirds  lay  dead  on 
the  field,  and  the  survivors  were  sullenly  retreating 
down  the  hill.  Mortal  man  could  not  have  stood 
that  fire." 

Again  the  old  story.  An  assaulting  column  ha^ 
been  driven  through  an  opposing  line,  it  is  true, 
but  with  the  loss  of  all  organization,  without  a  sup 
porting  force  to  follow  up  the  advantage  it  has 


148         THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

gained,  it  finds  itself  in  a  trap  where  it  is  in  danger 
of  being  sacrificed  to  the  last  man.  Unable  to 
execute  the  simplest  manoeuvre,  it  is  at  the  mercy 
of  any  organized  body  brought  against  it.  Lee 
seemed  to  have  forgotten  Fredericksburg.  Long- 
street  did  better  at  Chickamauga. 

Two  cavalry  battles  belong  to  the  complete 
history  of  this  remarkable  day,  though  in  no 
way  affecting  the  main  result.  In  the  first 
Stuart  attacked  and  was  defeated.  This  was 
cavalry  cavalry  against  cavalry;  and  as  Pick- 

Battles.  ett»s  front;  attack  was  repulsed,  that  in 
the  rear  amounted  to  little  in  itself.  In  the 
second  Kilpatrick  made  a  bold  dash  into  Hood's 
rear,  about  Round  Top,  with  the  view  of  throw 
ing  the  enemy  into  confusion,  breaking  up  his 
line  there,  and  so  facilitating  an  advance  by  the 
Union  forces  in  that  quarter.  This  was  cavalry 
against  infantry  in  position,  and  the  ground 
the  worst  possible  for  cavalry  manoeuvres.  For 
an  hour  the  enemy  had  our  troopers  riding 
round  them  with  drawn  sabres,  receiving  the  fire 
first  of  one  regiment  and  then  of  another.  No 


THE  THIRD   OF  JULY  149 

advantage    being    taken    of    the    diversion,    the 
cavalry  was  nearly  cut  to  pieces. 

1  To  this  day  the  woods  show  the  destructive  effects  of  this  can 
nonade. 

2 "  I  instructed  the  chiefs  of  artillery  and  battery  commanders  to 
withhold  their  fire  for  fifteen  or  twenty  minutes  after  the  cannonade 
commenced,  then  to  concentrate  their  fire  with  all  possible  ac 
curacy  upon  those  batteries  which  were  most  destructive  to  us, 
but  slowly,  so  that  when  the  enemy's  ammunition  was  exhausted  we 
should  have  enough  left  to  meet  the  assault."  —  Gen.  Hunt,  Chief 
of  Artillery. 

3  Pickett's  division  with  two  brigades  absent  was  probably  five 
thousand  five  hundred  strong,  Heth's  not  less,  and  the  three  support 
ing  brigades  as  many  more.  The  troops  were  no  doubt  selected  as 
the  very  best  that  offered. 


I5O  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 


THE   RETREAT 

THRICE  had  the  sun  gone  down  on  that  en 
sanguined  field,  where  one  hundred  and  fifty 
thousand  men  had  striven  for  the  mastery  and 
forty  thousand  sealed  their  devotion  with  their 
blood.  Exhausted  by  their  efforts,  the  Confed 
erates  thought  only  of  making  good  their  retreat. 
Gettysburg  Gettysburg  was  immediately  evacuated 
evacuated.  and  both  wjngs  drawn  back  on  the 

main  body,  so  that,  as  now  re-formed  and  con 
tracted,  Lee's  army  stretched  from  Oak  Hill  to 
Lee's  New  tne  peach  orchard.  Behind  this  line, 
Position.  an(j  uncjer  cover  of  its  woods,  he  was 
now  getting  ready  to  retreat. 

Such  plain  indications  could  hardly  be  over 
looked.1  A  reconnoisance  from  the  Union  left 
found  the  Confederates  retiring.  During  the 
night  the  Union  troops  went  forward  to  the 
battlefield  of  the  2d. 


THE  RETREAT  151 

Lee's  lost  opportunity  on  the  1st  was  as 
nothing  to  Meade's  on  the  3d.  It  came  when 
the  Confederates  were  in  the  confusion  resulting 
from  their  repulse.  It  was  lost,  however,  be- 
Lost  cause  the  great  captain  was  not  there. 

Meade  was  unequal  to  exacting  a 
supreme  effort  at  this  moment,  either  from  his 
army  or  himself.  To  let  slip  this  opportunity 
was  to  tempt  fortune  itself,  and  it  never  came 
again. 

But  if  from  any  of  the  many  causes  alleged,2 
or  all  of  them  put  together,  the  one  chance  out 
of  a  thousand,  for  which  all  this  marching  and 
fighting  had  been  going  on,  had  eluded  Meade's 
grasp,  or  if  it  be  conceded  that  he  found  Lee's 
new  position  so  strong  as  to  hold  out  no  hope 
of  a  successful  assault,  history  will  still  demand 
to  know  why  this  beaten  army,  short  of  ammuni 
tion,  encumbered  with  its  wounded,  its  prisoners, 
and  its  wagons,  thirty  to  forty  miles  from  the 
Potomac,  with  a  mountain  defile  to  pass  and  a 
strange  wide  river  to  cross,  was  suffered  to 

inaction.  march  off  unmolested  with  all  its  im 
mense  spoil,  and  not  only  to  do  that,  but  to  re- 


152        THE  BATTLE  OF  GE1TYSBURG 

main  eleven  days  between  Gettysburg  and  the 
Potomac  without  being  once  seriously  attacked. 
That  Lee  could  not  long  remain  on  Seminary 
Ridge,  let  his  position  be  ever  so  strong,  was  a 
self-evident  proposition.  He  had  exhausted  his 
Lee  in  a  means  of  attack,  his  army  was  cut 

Tight  Place,  down  by  more  than  twenty  thousand 
men,  his  ammunition  was  nearly  expended,  nor 
could  it  be  replenished  short  of  Virginia.  His 
means  of  defence  were  therefore  extremely  lim 
ited.  If  it  had  been  possible  to  detain  Lee  where 
he  was,  even  for  a  few  days  longer,  his  surrender 
was  a  foregone  conclusion  without  firing  another 
shot.  But  taking  the  situation  as  we  find  it, 
we  do  not  see  how  he  could  have  been  more 
critically  placed,  if  in  the  presence  of  an  enter 
prising  opponent.  Lee's  attitude  after  the  battle 
savors  far  more  of  bravado  than  a  desire  to 
be  attacked.  To  block  his  retreat  it  would 
have  been  necessary  to  seize  the  Monterey 
Pass  immediately  after  the  battle.3  Meade 
had  the  shorter  line.  His  cavalry  would  have 
kept  Lee  at  bay  until  the  infantry  could  come 
up.  He  should  never  have  suffered  Lee  to  put 


THE  RETREAT  153 

South  Mountain  between  them  without  making 
an  energetic  effort  to  prevent  it.  As  the  Union 
army  remained  immovable  until  this  was  done, 
we  have  only  to  chronicle  in  brief  the  inglorious 
ending  of  an  otherwise  glorious  campaign. 

All  the  4th  the  two  armies  lay  in  the  positions 
just  now  described.  Lee's  direct  line  of  retreat 
to  the  Potomac  was  by  the  Fairfield  and  Hagers- 
town  road,  which  crossed  the  mountain  below 
Read  over  and  behind  him  through  the  Monterey 
chap.  i.  defile.  To  withdraw  his  army  and 

trains  by  this  one  road  was  altogether  impracti 
cable.  The  trains  and  wounded  were  therefore 
started  off  during  the  afternoon  of  the  4th,  in 
a  drenching  rain,  by  the  Chambersburg  road, 
under  a  strong  escort  of  cavalry  and  artillery, 
but  no  infantry.4  When  stretched  out  on  the 
road  this  train  was  seventeen  miles  long. 

Being  ordered  to  push  on  to  the  Potomac  with 
out  halting,  the  sufferings  of  the  wounded  were 
horrible  beyond  description.  Travelling  all  night 
Lee.s  and  avoiding  Chambersburg,  this  col- 

wounded.  umn  struct  across  the  country  to 
Greencastle,  and  after  fighting  its  way  all  day 


154        THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

• 

against  detachments  of  Union  cavalry,  finally  got 
to  the  Potomac  at  Williamsport,  on  the  afternoon 
of  the  5th,  with  the  loss  of  a  few  wagons.  After 
the  escort  had  passed  through  Greencastle,  the 
citizens  turned  out  and  attacked  the  wagons  in  the 
rear  with  axes,  so  disabling  some  and  delaying 
the  rest. 

When  the  wagon  train  got  there,  the  Potomac 
was  found  too  high  to  be  forded.  The  bridges 
were  gone,  and  the  trains  could  not  get  across 
that  way.5  So  there  Lee  met  his  first  check. 

After  giving  his  trains  a  twelve  hours'  start, 
Lee  put  his  army  in  motion  for  the  Potomac  by 
way  of  Fairfield  and  Hagerstown,  by  daylight  of 
the  5th. 

The  road  being  unencumbered  by  trains,6  the 
Confederates  were  able  to  move  with  celerity  and 
silence.  As  soon  as  his  departure  was  discovered, 
Lee,s  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  Corps  moved  out 

infantry  m  pursuit.  But  it  was  then  too  late. 

move  off.  ,   . 

Lee  had  stolen  a  march  on  his  pur 
suers.  An  officer  of  this  force  says  of  its  tardy 
operations :  — 

"  As  we  moved,  a  small  rear-guard  of  the  enemy 


THE  RETREAT  155 

retreated.  We  followed  it  up  to  Fairfield,  in  a 
gorge  of  the  mountains.  There  we  again  waited 
A  Lame  f°r  them  to  go  on.  Then  only  one 
Pursuit.  brigade,  with  the  cavalry,  continued  to 

follow  them,  while  the  rest  of  the  corps  turned  off 
to  the  left,  toward  Boonsboro,"  to  which  point  the 
main  body  was  now  directing  its  march.  Lee  had 
got  the  short  road  and  left  Meade  the  long 
one. 

Lee's  army  was  thus  safe  back  again  in  the 
Cumberland  Valley  before  Meade  was  ready  to 
pursue.7  Having  abandoned  the  idea  of  forcing 
the  Monterey  Pass,  and  so  following  up  and 
Union  Army  harassing  the  enemy's  rear,  we  have 
en  Route.  just  seen  the  infantry  turning  off  to  the 

south,  on  the  Gettysburg  side  of  South  Mountain, 
as  if  to  head  off  Lee  from  the  Potomac  by  this 
roundabout  way,  or,  in  short,  by  a  march  of  fifty 
miles  to  his  thirty,  and  after  giving  him  a  start  of 
ten.  This  was  to  force  the  Union  army  to  efforts 
which  had  just  proved  so  exhausting.  Nothing 
could  exceed  the  impotence  of  this  pursuit.  In 
reality,  the  march  up  to  Gettysburg  to  find  and 
attack  Lee  was  now  being  repeated.  But  fate, 


156        THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

not  Meade,  was  so  checking  Lee  at  every  point 
that  but  for  the  weakness  or  delays  of  his  adver 
sary  the  Confederate  general  could  never  have 
saved  his  army  as  he  did. 

Even  before  Lee  could  reach  Fairfield,  General 
French  8  had  reoccupied  Harper's  Ferry,  destroyed 
the  enemy's  pontoon  train  at  Williamsport  and 
Lee  brought  Falling  Waters,  and  captured  the 
to  a  Halt.  guards.  Finding  his  means  of  crossing 
gone,  nothing  remained  for  Lee  but  to  show  a 
bold  front  until  they  could  be  restored.  And  the 
long  detour  the  Union  army  was  making  left  him 
ample  time  in  which  to  render  his  new  position 
between  Hagerstown  and  Williamsport  so  strong 
that  when  Meade  9  finally  got  his  army  up  before 
it  he  again  hesitated  to  attack.  The  tables  were 
now  fairly  turned  on  him.  His  generals  mostly 
shared  in  this  feeling  of  respectful  fear.  Stung 
by  the  President's  censure,  Meade  at  last  bestirred 
himself.  Again  he  was  too  late.  How  often 
during  this  campaign  have  we  been  obliged  to 
repeat  those  ill-omened  words  !  In  the  language 
of  the  general-in-chief,  Halleck :  — 

"  Instead  of  attacking  Lee  in  this  position,  with 


THE  RETREAT  157 

the  swollen   waters   of  the  Potomac    in   his    rear, 

without   any  means  of  crossing  his  artillery,  and 

when   a  defeat   must   have  caused   the 

Lee  Escapes. 

surrender  of  his  entire  army,  he  was 
allowed  time  to  construct  a  pontoon  bridge  with 
lumber  collected  from  canal-boats  and  the  ruins  of 
wooden  houses,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  I4th 
his  army  had  crossed  to  the  south  side  of  the 
river.  His  rear-guard,  however,  was  attacked  by 
our  cavalry  and  suffered  considerable  loss.  Thus 
ended  the  rebel  campaign  north  of  the  Potomac, 
from  which  important  political  and  military  results 
had  been  expected.  Our  own  loss  in  this  short 
campaign  had  been  very  severe;  namely,  2,834 
killed,  13,709  wounded,  and  6,643  missing  —  in 
all,  23,182.  We  captured  3  guns,  41  standards, 
13,621  prisoners,  28,178  small-arms." 

The  Confederate  losses,  considering  that  they 
were  always  the  assailants,  must  have  exceeded 
these  figures.10  As  it  is  well  known  that  Pick- 
ett's  losses  were  suppressed  by  Lee's  order,  any 
compilation  must  be  necessarily  incomplete. 

Ten  whole  days  thus  elapsed  from  the  time 
Lee  fell  back  defeated  from  Cemetery  Ridge 


158        THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

until  he  recrossed  the  Potomac.  He  had  brought 
off  his  army,  his  plunder,  with  upward  of  four 
thousand  Union  prisoners,  by  his  opponent's  leave, 
as  one  might  say.  There  is  a  saying  that  a  British 
army  may  be  gleaned  in  a  retreat,  but  not  reaped. 
So  far,  in  this  war,  barren  victories  had  been  the 
rule,  and  fruitful  ones  the  rare  exception. 

We  do  not  find  much  to  say  in  praise  of  a 
retreat  that  was  nowhere  seriously  molested.  It 
has,  we  know,  been  lauded  as  a  marvel  of  skill. 
Lee's  patience  alone  was  severely  tested.  The 
crossing  of  the  Potomac  was  effected  without 
hjnderance  in  the  presence  of  Meade's  whole  army, 
partly  by  the  bridge  at  Falling  Waters,  partly  by 
the  fords  at  Williamsport.  True,  the  Union  cav 
alry  did  a  great  deal  of  hard  riding  and  scouting ; 
but  it,  too,  failed  to  destroy  Lee's  trains  on  the 
6th,  when  it  was  in  its  power  to  have  done  so,  and, 
in  all  probability,  compelled  his  surrender. 

1  Lee's  cavalry  had  also  left  its  menacing  post  in  the  Union  rear. 

2  It  has  been  claimed  that  the  Union  right  was  too  much  disordered 
for  a  counter-attack,  and  that  one  on  the  left  was  impracticable. 

3  Meade  sent  his  cavalry  out,  not  in  a  body,  but  in  detachments,  on 
the  morning  of  the  4th.      Gregg  was   ordered  to  the  Chambersburg 
road,  Kilpatrick  to  the  Hagerstown,  and  Buford  to  Williamsport,  by  way 


THE   RETREAT  159 

of  Frederick.  Kilpatrick  attacked  and  dispersed  the  small  force  then 
guarding  the  Monterey  Pass  that  evening,  but  no  steps  seem  to  have 
been  taken  for  holding  it,  and  Kilpatrick  therefore  went  on  over  the 
mountains  next  day  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy's  trains.  We  observe,  in 
this  connection,  that  Lee  threw  every  sabre  he  had  into  Meade's  rear  in 
anticipation  of  his  retreat  on  July  3d. 

4  Lee  told  the  officer  in  command  that  he  could  spare  him  all  the 
artillery  he  wanted,  but  no  infantry. 

5  The  Union  cavalry  attacked  this  train  on  the   6th  without  success. 
Had  they  succeeded,  all  of  Lee's  immense  plunder  would  have  fallen 
into  their  hands.     As  it  was,  the  trains  were  got  across  by  a  rope  ferry; 
also  the  four  thousand  Union  prisoners  that  the  army  brought  along 
with  it. 

6  The  corps  trains  had  to  move  with  the  army  mostly. 

7 The  whole  Union  army  did  not  leave  Gettysburg  before  the  morn 
ing  of  the  6th.     The  Confederates  were  then  nearly  up  to  Hagerstown. 

8  French,  it  will  be  remembered,  had  been  ordered  to  hold  Fred 
erick.     He  now  occupied  the  lower  passes  for  which    Meade   was 
making,  so  reinforcing  Meade. 

9  The  infantry  reached   Middletown   on  the  morning  of  the  gih, 
crossed  South  Mountain  that  day,  and  on  the  next  came  in  front  of 
the  enemy's  intrenchments. 

10  The  Confederate   losses    have   been   variously  estimated  all  the 
way  from  twenty  thousand  four  hundred  (total)   to  thirty  thousand 
There  exists  no  accurate  basis  for  a  fair  count.    The  first  figure  is  far  too 
low ;  the  last,  perhaps,  too  high. 


160        THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 


XI 

THINGS    BY  THE   WAY 

THE  battle  of  Gettysburg  has  often  been  called 
the  turning-point  of  the  war  between  the  States. 
It  was  certainly  the  greatest  of  the  many  great 
conflicts  of  that  war  —  the  greatest  exhibition,  we 
will  say,  of  stubborn  fighting.  There,  if  ever,  it 
was  that  Greek  met  Greek.  During  three  swelter 
ing  midsummer  days,  two  numerous,  well-ap 
pointed,  veteran  armies,  ably  led  and  equally 
nerved  to  their  utmost  efforts,  fought  for  the 
mastery  with  equal  resolution  and  bravery.  For 
three  days  the  result  hung  in  suspense.  Through 
all  those  terrible  days  the  battle  constantly  grew 
in  its  proportions  and  intensity.  From  first  to 
last,  until  the  last  gun  was  fired,  the  hush  of 
expectancy  fell  upon  the  land.  It  was  felt  that 
this  battle  must  be  decisive.  On  one  side,  at 
least,  was  the  determination  to  make  it  so.  The 


THINGS  BY  THE  WAY  l6l 

impoverished  Confederacy  was  staking  its  fortunes 
upon  a  last  throw. 

Yet  this  battle  was  singularly  indecisive.  On 
the  first  day  the  Union  forces  suffered  a  serious 
reverse ;  on  the  second  they  narrowly  escaped  a 
defeat ;  but  on  the  third  the  Confederates  were  so 
signally  repulsed  that  nothing  was  left  them  but 
retreat.  This  they  effected  with  boldness  and 
skill,  in  spite  of  the  victors,  in  spite  of  the  ele 
ments  —  in  fine,  in  spite  of  that  fortune  which 
seemed  to  have  turned  against  them  from  the 
moment  of  their  defeat. 

Considered,  then,  only  as  a  battle,  Gettysburg 
was  a  series  of  isolated  combats,  delivered  without 
unity  and  followed  by  no  irremediable  reverse  to 
the  vanquished.  In  no  military  sense,  therefore, 
can  it  be  called  decisive.  In  a  political  sense  it 
was  even  less  so,  because  Lee's  army  was  neither 
destroyed,  nor  were  the  resources  of  the  Confed 
eracy  fatally  crippled.  Rather  was  it  a  trial  of 
strength  between  two  athletes,  one  of  whom,  after 
throwing  the  other,  tells  him  to  get  up  and  go 
about  his  business  —  in  short,  a  mere  pounding 
match. 


1 62  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

Yet  Gettysburg  ought  to  have  been  the  Water 
loo  of  the  Confederacy.  Then  and  there  that 
war  should  have  ended.  To  say  that  the  whole 
country  was  aghast  at  Lee's  escape  would  be  only 
the  plainest  expression  of  the  popular  feeling  of 
the  day.  Naturally  enough  one  great  chorus  of 
disappointment  greeted  its  announcement.  Was 
this  all?  Had  these  two  armies  merely  had  a 
wrestling  match?  Had  Meade  and  Lee  compared 
their  bruises,  only  to  separate  with  the  under 
standing  that  they  would  fight  again  at  some 
future  day  when  both  felt  stronger?  Appar 
ently  the  war  was  no  nearer  its  ending  than 
before.  To  the  common  understanding  it  did 
seem  "  a  most  lame  and  impotent  conclusion." 
If  the  Confederates  could  not  be  crushed  when 
everything  conspired  against  them,  and  in  favor 
of  the  Union  army,  when  would  they  be? 

That  Lee  extricated  his  army  from  its  highly 
dangerous  position  must  no  longer  be  attributed 
to  his  superior  generalship,  we  think,  but  to  the 
want  of  it  on  the  Union  side.  It  is  vain  to  ask 
why  this  or  that  thing  was  not  done,  since  this 
campaign  is  unique  for  its  omissions.  Meade  at 


THINGS   BY  THE  WAY  163 

Gettysburg  was  like  a  man  who  has  been  pushed 
into  a  fight  reluctantly,  and  who  stops  the  mo 
ment  his  adversary  is  down. 

The  history  of  this  battle  is  largely  that  of  the 
two  commanders  and  their  subordinates.  Things 
done  or  left  undone  control  the  destinies  of 
nations  as  well  as  of  individuals.  The  want  of 
cordiality  among  some  of  the  Union  generals  was 
an  incident  of  importance. 

In  arresting  Lee's  triumphal  march,  Meade  had 
undoubtedly  achieved  all  that  the  best-informed 
persons  would  have  asked  of  him  when  he  took 
the  command,  more  perhaps  than  he  allowed  him 
self  to  expect  when  the  magnitude  of  the  task 
first  unfolded  itself  to  his  troubled  vision.  His 
measures  are  so  expressive  of  this  want  of  confi 
dence  that  any  other  conclusion  seems  inadmis 
sible.  Very  sanguine  persons,  indeed,  said  that 
Lee  ought  never  to  return  to  Virginia  except  as  a 
prisoner  of  war.  The  bare  notion  of  a  successful 
invasion  by  seventy  thousand  or  eighty  thousand 
men,  with  one  hundred  thousand  behind  them 
and  the  whole  North  before  them,  was  scouted  as 
a  piece  of  folly  designed  and  put  in  execution 


1 64  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG 

by  madmen.  If  one  hundred  thousand  were  not 
enough,  were  there  not  one  hundred  and  fifty 
thousand  available?  When  Lee  got  to  the  Sus- 
quehanna  these  demands  were  somewhat  lowered. 
They  did  not  know,  these  unreflecting  persons, 
that  what  an  army  wants  is  not  men,  but  a  man 
—  one  man. 

So  far  this  army  had  been  a  school  in  which 
mediocrity  had  risen.  The  really  great  com 
mander  had  not  yet  forced  his  way  to  the  front  in 
spite  of  cabals  in  or  out  of  the  army.  There  had 
been  a  series  of  experiments  —  disastrous  experi 
ments.  No  army  had  ever  marched  more  bravely 
to  defeat  or  so  seldom  to  victory.  Few  expected 
victory  now. 

Yielding  to  an  imperative  order,  Meade  found 
the  Herculean  task  thrust  upon  him,  with  the  fact 
staring  him  in  the  face  that  a  defeated  general 
meant  a  disgraced  one. 

But  even  then  he  did  not  find  himself  free  to 
handle  his  army  as  he  thought  proper,  because  in 
Halleck  he  had  always  a  tutor  and  critic  who 
from  his  easy-chair  in  Washington  assumed  to 
supervise  the  acts  of  the  commander  in  the  field. 


THINGS   BY  THE  WAY  165 

Upon  a  not  over-confident  general  the  effect  was 
especially  pernicious.  The  war-cry  at  Washing 
ton  was,  "  Beat  the  enemy,  but  make  no  mis 
takes  !  "  This  was  constantly  ringing  in  Meade's 
ears.  As  Halleck  was  an  excellent  closet  strate 
gist,  some  of  his  suggestions  would  have  been 
eminently  proper  and  useful,  could  he  have  been 
on  the  spot  himself,  but  under  existing  conditions 
they  could  serve  only  to  make  Meade  still  more 
hesitating  and  timid.  Handled  in  this  way,  no 
army  has  ever  achieved  great  results,  and  no  army 
ever  will  achieve  them. 

At  the  close  of  the  Third  Day's  sanguinary 
encounter  with  Lee,  Meade  had  found  himself 
victorious.  The  fact  that  the  fortune  of  war  had 
thus  placed  the  initiative  in  his  hands  seems  to 
have  become  a  source  of  embarrassment  and  per 
plexity;  from  that  moment  his  acts  became 
timid,  halting,  partial.  When  pressed  to  more 
active  measures  he  flew  into  a  passion. 

The  fault,  as  we  look  at  it,  was  not  so  much  in 
the  commander  as  in  the  man.  Meade  the  com 
mander  could  do  no  more  than  Meade  the  man. 
He  was  no  genius.  He  was  only  a  brave,  method- 


1 66  THE  BATTLE  OF   GETTYSBURG 

ical,  and  conscientious  soldier,  who,  within  his  limi 
tations,  had  acted  well  his  part.  Under  Grant  he 
made  an  excellent  so-called  second  in  command. 

It  has  been  said  that  in  defending  itself  success 
fully,  the  Union  army  had  done  all  that  could  be 
expected,  under  the  circumstances.  Must  we  then 
admit  that  for  Lee  not  to  conquer  was  in  itself  a 
victory?  Unquestionably  there  was  a  prevalent, 
a  somewhat  overshadowing,  feeling  that  all  the  best 
generalship  was  on  the  Confederate  side. 

By  a  sort  of  perversity  of  the  human  mind,  a 
certain  class  of  critics  is  always  found  ready  to 
prove  why  a  beaten  general  is  the  best  general. 

Nevertheless,  Lee  himself  goes  down  in  history 
as  a  general  who  never  won  a  decisive  victory. 

He  was  certainly  lucky  at  Gettysburg.  For  a 
time  his  great  reputation  silenced  the  voice  of 
criticism.  His  own  subordinates  are  now  accusing 
him  of  making  fatal  mistakes.  May  it  not  be 
equally  true  that  Lee  rashly  undertook  more  at 
Gettysburg  than  he  was  able  to  perform?  He  has 
as  good  as  admitted  it.  Carried  away  by  a  first 
success,  he  committed  the  old  mistake  of  under 
rating  his  adversary.  His  victory  of  the  first  day 


THINGS   BY  THE  WAY  1 6? 

was  due  to  no  combinations  of  his  own,  because 
he  was  then  completely  ignorant  -of  where  the 
Federal  army  was.  He  supposed  it  at  least  twenty 
miles  off.  His  success  of  the  second,  again,  arose 
first  out  of  an  entire  misconception  on  his  part 
as  to  the  Union  position,  which  was  nowhere  near 
where  he  thought  it  was,  and  next  from  a  piece  of 
recklessness  on  the  part  of  one  of  the  Union  gen 
erals,  by  which  an  inferior  force  was  again  opposed 
to  a  superior  one.  On  the  third,  he  used  means 
wholly  inadequate  to  the  work  in  hand,  yet  of  his 
own  planning;  and  on  all  three  •  days,  with  the 
field  of  battle  under  his  eye,  little  or  no  manoeu 
vring  for  advantage  of  position,  and  plenty  of  time 
to  look  about  him  in,  he  signally  failed  to  secure 
cooperation  among  his  corps  commanders.  We 
see  no  evidence  here,  we  confess,  of  generalship. 
Indeed,  this  inability  to  make  himself  obeyed  in 
dicates  a  serious  defect  somewhere.  Like  another 
great  but  also  unfortunate  captain,  Lee  might  have 
exclaimed  in  bitterness  of  spirit,  "  Incomprehen 
sible  day !  Concurrence  of  unheard-of  fatalities  ! 
Strange  campaign  when,  in  less  than  a  week,  I 
three  times  saw  assured  victory  escape  from  my 


1 68  THE  BATTLE   OF  GETTYSBURG 

grasp !  And  yet  all  that  skill  could  do  was 
done." 

Gettysburg  made  no  reputations  on  either  side. 
It  may  have  destroyed  some  illusions  in  regard  to 
the  invincibility  of  Confederate  generals.  Meade 
succeeded  because  he  was  able  to  move  troops  to 
threatened  points  more  rapidly  than  his  assailant, 
but  the  battle  was  won  more  through  the  gallantry 
of  the  soldiers  than  by  the  skill  of  their  generals. 
Victory  restored  to  them  their  feeling  of  equality 
—  their  morale.  And  that  was  no  small  thing. 

Considered  with  reference  to  its  political  effect 
upon  the  fortunes  of  the  Confederacy,  not  to  have 
succeeded  was  even  worse  than  not  to  have  tried 
at  all,  since  it  settled  the  question,  once  and  for 
all,  of  achieving  independence  on  Northern  soil. 
Peace  without  submission  was  no  longer  possible, 
because  the  end  was  no  longer  in  doubt.  It  came 
at  last.  And  never  in  the  history  of  the  world,  it 
is  believed,  have  the  victors  shown  such  magna 
nimity  to  the  vanquished. 

THE   END. 


APPENDIX 


ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  AS  IT  FOUGHT 
AT  GETTYSBURG. 


Major-Gen.  GEORGE  G.  MEADE,  Commanding. 
STAFF. 

Major-Gen.  Daniel  Butterfield,  Chief  of  Staff; 
Brig.-Gen.  M.  R.  Patrick,  Provost  Marshal-General; 
Brig.-Gen.  Seth  Williams,  Adjutant-General ;  Brig.- 
Gen.  Edmund  Shriver,  Inspector-General ;  Brig.- 
Gen.  Rufus  Ingalls,  Q.  M.  General ;  Brig.-Gen. 
Gouverneur  K.  Warren,  Chief  of  Engineers  ;  Brig.- 
Gen.  Henry  J.  Hunt,  Chief  of  Artillery ;  Col.  Henry 
F.  Clarke,  Chief  Commissary ;  Major  John  Letter- 
man,  Chief  of  Medical  Department ;  Major  D.  W. 
Flagler,  Chief  Ordnance  Officer;  Capt.  L.  B.  Norton, 
Chief  Signal  Officer. 


I/O  APPENDIX 

FIRST    ARMY    CORPS. 

Major-Gen.  JOHN  F.  REYNOLDS. 

First  Division.  —  Brig. -Gen.  James  S.  Wads- 
worth.  First  Brigade  :  Brig. -Gen.  Solomon  Mere 
dith  ;  Second  Brigade  :  Brig. -Gen.  Lysander  Cutler. 

Second  Division.  —  Brig. -Gen.  John  C.  Robinson. 
First  Brigade  :  Brig.-Gen.  Gabriel  R.  Paul ;  Second 
Brigade:  Brig.-Gen.  Henry  Baxter. 

Third  Division. — Maj.-Gen.  Abner  Doubleday. 
First  Brigade  :  Brig.-Gen.  Thos.  A.  Rowley  ;  Sec 
ond  Brigade:  Col.  Roy  Stone;  Third  Brigade: 
Brig.-Gen.  Geo.  J.  Stannard  ;  Artillery  Brigade : 
Col.  Chas.  S.  Wainwright. 

SECOND    ARMY    CORPS. 

Major-Gen.  WINFIELD  S.  HANCOCK. 

First  Division.  —  Brig.-Gen.  John  C.  Caldwell. 
First  Brigade :  Col.  Edwin  E.  Cross ;  Second 
Brigade  :  Col.  Patrick  Kelly ;  Third  Brigade  : 
Brig.-Gen.  S.  K.  Zook ;  Fourth  Brigade:  Col. 
John  R.  Brooke. 

Second  Division.  —  Brig.-Gen.  John  Gibbon. 
First  Brigade  :  Brig.-Gen.  William  Harrow  ;  Sec 
ond  Brigade:  Brig.-Gen.  Alex.  S.  Webb;  Third 
Brigade:  Col.  Norman  J.  Hall. 


APPENDIX  I/I 

Third  Division.  —  Brig.-Gen.  Alexander  Hays. 
First  Brigade :  Col.  Samuel  S.  Carroll ;  Second 
Brigade  :  Col.  Thomas  A.  Smyth  ;  Third  Brigade  : 
Col.  Geo.  L.  Willard;  Artillery  Brigade:  Capt.  J. 
G.  Hazard. 

THIRD    ARMY   CORPS. 

Major-Gen.  DANIEL  E.  SICKLES. 

First  Division. — Major-Gen.  David  B.  Birney. 
First  Brigade  :  Brig.-Gen.  C.  K.  Graham  ;  Second 
Brigade:  Brig.-Gen.  J.  H.  H.  Ward;  Third 
Brigade:  Col.  Philip  R.  De  Trobriand. 

Second  Division. — Brig.-Gen.  Andrew  A.  Hum 
phreys.  First  Brigade  :  Brig.-Gen.  Joseph  B.  Carr  ; 
Second  Brigade :  Col.  Wm.  R.  Brewster ;  Third 
Brigade:  Col.  Geo.  C.  Burling;  Artillery  Brigade : 
Capt.  Geo.  E.  Randolph. 

FIFTH    ARMY    CORPS. 

Major-Gen.  GEORGE  B.  SYKES. 

First  Division.  —  Brig.-Gen.  James  Barnes. 
First  Brigade  :  Col.  W.  S.  Tilton  ;  Second  Brigade  : 
Col.  J.  B.  Sweitzer;  Third  Brigade:  Col.  Strong 
Vincent. 


1/2  APPENDIX 

Second  Division.  — Brig.-Gen.  Romayn  B.  Ayres. 
First  Brigade :  Col.  Hannibal  Day ;  Second 
Brigade  :  Col.  Sidney  Burbank  ;  Third  Brigade  : 
Brig.-Gen.  S.  H.  Webb. 

Third  Division.  — Brig.-Gen.  S.  Wiley  Crawford. 
First  Brigade:  Col.  Wm.  McCandless ;  Second 
Brigade :  Col.  Joseph  W.  Fisher ;  Artillery 
Brigade :  Capt.  A.  P.  Martin. 


SIXTH    ARMY    CORPS. 

Major-Gen.  JOHN  SEDGWICK. 

First  Division. — Brig.-Gen.  H.  G.  Wright. 
First  Brigade:  Brig.-Gen.  A.  T.  A.  Torbert;  Sec 
ond  Brigade :  Brig.-Gen.  J.  J.  Bartlett ;  Third 
Brigade:  Brig.-Gen.  D.  A.  Russell. 

Second  Division.  —  Brig.-Gen.  A.  P.  Howe.  Sec 
ond  Brigade  :  Col.  L.  A,  Grant ;  Third  Brigade  : 
Brig.-Gen.  T.  H.  Neill. 

Third  Division.  —  Brig.-Gen.  Frank  Wheaton. 
First  Brigade :  Brig.-Gen.  Alex.  Shaler ;  Second 
Brigade:  Col.  H.  L.  Eustis  ;  Third  Brigade  :  Col. 
David  J.  Nevin ;  Artillery  Brigade :  Col.  C.  H. 
Tompkins 


APPENDIX  1/3 

ELEVENTH    ARMY    CORPS. 

Major-Gen.    OLIVER  O.  HOWARD. 

First  Division.  —  Brig.-Gen»  Francis  C.  Barlow. 
First  Brigade :  Col.  Leopold  von  Gilsa ;  Second 
Brigade  :  Brig.-Gen.  Adelbert  Ames. 

Second  Division.  —  Brig.-Gen.  A.  von  Steinwehr. 
First  Brigade  :  Col.  Chas.  R.  Coster ;  Second  Bri 
gade  :  CoL  Orlando  Smith. 

Third  Division.  —  Major-Gen.  Carl  Shurz.  First 
Brigade:  Brig.-Gen.  A.  von  Schimmelpfennig ; 
Second  Brigade :  Col.  Waldimir  Kryzanowski ; 
Artillery  Brigade :  Maj.  Thos.  W.  Osborn. 


TWELFTH     ARMY    CORPS. 

Major-Gen.  HENRY  W.  SLOCUM. 

First  Division.  —  Brig.-Gen.  Alpheus  S.  Will 
iams.  First  Brigade:  Col.  Archibald  L.  Mc- 
Dougall ;  Second  Brigade :  Brig.-Gen.  Henry  H. 
Lockwood  ;  Third  Brigade :  Col.  Silas  Colgrove. 

Second  Division. — Brig.-Gen.  John  W.  Geary. 
First  Brigade:  Col.  Chas.  Candy;  Second  Bri 
gade  :  Col.  Geo.  A.  Cobham,  Jr.  ;  Third  Brigade  : 
Brig.-Gen.  Geo.  S.  Greene;  Artillery  Brigade: 
Lieut.  Edw.  D.  Muhlenberg. 


APPENDIX 


CAVALRY     CORPS. 

Major-Gen.   ALFRED    PLEASONTON. 

First  Division.  —  Brig.  -Gen.  John  BuforcL  First 
Brigade  :  Col.  Wm.  Gamble  ;  Second  Brigade  : 
Col.  Thos.  C.  Devin  ;  Reserve  Brigade:  Brig.  -Gen. 
Wesley  Merritt. 

Second  Division.  —  Brig.-Gen.  D.  McM.  Gregg. 
First  Brigade  :  Col.  J.  B.  Mclntosh  ;  Second  Bri 
gade  :  Col.  Pennock  Huey  ;  Third  Brigade  :  Col. 
J.  I.  Gregg. 

Third  Division.  —  Brig.-Gen.  Judson  Kilpatrick. 
First  Brigade:  Brig.-Gen.  Elon  J.  Farnsworth  ; 
Second  Brigade  :  Brig.-Gen.  Geo.  A.  Custer0 

HORSE     ARTILLERY. 

First  Brigade  :  Capt.  John  M.  Robertson  ;  Second 
Brigade  :  Capt.  John  C.  Tidball. 

ARTILLERY      RESERVE. 

Brig.-Gen.  R.   O.  TYLER. 

First  Regular  Brigade:  Capt.  D.  R.  Ransom; 
First  Volunteer  Brigade:  Lieut.  -Col.  F.  McGil- 
very  ;  Second  Volunteer  Brigade:  Capt.  E.  D. 
Taft  ;  Third  Volunteer  Brigade  :  Capt.  James  F. 
Huntington  ;  Fourth  Volunteer  Brigade  :  Capt. 
R.  H.  Fitzhugh. 


INDEX 


ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMA  follows 
Lee,  39;  order  of  march,  40; 
halts  at  Frederick,  Md.,  40; 
change  of  commanders,  40; 
dangerous  meddling,  41 ;  effect 
on  the  army,  42 ;  its  morale,  43, 
44;  its  efficiency,  note,  45;  in 
march  toward  the  enemy,  49; 
diverging  while  the  enemy  is 
concentrating,  52;  hard  march 
ing,  53  ;  is  badly  scattered,  53  ; 
left  wing  in  a  critical  position, 
54 ;  how  posted  on  June  30,  55  ; 
Buford's  cavalry  engaged  at 
Gettysburg,  62 ;  First  Corps  gets 
up  to  its  support,  63  ;  holds  the 
ground  till  the  Eleventh  arrives, 
68  ;  both  are  defeated,  76 ;  losses, 
77;  reasons  for  defeat,  77;  or 
dered  to  Gettysburg,  85  ;  Twelfth 
Corps  gets  up,  87 ;  also  part  of 
Third,  89;  other  corps,  90; 
strength  of  the  corps,  note,  96; 
as  posted  July  2  on  Cemetery 
Ridge,  98  ;  Third  Corps  move 
ments,  \G\,etseq.;  how  this  corps 
was  formed  to  resist  Lee's  at 
tack,  109  ;  whole  of  the  army  up 
at  last,  109 ;  the  battle  begins, 
112 ;  Sickles'  whole  line  is  driven 
in,  124;  we  hold  Little  Round 
Top,  121 ;  portions  of  the 
Second  and  Fifth  assist  the 
Third ;  they  have  to  fall  back, 
123  ;  other  troops  compel  Long- 
street  to  desist,  125  ;  dispositions 
for  renewing  the  battle,  133,  134  ; 
Gulp's  Hill  attacked,  135  ;  Ewell 


driven  out,  136 ;  sustains  a  ter 
rific  cannonade,  137,  138,  139 ; 
lines  as  formed  to  resist  charge  of 
July  3,  140 ;  the  assault  repulsed, 
143,  et  seq. ;  remains  inactive, 
153;  while  Lee  retreats,  154; 
marches  in  pursuit,  154;  finds 
enemy  in  a  strong  position,  156; 
notes,  159 ;  and  Lee  again  slips 
away,  157;  losses  during  the 
campaign,  157. 

BALTIMORE  alarmed,  note,  45. 

Baltimore  Pike,  cutting  the  Union 
lines,  99. 

Battlefield  Memorial  Association, 
note,  21. 

Buford's  (John)  cavalry  opera 
tions  on  the  left,  40;  riding  to 
Fairfield,  49;  finds  the  enemy, 
54;  is  ordered  to  hold  Gettys 
burg,  55  ;  posts  himself  on  Oak 
Ridge,  61;  fights  till  relieved, 
63 ;  is  sent  off  to  the  rear,  101. 

CAVALRY,  battles  of  July  3d, 
148 ;  operations  during  Lee's 
retreat,  notes,  158. 

Carlisle,  Pa.,  occupied,  29;  evac 
uated,  51. 

Cemetery  Ridge,  described,  15,16; 
becomes  a  rallying-point,  July 
I,  77  ;  situation  afternoon  of  July 
i,  82;  Hancock  renders  it  se 
cure,  87;  described  more  in  de 
tail,  98,  etseq.;  the  enemy  suc 
ceed  in  scaling  it,  July  2, 125, 128; 
but  are  repulsed,  129;  its  ad- 


INDEX 


vantages  for  defence  better 
availed  of,  130. 

Chambersburg,  Pa.,  occupied  by 
Lee's  cavalry,  25 ;  becomes  his 
headquarters,  27. 

Confederate  Army,  The,  eludes 
ours,  note,  32;  and  invades 
Pennsylvania,  23;  its  strength, 
24;  its  composition,  note,  32; 
points  of  superiority,  24,  25  ;  its 
personnel,  26, '27;  at  Chambers- 
burg,  26,  27  ;  moves  to  York  and 
Carlisle,  28  ;  its  spirit,  29 ;  moves 
to  concentrate,  52 ;  its  advance 
upon  Gettysburg  is  disputed,  62 ; 
finally  defeats  the  forces  op 
posed  to  it,  69,  et  seq.;  losses, 
note,  80 ;  all  but  one  division  up 
night  of  July  i,  91 ;  how  formed, 
note,  no;  the  attack  on  Sickles, 
115;  Sickles  defeated,  123; 
Longstreet's  losses,  125  ;  Ceme 
tery  Ridge  reached  by  Hill's 
troops,  125  ;  Ewell  gains  a  foot 
hold  at  Gulp's  Hill,  126;  advan 
tage  to  the  Confederates,  127 ; 
position  at  close  of  the  day,  note, 
131 ;  Ewell  expelled  from  Gulp's 
Hill,  136;  cannonades  Union 
position,  137 ;  final  attack  re 
pulsed,  141,  et  seq.;  evacuates 
Gettysburg,  150;  getting  ready 
to  retreat,  150 ;  retreat  effected, 
157  ;  losses,  note,  159. 

Gulp's  Hill,  its  relation  to  Ceme 
tery  Hill,  19 ;  occupied  by  Union 
troops,  84 ;  made  secure,  87 ; 
enemy  gain  a  lodgment  at,  126 ; 
retaken,  136. 

Cumberland  Valley,  route  of  Lee's 
invasion,  23 ;  exodus  from,  34. 

Curtin,  A.  G.,  his  efforts  to  meet 
the  invasion,  36. 

DEVIL'S  DEN,  The,  situation  of, 
20 ;  surroundings,  note,  22 ; 
struggle  for  its  possession,  115, 
116,  117 ;  in  the  enemy's  hands, 
note,  131. 


EARLY'S  (J.  E.)  operations 
around  York,  28 ;  as  a  blind, 
note,  33 ;  recalled  to  Gettys 
burg,  52;  his  arrival  decides  the 
day,  73,  76 ;  assaults  Cemetery 
Hill,  July  2,  128;  but  is  forced 
out,  129. 

Emmettsburg  Road,  described,  21 ; 
picketed  by  Union  troops,  88 ; 
its  relation  to  the  hostile  armies, 
99 ;  becomes  a  point  of  direc 
tion  for  Longstreet's  attack,  114. 

Ewell's  Confederate  corps  at 
Chambersburg,  26 ;  moves  on 
to  Carlisle  and  York,  28  ;  moves 
to  Gettysburg  and  decides  the 
first  of  July,  69,  et  seq. ;  but  hes 
itates  to  attack  Cemetery  Hill. 
81. 

FREDERICK,  Md.,  becomes  the 
pivot  for  the  Union  army,  40. 

GETTYSBURG,  described,  10,  n; 
its  strategic  value,  13,  14,  15,  et 
seq. ;  its  topography,  15,  16,  et 
seq.  ;  Cemetery  Ridge,  16 ;  Sem 
inary  Ridge,  17;  commanding 
points,  19,  20 ;  Cemetery  Ridge 
as  a  defensive  line,  20;  notes  i, 
2,  and  3,  p.  21 ;  memorials  of 
battle,  note,  21 ;  first  appearance 
of  Confederates  in,  28  ;  and  note, 
33  ;  Lee's  whole  army  marching 
to,  52 ;  Union  forces  approach 
ing,  55 ;  how  and  where  the 
battle  began,  see  Chap.  V., 
p.  60 ;  in  first  day's  conflict,  60, 
et  seq. ,'  occupied  by  Ewell,  78  ; 
evacuated,  150. 

Great  Round  Top,  how  situated, 
19. 

HANCOCK,  Winfield  S.,  organizing 
victory  from  defeat,  81,  82,  83; 
orders  Gulp's  Hill  occupied,  84; 
his  report  to  Meade,  85  ;  note,  95  ; 
sends  Geary's  division  to  Little 
Round  Top,  88. 


INDEX 


1/7 


Harrisburg  alarmed,  25 ;  enemy 
near  it,  29 ;  the  panic  at,  34,  et 
seq. ;  militia  ordered  to,  37 ; 
narrow  escape  of,  50. 

Heth's  (Harry)  Confederate  divi 
sion  approaches  Gettysburg 
first,  52;  encounters  Buford's 
cavalry,  62;  brings  on  battle 
of  July  i,  63 ;  sustains  a  check, 
66;  Fender,  Rodes,  and  Early 
come  to  his  aid,  69,  75 ;  takes 
part  in  the  famous  charge  of 
July  3,  140,  141. 

Hood,  John  B.,  marches  into 
Chambersburg,  26,  27  ;  attacks 
the  Union  left,  July  2d,  114;  is 
wounded,  115;  his  attack 
checked,  117;  Union  cavalry  in 
his  rear,  148. 

Hooker's  (Joseph)  plan  of  cam 
paign,  40;  objections  to,  note, 
45  ;  is  superseded,  40. 

Howard,  Oliver  O.,  takes  com 
mand  at  Gettysburg,  70 ;  calls  in 
vain  for  help,  70,  71. 

LEE,  Robert  E.,  his  ascend 
ancy  over  his  troops,  29 ;  por 
trait  of,  30 ;  wants  his  cavalry 
badly,  38  ;  feels  what  it  is  to  be 
in  an  enemy's  country,  39 ;  plans 
thwarted  by  Meade,  50 ;  decides 
to  cross  South  Mountain  and 
give  battle,  50 ;  note,  59  ;  orders 
all  corps  to  Gettysburg,  51 ; 
steals  a  march  on  Meade,  53; 
at  Gettysburg,  81 ;  decides  to 
attack,  91 ;  Longstreet  to  turn 
Union  left,  94 ;  the  plan  in  de 
tail,  105,  106;  determines  to 
renew  the  battle,  133 ;  reinforces 
Ewell,  133;  orders  Longstreet 
to  assault  Cemetery  Ridge,  134 ; 
sends  off  his  wounded,  153  ;  fol 
lows  with  his  army,  154 ;  gets  to 
the  Potomac  before  he  can  be 
intercepted,  156 ;  and  crosses  to 
Virginia  safely,  157. 

Little    Round    Top,   its    position 


and  appearance,  19;  note,  22; 
Hancock  causes  its  occupation, 
88  ;  is  abandoned,  98  ;  is  about 
to  fall  into  the  enemy's  hands, 
115;  troops  brought  up  to  it, 
119,  120;  conflict  for  its  posses 
sion,  120,  121 ;  Union  troops 
remain  masters,  121. 

Longstreet,  James,  opposes  Lee's 
purpose,  91 ;  is  ordered  to  begin 
the  attack  of  July  2,  105 ;  gets 
into  position,  106;  as  a  fighter, 
106,  107 ;  method  of  attacking 
Sickles,  114,  115 ;  is  successful 
here,  but  halts  before  the  main 
position,  125. 

Lutheran  Church  a  hospital,  22. 

Lutheran  Seminary,  its  situation, 
17  ;  Union  troops  make  a  stand 
there,  77. 

McLAWS,  (Lafayette)  Confeder 
ate  division  attacks  Sickles,  July 
2,  117. 

Meade,  George  G.,  takes  com 
mand,  42 ;  his  qualifications,  43 ; 
divining  Lee's  intentions,  47, 
48  ;  discards  Hooker's  plan,  48  ; 
his  own,  49  ;  transfers  his  base  to 
Westminster,  49;  relieves  Har 
risburg  and  York,  51 ;  his  per 
plexities,  51 ;  is  outmanoeuvred, 
53;  learns  that  Lee  is  moving 
to  the  east  of  South  Mountain, 
55;  but  holds  his  purpose  of 
concentrating  at  Big  Pipe  Creek, 
57  ;  learns  of  the  defeat  at  Gettys 
burg  and  sends  Hancock  there 
with  full  powers,  70 ;  decides  to 
fight  at  Gettysburg,  85 ;  though 
the  chances  are  against  him,  90; 
gets  to  the  field,  94;  designs  at 
tacking  Lee  himself,  97;  post 
ing  his  troops,  98;  depressed 
by  the  results  of  July  2  he 
calls  a  council  of  war  which 
decides  to  fight  it  out,  132; 
sends  troops  to  retake  Gulp's 
Hill,  133;  starts  his  cavalry  on 


1/8 


INDEX 


reconnoisances,  note,  158;  his 
indecision,  151 ;  follows  Lee  to 
the  Potomac,  155. 

NATIONAL  CEMETERY,  Account 
of,  note,  21. 

OAK  RIDGE,  Buford's  cavalry 
defends  it,  62,  63 ;  see  Chap.  V. 

PENNSYLVANIA  invaded,  23 ;  first 
effects  of,  34,  et  seq. 

Philadelphia  during  the  invasion, 
note,  45. 

Pickett's  (Geo.  E.)  Confederate 
division  ordered  to  charge 
Cemetery  Ridge,  134;  it  ad 
vances,  141 ;  is  cannonaded, 
142;  but  keeps  on,  143;  is  at 
tacked  in  flank,  143,  144;  en 
counters  a  terrible  musketry 
fire,  144;  breaks  through  the 
Union  line,  146;  is  destroyed, 
147 ;  his  losses  suppressed,  157. 

Pittsburgh,  Defensive  works  at, 
note,  45. 

REYNOLDS,  John  F.,  commands 
Union  left  wing,  54;  orders 
Buford  to  hold  Gettysburg,  55  ; 
orders  up  his  troops  and  hastens 
there  himself,  62 ;  is  killed  while 
posting  his  soldiers,  64;  his  fall 
a  misfortune,  64,  73. 

Rock  Creek,  its  position  on  the 
field,  19. 

SEMINARY  RIDGE  described,  17. 


SHERFY'S  PEACH  ORCHARD,  89, 

103,  104;  is  occupied  by  the 
Third  Union  Corps,  108 ;  not 
strong  enough  to  cover  the 
ground,  109;  note,  no;  is  at 
tacked,  118;  is  carried,  122; 
note,  130. 

Sickles,  Daniel  E.,  101 ;  feels  the 
enemy  on  his  front,  104;  finds 
him  extending  his  right,  104; 
determines  to  move  his  corps 
out  to  the  Peach  Orchard,  105 ; 
his  attitude  toward  the  general 
commanding,  107,  108 ;  notes, 
in  ;  is  attacked,  112;  wounded, 

122. 

South  Mountain  assumes  the  first 

strategic  importance,  39 ;  masks 

Lee's  movements,  50. 
Stuart's   (J.   E.  B.)    Confederate 

cavalry  operations,  note,  32;  is 

cut  off  from  Lee,  38. 
Swale,  The,  its  situation,  20. 


WARREN,  Gouverneur   K.,  sees 

the  peril  of  Little  Round  Top 

and  saves  it,  119. 
Westminster,   Pa.,  as  base  of  the 

Union  army,  49. 
Wheat-field,  Combat  at  the,  July 

2,  117, 123. 
Willoughby  Run,  61;  see  Chap. 


YORK,  Pa.,  occupied  by  Confed 
erates,  28 ;  evacuated,  51. 


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